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



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
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
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
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THE CONGREGATIONAL LECTURE
FOR 1854.

Psychology and Theology.

BY RICHARD ALLIOTT, LL.D.

LONDON:
REED AND PARDON, PRINTERS,
PATEBNOSTER ROW.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THEOLOGY:

OR,

PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO THE INVESTIGATION OF
QUESTIONS RELATING TO

RELIGION, NATURAL THEOLOGY, AND REVELATION.

BY RICHARD ALLIOTT, LL.D.,

PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY AND MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, WESTERN COLLEGE,
PLYMOUTH.

LONDON:

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P R E F A C E.

SEVERAL very important topics have been discussed in the "Congregational Lectures" of past years, and those lectures as a whole are so valuable, that the authors of succeeding courses cannot but feel it a difficult task to preserve the reputation which the series has hitherto sustained.

With this conviction, I have used my best efforts to produce a work worthy to stand by the side of its predecessors. I am aware that the theme of the present course will not be so attractive to the public at large as some preceding ones, there being perhaps no science more generally neglected than Psychology. Still it will be felt to be important by thinking men, and especially in relation to many of the controversies of the present day.

The design of the course is explained in the Introductory Lecture. It is to show the relation of Psychology to Religion, Theology, and Revelation, and to discuss, with its assistance, those questions, in reference to them, which are important either in themselves or

in consequence of the controversies to which they have given rise.

Questions in reference to religion are first discussed. Some may think that, as the being and attributes of God and the Divine origin of Christianity are pre-supposed by religion, it would have been most natural to have deferred what related to the latter, till the former topics had been disposed of. When, however, it is remembered that the different topics are introduced *in consequence of their relation to psychology*, it will be perceived that there is a reason for beginning with what concerns the subjective experience, that having naturally a closer relation to the science of mind than what refers merely to the objective.

In discussing questions relating to religion, I have confined my attention to two—one, whether religion is the offspring of a distinct mental faculty; and the other, whether the will (which must have to do with its production) be a self-determining power.

Proceeding to questions in Natural Theology, I have inquired what is our idea of God, how this idea is gained, and what proof we have of the objective reality of his existence?

In reference to Christianity, I have asked whether supernatural communications from God are possible; whether such communications are necessarily restricted, either as to their subject-matter or the mode in which they may be made; what evidence will suffice to prove that a supernatural communication is from God, and

therefore authoritative; and whether we have such evidence of the Divine origin of Christianity?

Finally, the questions are investigated, whether, on the supposition that Christianity is of God, the New Testament gives us a fallible or an infallible representation of it; and whether, if infallible, it is necessarily without any admixture of what is merely human?

Many of these questions, it will be perceived, have special reference to the controversies of the day. Hence the discussion of them will not be considered inopportune. A few years ago it would scarcely have been thought necessary to have adduced any argument in proof of the existence and perfections of God, but recent controversies have proved that Christians must be prepared to give a reason for their faith even in this foundation truth. And perhaps at no time, in the history of the Church, has it been more necessary than now to investigate the origin of Christianity and the inspiration of Holy Writ.

A brief view of Psychology is necessary to enable some of my readers to follow my reasoning. I have therefore, in Appendix A, given a short description of that science. Moreover, having, in the Sixth Lecture, had occasion to treat of the foundation of virtue, and the origin of our moral notions, I have thought it desirable, with the view of making my argument clearer, to add a brief statement of my ethical opinions. This will be found in Appendix B.

Some of my ministerial friends will, I have no doubt,

disagree with me in some points. Whilst Congregationalists are, I believe, one on all essential truths, there are comparatively minor ones on which they regard it as no infringement either of brotherly love or denominational unity to entertain and to express different views. I am sure that all, whether their opinions may harmonize with my own or not, will read with candour, and will join me in the prayer that whatever, in these Lectures, is accordant with truth may be blessed of God to the promotion of his glory and the good of our fellow men.

RICHARD ALLIOTT.

Plymouth, Nov. 25, 1854.

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of interesting importance, not included within the ordinary range of pulpit instruction. To illustrate the evidence and importance of the great doctrines of Revelation; to exhibit the true principles of philology in their application to such doctrines; to prove the accordancy and identity of genuine philosophy with the records and discoveries of Scripture; and to trace the errors and corruptions which have existed in the Christian Church to their proper sources, and, by the connection of sound reasoning with the honest interpretation of God's holy Word, to point out the methods of refutation and counteraction, are amongst the objects for which "the Congregational Lecture" has been established. The arrangements made with the Lecturers are designed to secure the publication of each separate course, without risk to the Authors; and, after remunerating them as liberally as the resources of the Institution will allow, to apply the profits of the respective publications in aid of *the Library*. It is hoped that the liberal, and especially the opulent, friends of Evangelical and Congregational Nonconformity, will evince, by their generous support, the sincerity of their attachment to the great principles of their Christian profession; and that some may be found to emulate the zeal which established the "Boyle," the "Warburton," and the "Bampton" Lectures in the National Church. These are legitimate operations of the "voluntary principle" in the support of religion, and in perfect harmony with the independency of our Churches, and the spirituality of the kingdom of Christ.

The Committee deem it proper to state that, whatever responsibility may attach either to the reasonings or opinions advanced in any Course of Lectures belongs exclusively to the Lecturer.

CONGREGATIONAL LIBRARY,
Blomfield Street, Finsbury, August, 1836.

**** The present volume forms the commencement of a New Series in a smaller size. A list of the fifteen volumes already published, will be found at the end of this work.*

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PSYCHOLOGY

APPLIED TO RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND REVELATION.

LECTURE I.

INTRODUCTORY.

[The object of this Lecture is to show that a relation exists between psychology and the sciences of religion, of God, and of revelation.]

MANY valuable treatises have been published exhibiting the relation of physical science to theology. Their object has been to show how the truths which science has elicited develop the power, the wisdom, and the goodness of God. A similar use has been made of mental science, though the subject admits of fuller illustration than it has yet received. The human mind might be so analyzed as to exhibit, far beyond any material structure, the attributes of the Creator. Such, however, is not my purpose in the present Course of Lectures. My object is rather, after showing that psychology is intimately related to investigations respecting religion, natural theology, and revelation, to use the aid it affords in discussing some of the most interesting and controverted points pertaining to these all-important topics. That the science

of mind is related to the investigations referred to, may not be immediately obvious, and hence it will prepare the way for what is to follow, if I previously show what its relations to them are.

We will, then, first inquire what are the relations of mental science to *religion*. I need not say that religion and theology are two things—the former an experience, the latter a knowledge. As, however, our inward experience, as well as objective truth, may be made the object of scientific investigation, there is the science as well as the experience of religion, and it is with the science that we have now to do. That the science of mind must comprehend the science of every particular experience of mind, and therefore of its religious experience, is too obvious to need proof; but it may be shown that the science of religious experience is not simply thus a part and parcel of the science of mind, but that it is so intimately connected with every other part, that it is only when the whole science is studied, that the religious experience can be scientifically understood.

Some, indeed, maintain that the religious capacity or susceptibility is something essentially distinct from every other mental capacity and susceptibility; but even on the supposition that this is the case, it must be admitted that the religious capacity or susceptibility could not exist alone; that on the contrary there are several general mental capacities or susceptibilities which are essential conditions of its existence. If so, as the knowledge of the essential prerequisites to the existence of a thing must be included in the full knowledge of the thing, a knowledge of those general mental powers and susceptibilities, without which a religious capacity or

susceptibility could not possibly exist, or at least could never be developed, must be requisite in order to a scientific knowledge of the capacity or susceptibility referred to.

Besides, not only does the religious capacity or susceptibility, presuming it to be a distinct power, presuppose some general mental powers, but there is reason to believe that it differs, if not in its own nature, at least in its capability of development, accordingly as the general mental powers are stronger or weaker. It must be admitted that differences do exist in the actually developed religion of different individuals, and often indeed of the same individual at different periods of his life. Parties have been known to manifest true religion at one period of their lives, and yet to manifest it in far deeper intensity at another period ; and still more marked differences have been manifested in the religion of different men. But grant that there are differences in the actual development of religion, and it follows, that religion exists in some cases in a higher degree of intensity than the lowest form of its possible development. Whatever the cause of such difference may be, it must be allowed that if any development of religion necessarily presupposes some general mental power, a higher development will necessitate a proportionately higher amount of general mental power : without, then, affirming that the lowest mental power found amongst men is insufficient for the highest actual religious development, it would appear probable that where there was higher general mental power, there would be a capacity for a higher development of the religious faculty or susceptibility.

But may we not go further than this ? Does not the religious history of mankind decidedly *prove* that there

is a greater capability for religion where there is greater general intellectual power? I admit that it is possible to point to two men, one of them characterized by the highest intellectual powers and the deepest sensibilities, the other by an unusually low grade of intellect and sensibility, whose religion appears to be in an inverse ratio to their mental power. Many such cases exist. Some men of powerful intellect are altogether destitute of religion, and, on the other hand, many weak-minded men exhibit piety worthy of high admiration. But let me observe, that such instances have no force as an argument, except it could be shown that the religious capacity or susceptibility bore a like proportion in the two cases to the religion actually manifested. So far, however, from this being *à priori* probable, is it not likely that the religious as well as every other capacity of the mind often exists when it is either only partially developed, or perhaps even altogether undeveloped? To argue then fairly from example, we must take two cases, in both of which the religious capacity appears fully developed—not take from the higher class of mind a man whose religion is weaker than that of many of his fellows, and from a lower class of mind a man whose religion is unusually strong—but take from both classes the individuals characterized by the highest amount of religious intensity. By such instances I am willing to abide, and entertain no doubt that, however intense we should find the religion of the weak-minded man, and that however worthy it would render him of our high esteem, that of the man of superior mental power would be perceived to be far before it in real value, indicating that the religious capacity is proportionate to the intellectual powers and susceptibilities with which the mind

is endowed. But if so, not only will it be important to the thorough acquisition of the science of religion to be well acquainted with those general mental powers, without which religious experience would be an impossibility, but with the differences of mental power which permit differences of development in the experience of religion.

There is still a further reason why mental science will be conducive to the science of religion. The latter science does not simply involve a knowledge of every thing pre-essential to the existence of religion, or to differences in the religious development; but also a knowledge of the influence which developed religion produces on all the powers of the mind. In order to this knowledge, however, there must evidently be a knowledge of the powers operated upon; we cannot scientifically understand the action of one power on another, if we have no scientific knowledge of the power on which the action is produced. Even then, if the religious power or susceptibility was not only distinct from every other mental power and susceptibility, but could be developed independently, we must still have a knowledge of mind generally, in order to understand a religious experience, which of necessity includes the action of religion on all the mental powers and susceptibilities. How can we possibly understand the inward working of religion, unless we have a knowledge of the mental powers on which it acts, and which it subjugates and uses for its own purposes?

I have, in the preceding reasoning, argued on the supposition, that the religious capacity, or susceptibility, is something essentially distinct from every other mental capacity and susceptibility. I do not, however, grant that this is the case. I hope to be able, hereafter, to

prove the contrary ; and if I succeed, if I show that the religious capacity or susceptibility, instead of being an original and independent power, arises entirely from, and is wholly dependent upon, the general powers and susceptibilities of the mind ; it must be still more evident that the science of mind is essential to the science of religion. We undoubtedly can have no scientific knowledge of a power or susceptibility, which arises from a combination of various powers and susceptibilities, except we understand the powers and susceptibilities the combination of which is its producing cause. Besides, on the supposition that the religious capacity is not a distinct power, there is the same necessity as on the contrary supposition, to be well acquainted with the mental powers on which it acts, in order to have a scientific knowledge of its actual working ; for even if it arise from the combined influence of all the mental faculties, it will re-act on those faculties as soon as it is properly developed.

Whether, then, we take the supposition that the religious faculty is an original power, or take the contrary supposition, mental science is necessary to the science of religion.

I may, however, add, that the question, whether the religious capacity or susceptibility be an original and distinct power, cannot be disregarded by the individual who would scientifically understand religion ; and if not, how, let me ask, can that question be studied, except with the aid of mental science ? The man who has never studied the human mind, who has never analyzed it, who has never investigated its faculties, is utterly incompetent for the inquiry, whether the religious, or any other faculty, be original and distinct, or the contrary.

These remarks will, I trust, have made it plain to all, that there is an intimate and inseparable connexion between psychology and the science of religion. At the same time, there is one objection, which some may feel in reference to the conclusion at which we have arrived, and it may, therefore, be desirable to notice it before we proceed. It is this: that as a man utterly ignorant of mental science may experience religion in its fullest intensity, and must know what he himself experiences, there evidently may be the knowledge of the highest religious experience, where mental science has never been studied.

In reply, I do not deny that such a man has some kind of knowledge of religion; but the question with which we have now to do is, whether he has a scientific knowledge. I need not remark, that the experience of a mental state, and such knowledge of it as is the necessary consequence of the experience, is one thing, and a scientific acquaintance with it, a completely different thing; if it were not, as every man has a mind, the science of mind must be common to all. To understand scientifically our mental states, we must not only have the knowledge which experience forces upon us, but that which results from careful reflection; nor is it even sufficient that we examine such mental states as wholes; if we would know them scientifically, we must analyze them, and ascertain the relations in which they stand to other mental states, and to everything objective. But such a knowledge of his own religious experience no man has, who has paid no attention to mental science.

Having thus shown that there is a relation between mental science and that of subjective religion, I proceed

to show that there is a relation between the science of mind and the science of God.

I need not say that the existence of a personal God is the foundation fact of all theology. If there be no God, there cannot possibly be any true science of God ; if the supposition of a God is a delusion, theology, whatever be its form, is a mistake and a deception. Accordingly, the possibility of a true theology depends, primarily, on the question, whether God exists. To solve satisfactorily this question, we must ask, first, what are the essential elements of our idea of God ; and, secondly, whether we have any ground for believing that a Being actually exists, whose nature corresponds to that idea, so far as its essential elements are concerned? But we cannot begin to investigate questions such as these, without discovering an intimate relation between mental science and the science of God. Thus, when we inquire what are the essential elements of our idea of God, we have a question before us which pertains as much to the science of mind, as it does to theology. To ascertain what our ideas are, to resolve them into their elements ; to ascertain which of these elements are essential, and which adventitious, is the proper business of a mental philosopher. Nay, so necessary here is psychology to theology, that independently of the fact, that the particular inquiry is itself psychological, we should be unfitted to pursue such an investigation, except the study of mind had habituated us to similar researches ; we must, for example, reflect before we can accurately ascertain what our idea of God is, but reflection is an exercise to which the man who has never studied himself is unaccustomed, and for which he will, consequently, feel himself unadapted : moreover, we must analyze in order to understand our

idea of God, and especially in order to resolve it into its elements; but will not he, who, never having studied his own mind, finds reflection difficult, find mental analysis a still greater difficulty? To analyze successfully any mental power, operation, or idea, requires a practice in mental analyzation, which is the distinguishing characteristic of the mental philosopher alone. Nay, to ascertain the essential elements of our idea of God, not only must the general idea be ascertained and analyzed, but we must separate from it everything adventitious: but how is this to be done, till it is ascertained, either from a comparison of their relative importance, or from a discovery of their sources, which of the parts are, and which are not, essential? But if to reflect and to analyze mind belong to a mental philosopher, it is, if possible, still more distinctively his work to compare ideas, or any of their elements, and to trace them to their origin: this is a work for which a man will evidently be utterly unqualified who has never studied psychology.

If, then, in order scientifically to ascertain that God exists, we must first discover what are the essential elements of our idea of God, it is very plain that thus far there exists an important relation between mental science and the science of God. Nor is the relation less clear when we come to the inquiry, for which the preceding one is merely preparatory, viz.:—Whether, after we have stripped our idea of God of everything non-essential, we have any satisfactory ground for believing that a Being really exists whose nature corresponds to it. Such an investigation leads us again into the realms of mental science, for in pursuing it we must trace the idea to its origin, in order that we may ascertain whether its origin renders it worthy of credence.

Different origins have been assigned to our idea of God; some regard it as a mere creation of our own minds; others as a supernatural communication; others again as innate; whilst a fourth class believe it to be received from direct intuition of the objective reality; and a fifth, that it is immediately acquired by the exercise of the powers of the understanding on the phenomena within and without us.

If the idea can possibly be a creation of the human mind, its existence could be no evidence of a corresponding objective reality; what we create has a subjective origin, and may have no other than a subjective existence. Such an origin of the idea of God would not, indeed, demonstrate his non-existence, but it would be perfectly compatible with it. It is, therefore, important in an inquiry into the objective reality of the Divine existence, to investigate the question, whether our idea of God can possibly be the offspring of the creative powers of the human mind? But I need scarcely say, that it would be impossible to pursue such an investigation as this without the help of mental science. It is from mental science that we must learn the limits of the powers possible to man, and hence it is from this science that we must learn the limits of the possible extent of our creative powers.

Another conceivable source of the idea is a supernatural communication. To prevent misapprehension, let me remark, that by a supernatural communication, I mean simply a communication made in a supernatural way: whatever communication is made to us in accordance with the known laws of nature, be its source what it may, we call natural; but any communication made to us contrary to the known laws of nature, we

call supernatural. If, then, God, in opposition to the ordinary laws of his operations, were to make a direct communication to the human intellect for the purpose of imparting to us knowledge, which, without such special interference, would be beyond our reach ; or if, for the same purpose, he were specially to endow an individual with a mental power which did not belong to his nature, or even specially to elevate a natural power beyond its natural strength, the knowledge so acquired, we should, according to the preceding explanation of our present use of the word, represent as attributable to a supernatural origin.

I shall not now inquire whether, if it could be proved that the idea of God was thus owing to a supernatural source, this would, of itself, be sufficient evidence of the objective reality of the Divine existence. Whether it would or not, the prior questions must first be solved, viz. : Whether the idea can possibly be owing to such a source, and whether, if it can, and is owing to such a source, the fact is ascertainable by us ; but the solution of these questions requires the aid of mental science. In investigating the first, the fact must be taken into account, that the idea is one which, if it had in the first, or in other instances, a supernatural origin, is not universally owing to such an origin, it being evidently impossible, in the sense in which we are using the word "supernatural," that a supernatural communication should be universal, since whatever is received in the same way by every man, cannot but be presumed to be so received by a law of his nature. On the hypothesis of a supernatural origin, however, the idea is one which is beyond the reach of the human faculties, and hence, in order to decide the possibility of such an origin,

the question arises, whether the idea, after being supernaturally received, could possibly be communicated from man to man. But this is a question of mental science; we must study mind,—inquire into its powers of receiving knowledge, or we cannot arrive at the conclusion which the mental philosopher regards as indubitable—that if there be any idea which, in its primary elements, is beyond the reach of the natural powers of man, it would be as impossible for a person, to whom it was supernaturally communicated, to communicate it to another, as it would be to communicate the idea of colour to a man born blind.

Even, however, if we grant that the idea of God may possibly have a supernatural origin, the question still remains, whether, if this be its source, the fact is ascertainable by us. Here, as before, the circumstances of the case must be considered; there is certainly no direct proof that any one of our ideas is to be ascribed primarily to a supernatural source, and, therefore, we could have no other evidence in reference to the idea in question than what might arise from finding that it could not be otherwise accounted for. But the inquiry whether this is the case is one which cannot be successfully conducted without the aid of mental science: unless we have studied mind, and fully investigated the natural sources of its ideas, and unless we have perceived how mind can analyze and recompose the ideas it receives from these sources, we shall be incompetent to decide the question, whether the idea of God is one which cannot be naturally accounted for. Ignorance is a fruitful source of error; and ignorance of mental science may have led some to attribute to the supernatural, what a little deeper insight

into the human mind would have taught them was perfectly natural.

But there are some who maintain that the idea of God is innate; in other words, that it is in some way so inwrought into our nature, as only to require appropriate circumstances in order to its development. If this could be proved, there could be no reasonable doubt that God himself was its true author, because, on the supposition that he exists, and that we owe our being to him, what is inwrought in our nature must be his work; whereas, on any other supposition, the fact that such an idea was inwrought in our original constitution, would not only be unaccountable, but unnatural. We cannot, then, pass over the question as unimportant; and this, let me add, not only because if the idea can be shown to be innate, shall we thus find a probable solution to the inquiry whether God exists; but even if it can be shown that the idea is not innate, we shall have advanced somewhat towards ascertaining the true origin of the idea; for the field of investigation will not only thus far be narrowed, but the discussion will be not without its use in reference to the question, to what remaining part of the field we are to look for the source of which we are in search. But need I say that the inquiry, whether we have an idea of God which is in any sense innate, is one of the chief problems of mental science, and is one which cannot be successfully solved without the previous study of several questions pertaining to the philosophy of the human mind; for how could we ascertain what was sufficient evidence of an idea being inwrought in our nature, or what was evidence to the contrary, till we had studied our nature? Nor could we ascertain whether, what,

supposing it could in no other way be accounted for, might be regarded as originally inwrought in our nature, was really attributable to this cause, except we had first discovered from an examination into the effects produced on mind by various causes, both what circumstances would suffice, provided an idea were inwrought in our nature to occasion its development, and also under what circumstances it might be possible for an idea to be really inwrought in our nature, and yet to continue undeveloped.

Direct intuition of Deity is another supposed origin of the idea of God. There are those who maintain that we have a power of intuition transcending that of sense, by means of which we are able, so to speak, to gaze immediately on God, and to this power they attribute our idea of Deity. As we have the idea of an external world, because our senses give us the intuition of it, so they think we have the idea of God, because we have a higher power of intuition by which we directly perceive him. Grant this, and our idea, except the supposed power deceives us, must be traceable to his immediate presence, and therefore to his real existence. Hence, if we find that our idea of God is not innate, we ought to inquire whether it results from this supposed power of supersensual intuition. Here, however, we have no need to investigate the possibility of our possessing an undeveloped power of the kind spoken of, for our inquiry is not as to the origin of some idea which is merely possible to us, but that of an idea which we actually possess. At the same time, we cannot decide whether the idea, which we now possess of God, be owing to immediate intuition, by taking at once for granted, that because our first impressions in relation to our past experience may be op-

posed to the supposition that we have any such intuition, our experience is a witness against it. If we have a power of intellectual intuition, it differs so completely in nature from that of sensual intuition that it would be premature to conclude that we have had no experience of an intellectual intuition, merely because we have had no experience of such an intuition which at all resembles an intuition of sense. Accordingly we cannot study the subject satisfactorily unless we have so far investigated psychological questions as to know what those philosophers really mean by an intellectual intuition, who have expressed their belief that the power referred to belongs to human nature; nor, having done so, can we decide the point without diving into the depths of our past experience, and making the most vigorous efforts to discover what is furthest removed from sense and from cursory observation.

Other philosophers believe that we have no *immediate* perception of God; but yet that we have intellectual powers, by means of which we may gain a *mediate* perception of him, through his works; and they hold, that in this way our idea of God may be fully accounted for. According to them, we are endowed with mental powers, which enable us to discover enough of ourselves, and of the external world around us, to satisfy us that neither can have eternally existed, and which warrant the inference, that they must be effects of the exercise of some prior power. And they believe that the mental powers, which can thus discover the existence of a cause prior to all the phenomena of which we are conscious, are sufficient to enable us to ascertain, from the character of the effects produced by it, something of the nature and character of the cause to which they are

attributable. Now, supposing, that after investigation we are compelled to agree with these philosophers, we shall not only arrive at the goal of which we have been in quest; but what is of equal importance, provided this is the true path to that goal, shall not be in danger of supposing that our idea of God is characterized by a perfection, which, in such a case, it does not, and cannot, possess, since in that case it is plainly one which, by the diligent application of our mental powers, may be illimitably extended, and may be purged of that in it which, when first received, rendered it partial and erroneous. But what an extensive field of research does the thorough investigation of such a doctrine as this, respecting the origin of the idea of God, open up to us, and a field, in every part of which we shall be compelled to resort to the help of mental science!

At the very entrance, not only does the question present itself,—What reason have we for believing in our own existence?—a question, to which, perhaps, none but the mental philosopher could give a scientific reply; but the more difficult question—What reason have we for believing in the existence of an external world?—one which cannot be satisfactorily answered, without investigating one of the most important problems of the science of mind, viz., whether our perception of the world, without us, be mediate or immediate;—for if it be only mediate, in other words, if what we directly perceive be not the objective reality, but merely a subjective representation of it, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that the objective reality exists. If any imagine that the actual existence of an external world is, so far as its manifestation of God is concerned, a point of no consequence, because they think that an ideal existence would also

make a manifestation of God ; I reply, that the manifestation made in the two cases must essentially differ, and, therefore, that the question of the objective existence of an external world affects the kind of manifestation ; and the kind of manifestation must be a question of first importance, in an inquiry into the reality of the knowledge founded upon it.

When, however, we have, philosophically, ascertained our own existence, and that of the world around us, our next inquiry will render it equally necessary for us to avail ourselves of the light which mental philosophy will afford ; for, as it is only by the exercise of our mental faculties on the facts presented to our consciousness that we can arrive at the conclusion, that what we have thus found to exist has not eternally existed, we cannot ascertain whether we have good ground for reposing in such a conclusion, till we have investigated the nature and limits of those faculties to which it is to be ascribed, and thus learned whether they have, in the present instance, exceeded their proper limits ; and, if not, whether, within these limits, they may be regarded as trustworthy.

Nor when this question is decided, is mental science less necessary, if we would proceed further with our investigations ; for how can we know that that which has not eternally existed, must have had a cause prior to itself—except on the principle of causality, or that every change necessarily implies a cause ? But, if so, we must, in order to arrive at certainty, examine this principle, and inquire into its origin and truth. This, however, cannot be done, without entering into investigations which belong to the province of mental science—namely, whether the principle referred to, be or be not a primary fact in our mental constitution ; if it be, why we should

regard the primary facts of our constitution as undoubted truths; and if, on the other hand, it be not a primary fact, what is its origin, and what its credibility?

But when we have gained the knowledge that a First Cause exists, our work is not done, nor is the need of assistance from mental science at an end. The question still remains to be solved, what are the lessons which the phenomena of our own existence, and of the world without us, impart to our minds respecting the attributes of that prior power to which they owe their being, and how far such lessons are worthy of our confidence?—And this is a question, the investigation of which will compel us, in more particulars than one, to betake ourselves to studies essentially connected with the science of the human mind. For, first, these lessons are derived not from things as they are in themselves, but only as they exist phenomenally to us, that is, as they exist in relation to our minds. But how are we to have such a knowledge, as we can depend upon, of anything as it exists in relation to our minds, without understanding that to which it is related? Could we gain a knowledge of what is without, as it is in itself and independently of any of its relations, such knowledge would not require the addition of any other knowledge. The knowledge of a thing as it exists in itself and independently of any of its relations, would be true knowledge, even though nothing else was known; but the knowledge of a thing, not as it is in itself, but simply as related to some other thing, must be in its own nature partial and incorrect, and, therefore, unworthy of confidence, if unaccompanied with the knowledge of that other thing to which it is related. Hence, before we can have a true knowledge of the phenomena of which the mind is conscious, whether

external or internal, we must have a true knowledge of the mind in relation to such phenomena. Accordingly, before we can depend upon the lessons learnt from phenomena, we must study the science of mind, for if we have not a *true* knowledge of phenomena, the lessons we hence derive must partake of the error and imperfection by which our knowledge of them is characterized.

Something more, however, than a true knowledge of phenomena is requisite, in order to our being taught the lessons of which we are speaking. There is another teacher beside this, and it is to the united instruction of both that we must ascribe the lessons said to be imparted to us by phenomena; our knowledge of phenomena might be perfect, and yet, were we destitute of the power of reasoning,—the other teacher of which I speak,—in other words, could we draw no inferences, our knowledge would be found insufficient to give us any insight at all into the attributes of God. Accordingly, the question whether the lessons concerning God, derived from phenomena, are worthy of our confidence, not only depends on the question, whether our knowledge of phenomena is to be relied upon, but also on the mental power we have of drawing inferences; for if that power is not trustworthy, or if it has exceeded its proper limits, no confidence could be placed in any conclusion it may have drawn. We must, consequently, investigate this power, if we would arrive at a philosophical conviction that the lessons inferentially derived from phenomena concerning God are worthy of belief.

We see, then, that mental science is requisite if we would fully investigate the doctrine that we have a mediate perception of God through his works. It is mental science that must teach us that these works really exist; it is by means of mental science that we

can gain philosophical reasons for confidence, both that they have not eternally existed, and that we are warranted in believing in the existence of a cause prior to and productive of them; nor without mental science could we learn the ground we have for confidence in the lessons respecting God, which our reason has inferred from phenomena around us.

Let it now be granted that the origin of our idea of God has been discovered, and that we have satisfied ourselves both as to his existence and his possession of the attributes manifested to us in his works: our next topic of inquiry has reference to the supernatural communications which are said to be from him. Here our first question will be, whether supernatural communications of any kind are possible; if it be thought that we need not ask whether they are physically possible, because the revelations made of God in nature will not allow us to assign any limit whatever to his physical power, much less a limit which should restrain it from anything within the reach of our finite conception; still the question may be asked, in reference to their moral possibility—that is, to their possibility consistently with what nature reveals to us of the character of God. At the same time, it cannot be denied, that we ought not to presume anything to be morally impossible to God except we have satisfactory evidence that it is so, and, therefore, ought to take for granted that a supernatural communication is morally possible to him, not only if we find sufficient evidence that this is the case, but even if we find the question to be beyond our reach.

But we can neither ascertain that this question is beyond us, nor legitimately decide it till we have first in-

vestigated the nature and extent of our mental powers, and inquired how far they are fitted for solving it. How can we tell whether we are able to decide that a particular action is or is not consistent with the character of a certain being, except we first ascertain whether *we have or can gain* a sufficient acquaintance with the nature of the action, and a sufficient knowledge of the character of the being to justify us in pronouncing that the one undoubtedly agrees or disagrees with the other? And even if we could gain a sufficient knowledge of both, we must know, before we felt that we could decide the point referred to, whether the agreement or disagreement of the action with the character was dependent on circumstances or independent of them; and if dependent on circumstances, whether *our powers are sufficient* to ascertain all the possible circumstances on which the agreement or otherwise might depend. Mental science, then, is as necessary here as in any investigation to which we have previously referred.

But grant that a supernatural communication from God may be fairly presumed, if not fully proved, to be both physically and morally possible, we must next ask in what mode or modes it may be made to man, whether it may be made in every conceivable mode, or whether God is limited to any particular mode or modes. It cannot be denied that if God is Almighty, it is impossible for him to be limited so far as his own power is concerned, but it must at the same time be admitted that he must be limited by the capacity for receiving knowledge possessed by the beings to whom he may make communications. No doubt he could change the nature of any of his creatures, by imparting capacities which did not naturally belong to them, but except he changed

their nature it must be impossible for him to make a communication to them in any way but one in which their nature adapted them to receive it. Accordingly, there may be modes of communication from God possible to superior orders of intelligences, which may, nevertheless, be impossible to man as long as he continues man. But if the modes of communication to man must be adapted to human nature, we must study human nature, if we would learn what are the possible modes in which God may make a communication to the human mind. It is psychology which must teach us what capacities we have for receiving knowledge, and what are the different ways in which these capacities are capable of receiving it. Without the science of mind, we may suppose that to be possible which is impossible, and *vice versa*.

And if, after we have ascertained what are the possible modes of any communication to man, and therefore, the possible modes of a supernatural communication, we would further ascertain whether there be any limit to the possible nature and extent of such a communication, we must again resort to psychology. It is psychology which must teach us not only *how* the human mind may receive knowledge, but the *kind* and *measure* of knowledge which it is capable of receiving ; and hence it is to this science that we must look, if we would learn the boundary beyond which knowledge is impossible to our present powers. This question being decided, the inquiry would still remain, whether within the physical limit to the possible nature and extent of a supernatural communication, there may not be a still more contracted moral limit. If the study of nature has convinced us that its Author would do nothing uselessly, we may fairly presume that under ordinary circumstances, it would be

morally impossible for him to make a supernatural communication of knowledge, which he has given us the power of acquiring naturally. Granting this, we must, in order to discover such a moral limit, be so thoroughly acquainted with the faculties of the human mind, as to ascertain not only what knowledge it could acquire when extraordinarily developed and placed in circumstances peculiarly favourable, but what knowledge it would probably acquire under the circumstances in which mankind are generally placed, for that which might seem unnecessary to the few might be essential to the many. As then, psychology is thus needed, to teach us the possible modes in which a supernatural communication can be made, and the physical and moral limit of such a communication, both as to its nature and its extent, it is psychology which will enable us to test the real value of the propositions—*That a book revelation is impossible—That no communication can be made from God except through the intuitional faculty ; and, therefore, that the only possible revelation of Christianity is that made by means of the historical facts connected with the life and death of Christ, perhaps with, perhaps without, any special elevation of the spiritual intuition, in order to capacitate it to discern the truths embodied in these facts.*

But, supposing a supernatural communication to be made to particular individuals of the human race, would they be able to make the substance of it known to others ? The answer to this question would evidently depend on the nature of the communication ; for there are species of knowledge which man can only *immediately* receive, and other species which he can *mediately* receive ; if, then, a communication be made of knowledge which the human mind can only immediately receive, and if the

individual to whom it is made could only mediately communicate what he had received, he evidently could make no intelligible communication of it to his fellow-man ; but if, on the other hand, a communication be made to him which the human mind could mediately receive, he would be able to convey what he had received to the minds of others. It is, however, mental philosophy which must teach what is the limit of our capacity, both for the immediate, and also for the mediate reception of knowledge : accordingly, if we would decide what kind of supernatural communications can be promulgated after being received, we must study the human mind, and inquire both what sort of truths it must, from their nature, be able immediately to present to others, and what sort of truths cannot, in the circumstances in which mankind are placed, be mediately received by them.

Thus far, we perceive, not merely the value, but the absolute necessity of psychology, in order to a scientific investigation of the questions which naturally arise, *à priori*, in reference to a supernatural communication from God. It is psychology which must teach us that such a communication is possible—what are the possible modes in which it can be made to man—what is the physical and moral limit of its nature and extent—and whether, if made to an individual, it can possibly be made known by him to others.

There still remain, however, two questions in reference to such a supernatural communication : one, whether it could possibly be of any value except it was known to be from God? the other, what evidence would be sufficient to prove that it was really from him? As to the first, if the communication consisted of self-evident truths, in other words, of truths which could not be

presented to the mind without being intuitively received, its value, not being dependent on authority, might be equal, whether its divine origin was or was not known. Still in such a case, its value would depend on the nature and value of intuitive evidence, an inquiry pertaining to the philosophy of mind. The communication, however, might be of a different character; it might contain truths which did not carry with them their own evidence, and in that case, as its value would altogether depend on authority, the second question would evidently be important,—what evidence would be sufficient to prove that it was really from God? This question, where a communication is directly received from God by one individual, and is afterwards propagated amongst others, divides itself into two parts—what evidence would suffice for the individual who received the communication? and, what evidence would be necessary to satisfy others? So far as the individual to whom God makes the communication is concerned, the evidence can only arise from the nature of the communication, the mode in which it is made, or the circumstances connected with it. In briefly touching these points, let me premise that as the first and the last are the chief sources of evidence to others, as well as to the party himself, I shall not need to say anything separately, in reference to the evidence sufficient for others.

Notice, then, first, the evidence arising from the nature of the communication. A communication, whether divine or not, is manifestly superhuman if it possess characteristics which would have been impossible to it, had its origin been human; if, for example, it be characterized by superhuman wisdom. But before we could come to such a conclusion, either as to this or any other cha-

racteristic, we must investigate the mind of man, and ascertain the utmost limit which it can reach ; for except this be done, we should not be able to pronounce anything superhuman. The nature of the communication might in another way manifest the divinity of its origin. Suppose that whilst professing to be from God, it had characteristics morally impossible to falsehood and fraud—if, for instance, it bore the marks of holiness, goodness, and truth, and was adapted to produce these qualities in men, and generally to raise their moral character, these characteristics would suffice to prove its divinity—because they are incompatible with a false profession. But we could not examine into the adaptation of anything to produce certain effects on the human mind and character, without such an acquaintance with the human mind as would enable us to decide the kind and measure of influence of which it is susceptible. Accordingly, psychology is necessary to enable us to judge of internal evidence, viz., evidence to the divinity of an alleged supernatural revelation arising from its nature.

I proceed to notice the evidence arising from the mode in which the communication is made, an evidence simply adapted to the party receiving it. He has this evidence if he consciously receives supernatural powers for the reception of the communication, or if he is conscious of a communication being made in a supernatural way to his ordinary powers. But before any one could decide that he had been endowed with a supernatural power for receiving any communication, he must inquire whether the supposed change in his mental constitution may not possibly be the mere development of a natural power previously undeveloped, and hence, whether the circum-

stances in which he may have been placed, are sufficient to account for the development of such a power. To answer the former part of this question, he must ascertain whether the phenomena of mind indicate, however obscurely, the existence of such a latent faculty, and whether, when developed, it so fits in with the other faculties of the mind as to be manifestly a part and parcel of the same nature; or is, on the other hand, so diverse from them as to indicate that it is something superadded to the nature and not a part of it. But how can such inquiries as these be scientifically solved, except by patient psychological research? And if psychology be necessary to decide whether a supposed new power be natural or supernatural, it is, if the investigation of which we have just spoken lead to the conclusion that the supposed power really belongs to human nature, equally necessary, in order to ascertain whether it has been naturally or supernaturally developed; for to this end we must study the phenomena of mind generally, with the view of learning in what way its other faculties have been developed, and thus of deriving analogical evidence as to the question, whether the mode of the development in the present case, either has been, or may reasonably be supposed to have been natural. No one, then, could *philosophically* decide that he had received a supernatural communication merely because he supposed himself either endowed with a supernatural power or with a power supernaturally developed, till he had tested the reality of such a supposition by psychological research.

There is another way in which the mode of a communication might afford evidence to the party receiving it, of its supernatural origin, namely, if it is made to his ordinary faculties in a supernatural way; but in such

a case the question would demand investigation, whether the presentation made to the mind, be it through the medium of the external senses or more directly to the intellect, be really supernatural. Accordingly, it must be asked, not only whether there could possibly be any external cause to which it might be naturally attributed, but also whether the supposed presentation might possibly be of the mind's own creation. But how could we satisfactorily determine this latter point, without inquiring how far the power of the mind to create ideas extends, how far circumstances may enlarge that power, and how far, if it be found that it is not physically impossible for the mind to have created the presentation in question, its peculiar idiosyncrasies render it possible or probable that it should in the present instance have exercised its power? But these are psychological questions, and it is by means of psychology alone that they can be fully investigated and satisfactorily answered. Psychology is thus seen to be necessary to judge of that species of evidence of the supernatural origin of a communication, which arises from the mode in which it is made.

We now notice, thirdly, the evidence arising from the circumstances connected with it. Here we refer to an accompanying supernatural phenomenon. The first question to be decided is the reality of the alleged phenomenon, be it supernatural or not. If there is the evidence of sense to its reality, we must investigate our power of perception by means of the senses, and inquire under what circumstances we may suppose it possible for the senses to deceive us, and under what circumstances we are warranted to rely on their testimony—investigations which, I need not say, are in their nature psychological.

And as there will be the direct evidence of sense only for a few, the real existence of such evidence in the case of the majority being only known by testimony, we must further inquire whether, in a case in which the evidence of sense is sufficient, testimony may be relied upon in reference to it. This will render it necessary that we should investigate the circumstances which render false testimony morally possible, which cannot be fully done without such a research into the secret workings of the human mind as is only practicable to the psychological student.

The reality of the phenomenon having been decided, the next point to be inquired into is, whether it is natural or supernatural. To investigate this question, it will be necessary to ask, whether there are any apparent causes sufficient to account for it, and, if not, whether there may, possibly, be any natural causes which are non-apparent. To solve the first part of this question, in reference to cases where the only apparent cause is the exercise of human power, we must study mind, and so study it, as to be able, not merely to see whether the mental phenomena, which have come under our observation, indicate the developed existence of such a power, but even indicate its probable undeveloped existence; how otherwise can we decide, whether a power apparently exercised by man does, or does not, naturally belong to him?

And even after we have ascertained that the phenomenon is supernatural, we must still ask what connexion exists between such a phenomenon and the supposed supernatural communication—what the testimony is, which the phenomenon bears to the supernatural origin of the communication, and what dependence may be

placed on its testimony. A phenomenon could evidently bear no testimony to something with which it had no connexion. Now, so far as connexion between a phenomenon and a communication is concerned, the closest is manifested when the phenomenon is itself the medium of the communication; but there may be a connexion sufficiently close, if the individual by whom the phenomenon is occasioned be the same individual to whom the communication is made, supposing we could conceive of no other purpose to be answered by the phenomenon: and the same may be said, if the individual by whom the phenomenon is occasioned testifies, either directly or indirectly, to its object, for authority is in such a case given to his testimony. I do not say that mental philosophy is absolutely essential to perceive the connexion in these different cases, but it will, undoubtedly, tend to make it more distinct, for the study of mind will convince us that there is a purpose to be answered by every power with which we are endowed, and that that purpose is in every instance discoverable by us; this is surely an analogical argument, that wherever a supernatural power is bestowed, there is a purpose to be answered which is discoverable; and if so, as the supposition of a connexion between the supernatural phenomenon and a professedly supernatural communication accounts for the phenomenon, whilst the contrary supposition leaves its purpose altogether undiscoverable, the argument is a powerful one for proving that the supposed connexion really exists.

But granting that it exists, the testimony borne by the phenomenon is simply to the *supernatural* origin of the communication; and, if so, the value of this testimony depends on the presumption, that what is supernatural must

be divine. This presumption, then, will require investigation ; but, previously to investigating it, we ought to inquire whether our mental faculties are competent to the task, and the more so, because we shall find that this is a case, in which it would help us to come to a satisfactory conclusion, with regard to the presumption referred to, provided we can ascertain either their competency or their incompetency to investigate it ; to ascertain, on the one hand, their competency would help to point out to us the true method of investigation, and also to satisfy us with the result ;—and, on the other hand, to ascertain their incompetency, would give us of itself some ground to believe the presumption trustworthy, because, if it had been false, and therefore, calculated to deceive us on so important a point as the divinity of a communication falsely professing itself to be from God, we may fairly suppose that we should not have been left without any power of discovering its falsehood. To ascertain, however, the competency or incompetency of our powers for such a task is the province of psychology.

I have now shown that an inseparable relation exists between psychology and the three sciences, those of Religion, of God, and of Revelation. To sum up what I have said in a few words,—I have first shown the importance of psychology to the science of religion : and this not only because religious experience, like every other mental experience, is a branch of psychological science, but also because general psychological research is important to a scientific knowledge of it, whether it be attributed to an original mental faculty, or susceptibility, or not. I observed that if religion be a distinct faculty, or susceptibility, psychology will throw light on its relation to those general mental powers which are essential

conditions of its existence, because it will show how far its power of development depends on the degree of strength which these powers possess; and it will help to explain its influence, after it is developed, over the whole mind: but that if, on the other hand, religion be not a distinct faculty, but be a power, or susceptibility, arising from the whole mental structure, psychology is evidently essential to a true conception of its origin and nature, and that it will be as necessary as before to explain its influence, when developed, on all the powers and affections of the mind. Besides, I remarked, the question whether religion be, or be not, a distinct faculty, can only be investigated by means of psychology. I thus showed that a relation clearly exists between psychology and the science of religion. It may, indeed, be said, that religious experience is altogether independent of the study of psychology, and that it cannot exist without the party knowing something of what he himself feels, but to this, I replied, that we are not here speaking of knowledge which experience forces upon us, but of a scientific knowledge which experience does not involve. We proceeded, next, to show the importance of psychology to the science of God, and to that of supernatural communications from him. To solve, philosophically, the question of the Divine existence, we must, I observed, first ascertain what are the essential elements of our idea of God: but this will, I remarked, require us to look within, to analyze and to discover whether any of its parts are traceable to sources which at once prove them to be either fallacious or non-essential; and all this is the province of psychology. Having ascertained the essential elements of our idea of God, we must, I showed, if we would discover its truth, trace the idea to its source, and for this purpose must

investigate these problems of mental science,—whether the idea may be a creation of the human mind,—whether it may have a supernatural origin,—whether it may be innate,—whether it may be owing to immediate intuition,—or whether a mediate perception of God through his works would suffice, without any immediate intuition to account for it. The question of the real existence of God having been investigated, the next inquiry demanding attention respected the supernatural communications said to be from him. Accordingly, we showed the value of mental philosophy in investigating the questions,—whether supernatural communications are possible,—how far they are limited as to the mode in which they are made, and as to the nature and extent of the knowledge imparted,—whether, if made to one individual, he would be able to propagate the knowledge so received,—whether such knowledge would be of any value if not known to be from God,—and what evidence would be sufficient to prove that it had a divine origin.

You will remember that the object of the present lecture is simply to show that mental science is related to religion, theology, and revelation. Were it not for the general neglect of the science of mind, this would have seemed unnecessary, especially when all must admit that the mind is the subject of religion, and the receptacle of the knowledge of God and of all revelations which have come from God. This object, however, has been simply preparatory to what is a much more important as well as more difficult task,—namely, to throw light, if possible, on some controverted points of theology, by investigating them in connexion with psychological researches. If, indeed, we were to investigate every question in mental science, which in any way

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affects theology, we must bring the whole science of mind under examination; but this would be too extended a field to afford any hope that we should be able, in a short course of lectures like the present, thoroughly and successfully to explore it. All that we can reasonably hope to accomplish, and all which it appears to me desirable to attempt, is the discussion of those points which have bearing on such questions in theology, as either intrinsically or in consequence of the controversies of the day are of primary importance.

As such a discussion will have reference to matters on which, both in psychology and theology, there is considerable difference of opinion, I do not expect to carry all my hearers and readers with me; still I cannot but hope, with the blessing of God, to be the means of convincing intelligent minds of the truth of some doctrines which I regard as important: and even if I fail to produce such a result I shall not esteem my labour lost, should it be permitted me to invest mental science with any additional interest, and to induce to such a study of it as will, I am persuaded, ultimately promote the interest of theological truth.

Some individuals may possibly be prejudiced against discussions like those on which we are about to enter, in consequence of the theological errors to which they have sometimes given rise. There can be no question that, so far as theology is founded on philosophy, a false philosophy will be likely to lead to a false theology; but this, instead of deterring us from those philosophical investigations, with which theology is necessarily connected, should only stimulate us to pursue them more cautiously and thoroughly. If the result has a theological as well as a philosophical value, we should be additionally

anxious as to every step of the path leading to it, nor should we allow ourselves to make any advance without taking the utmost precaution to avoid being led astray ; especially should we pray for that Divine aid, without which we cannot expect to be kept in the path of truth. If we only arrive at the truth, we may be quite sure that true philosophy will not undermine but establish a true theology ; and let us not imagine that philosophical truth cannot be reached, though, even if it could not, philosophical investigation would still be advantageous, if it enabled us to perceive and to demonstrate this fact. Moreover, how, let me ask, can the errors built upon a false philosophy be met, except we can show that that philosophy is false ; and how can this be shown, but by such investigations as will either bring to light truths proving it to be false, or will at least show that its conclusions, being beyond the grasp of the human intellect, are unworthy of credit ? Nay, if there be any conclusiveness in the reasonings of the present lecture, we cannot give up philosophy without also giving up theology. I will conclude in the words of a celebrated author with whose psychological and theological views I do not agree, but to whose sentiment, as here expressed, I heartily respond :—

“ All religion reposes upon the idea of God as its foundation. Without this idea, revelation itself has no authority, inasmuch as its authority is solely derivable from the fact of its coming from God. The being of a God, therefore, is a truth that must be impressed upon us before we open the very first page of inspiration ; nay, its very first proposition would be unintelligible without it. ‘ In the beginning,’ says Moses, ‘ God created the heaven and the earth.’ But who is God ? and where is the evi-

dence of his existence? All these must be settled points before the Scriptures can be to us of the slightest authority; and they cannot be settled, when once started, without deep inward reflection upon nature and upon man as its interpreter."* And again :—"All revealed religion, accordingly, rests upon the pedestal of natural religion; all natural religion, again, rests upon the existence of God; and the certainty of his existence must be derived from the relation of the laws of nature to those of the human mind. If these laws be not established, natural religion fails of a foundation; and if the foundation of natural religion sinks, the whole authority of revealed religion sinks with it to a nonentity. Revelation, therefore, so far from putting a check upon philosophical investigation in reference to these topics, renders it in fact, only so much the more necessary, and so much the more valuable in proportion as the superstructure, which, by the aid of revelation we build upon it, becomes to us of the deeper importance."†

* Morell's History of Modern Phil. vol. i. p. 27. (1st edition.)

† Morell's History of Modern Phil. vol. i. p. 28.

LECTURE II.

PSYCHOLOGY IN RELATION TO RELIGION.

[THE object of this and the following lectures is to discuss, with the aid of psychology, controverted questions relating to Religion, to God, and to Revelation. In this lecture, two questions are discussed relating to Religion; *first*, whether religion be owing to a distinct faculty, susceptibility, or principle of the human mind,—the arguments of Schleiermacher and Morell being stated and answered; *secondly*, whether the human will has a self-determining power,—the question being explained, arguments given for a negative reply, objections answered, and the relations of the doctrine to religion, and also to a scientific knowledge of God, exhibited.]

It is impossible for a thinking man to be without some considerable knowledge of the human mind. If he be a man of science, we can scarcely suppose but that his attention will have been given to some or other of the sciences, which are, more or less, connected with the science of mind, and therefore cannot be studied without the investigation of questions requiring psychological research. But whether this be the case or not, no man accustomed to think can fail to have reflected on powers which he daily exercises, and on the subjective phenomena presented in ever-varying forms to his own consciousness. This will account for the fact, that there have been many, who have never directly studied psychology as a science, who yet have seemed

well prepared for theological questions, the successful investigation of which I have shown to require its help. If such a fact could not have been explained, it must have formed a powerful objection to some of the conclusions to which I arrived in my last lecture. But, even when explained, some may think that it is sufficient to prove that no further knowledge of the human mind is of any value to theology, than what may be gained independently of the study of psychology as a science. A little thought will, however, convince them to the contrary; for, granting, what I suppose will not be denied, that he who has made the mind an object of scientific research will understand it better than the man who has only given it desultory attention, it must be allowed to be, at least, probable, that if the less knowledge of mind be essential to any measure of success in certain theological investigations, the greater knowledge would give hope of still larger success. Indeed, it is perhaps because the science of mind is itself only in its infancy, that some important questions in theology are not better understood and more incontrovertibly decided.

We now, however, proceed to investigate, with what help psychology will give us, some of those questions in religion, natural theology, and revelation, in reference to which its aid is most necessary, beginning with those which pertain to religion *considered as a subjective experience*.

Here we will first direct attention to the question, whether religion be or be not owing to a distinct faculty, susceptibility, or principle of the human mind. This is at once a psychological and a religious inquiry: it belongs both to the science of mind and to the science of

religion. Nor in the latter relation is it unimportant; for, accordingly as it is answered in the affirmative or negative, religion differs both as to its nature and as to the means to be used for producing and strengthening it; *as to its nature*, it being in the one case a mere development of some peculiar power of mind, and in the other, the result not of any peculiar power, but of a peculiar use of the ordinary powers: *and also as to the means to be used for producing and strengthening it*, the effort being in the one case to be directed simply to one peculiar part of human nature, and never except subordinately to the other parts, but in the other to be directed immediately and co-ordinately to the whole nature.

In order rightly to investigate this question we must, as a first step, ascertain what religion is. For this purpose let me premise that man sustains relations to other beings—God and his fellow man; and that these relations involve duties. He owes it to those to whom he is related, and as the consequence of the relations he sustains, to exercise certain feelings which will prompt to certain actions. Now that state of mind, which is the exercise of the feelings due to our fellow men, and which prompts to the doing of the actions due to them, is called morality; whilst that state of mind, which is the exercise of the feelings, and which prompts to the doing of actions due to God, is called religion. Accordingly, if we would ascertain what religion is, we must ask what is the relation in which we stand to God, and what feelings ought to be exercised towards him in consequence of that relation.

The feelings and actions due from men to God, arise from the fact that he is their Creator, Preserver, Benefactor, Absolute Disposer, and Moral Governor; and that

he has constituted them capable of understanding these relations, and of exercising the feelings which, in the circumstances in which they are placed, harmonize with them. Thus, because, as our Creator and Preserver, we depend entirely upon God for existence and for its future continuance, we owe it to him to feel our absolute dependence ; because, as our Benefactor, he has given us every blessing we enjoy, we owe it to him to exercise all the gratitude of which we are capable ; because, as our Absolute Disposer, he is not only governed by wisdom and kindness, but has given us sufficient evidence that this is the case, we owe it to him to exercise full confidence in his dealings with us, and therefore to put implicit trust in him ; and because, as our rightful Moral Governor, he has a right to rule over us, we owe to him full subjection. Moreover, because in all these relations he has manifested himself to us as a Being of infinite excellence, we owe it to the manifestation which he has made of himself, to admire his perfection, and to feel complacency and delight in the contemplation of it. Such are the feelings due to God ; and as we cannot exercise them without being led to perform the actions due to him, they comprehend the whole of subjective religion. Subjective religion, accordingly, includes the exercise of dependence, gratitude, confidence, voluntary subjection, admiration, and complacency.

Whatever then religion may be as to its origin, it is evidently when developed, not a simple but a compound thing. Even if it owe its existence to a separate power or susceptibility, it is plainly a power or susceptibility which produces not simply one kind but a variety of fruits. It also very plainly, when developed, belongs essentially to the whole nature of man : it belongs *to the*

understanding; for those states of mind which, as we have just now seen, form the essential parts of religion, when directed towards God, would not be religion at all if directed to other beings; and hence they must each of them include AS AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT the idea of God, and consequently an exercise of understanding: it belongs *to the will*; for to say nothing of any other state of mind included in religion, voluntary subjection is distinctively an act of the will: it belongs also *to the emotions*; for several of the states of mind referred to as included in religion are themselves states of emotion. Accordingly religion, when developed, cannot belong simply to one part of our nature to the exclusion of the rest, neither to the intellect alone, nor to the will alone, nor to the emotions alone, but to our whole nature.

I am aware that Schleiermacher, whose depth of thought and well-earned philosophical reputation, combined with his genuine piety, entitle all his opinions to respect, has expressed different views.* He maintains that piety is simply a determination of the feeling, or (to use his own language) of "the immediate self-consciousness." He prefers the term "*immediate self-consciousness*" to "*feeling*," merely because he considers it more specific: he thinks that feeling may possibly be used in so wide a sense as to include unconscious as well as conscious conditions of mind, but "*self-consciousness*" cannot; and he describes this self-consciousness as "*immediate*," to distinguish it from a consciousness of self which is not a feeling but simply an intellectual act, and which is only distinguished from objective consciousness, by making self instead of something external the

* Christliche Glaube, vol. i. pp. 6—14.

object of thought: when self-consciousness is thus an intellectual act, we make a representation of self to ourselves, and are conscious of self through the medium of the representation or idea we have formed; but where self-consciousness is feeling, there is, he says, no representation of self, the consciousness of self is immediate, not mediate; in the former case there is a consciousness of self as object, in the latter simply a consciousness of self as subject. Whilst, however, he prefers, for the reasons stated, the term "immediate self-consciousness" to "feeling," yet taking the word "feeling" in a sense expressive of his idea, he thus endeavours to prove that religion is a feeling.

He first observes that the only three elementary states of mind are, *knowing*, *doing*, and *feeling*, the difference between which he thus explains—Life, he says, consists of self-immanency and self-egression: but "doing" is properly self-egression; "knowing" is, in its continuance, self-immanency; but yet, as a present perception, is realizable only by an act of self-egression: whilst "feeling" is not only in its continuance, but in its commencement, simply a self-immanency, for it does not consist in being affected *by* the subject, but merely *in* the subject. Now, says Schleiermacher, there is no third which can be added to these two forms, self-immanency and self-egression, for the only supposable third is the unity of the two; and this unity is the essence of the subject which manifests itself in these reciprocally opposing forms; and which may therefore in this especial relation be called their common ground, and consequently cannot be put by their side. For the same reason, there is no fourth which can be added to "knowing," "doing," and "feeling." Feeling however is, he says, not to be supposed as excluded from

all union with knowledge and action, for, as life consists of self-immanency and self-egression, every real moment of life is made up of these two elements; so wherever there is feeling there will have arisen both knowledge and action, yet only as vestiges or as germs: still less is feeling excluded from the union of knowledge with action, for it so mediates the transition between them, that the same knowledge will produce a different action according to the difference of the intermediate feeling. Now piety, he maintains, if it be a feeling, is one which thus mediates, and accordingly it belongs to it to awaken knowledge and action, and hence one or both of these, wherever it exists, will be found accompanying it as germs. In order to show that piety thus consists in feeling, he observes—

1st. That it does not consist in knowledge, or, he says, *a man's piety would always be measurable by his knowledge of the doctrinal system of Christianity.* If to this it be objected that by knowledge is to be understood not merely the contents of the cognition, but also the strength of the conviction, Schleiermacher answers, that if the conviction is of the same kind as in other spheres of knowledge, its strength can only be measured by the clearness and the perfection of the thought, and accordingly that we shall come substantially to the same conclusion as before, viz., that piety is measurable by the clear and consistent manner in which a man conceives of Christian doctrines. But if, on the other hand, the conviction is of a different kind from that of other spheres of knowledge, and has therefore a different measure, the close connexion of piety with such a conviction could be no proof that it was similarly connected with the mere knowledge of the system of Christianity. If, in

such a case, knowledge was related to piety, it could only be because piety was its end ; but as that end could only be developed where the connexion spoken of was found in some particular form of the self-consciousness, the piety, even if knowledge is related to it, is evidently determined by something else, and therefore knowledge cannot constitute its essence.

2nd. Nor does piety, says Schleiermacher, consist in action, for the piety of an action cannot be determined simply by its contents, and therefore must be determined either by the impulse from which it originates, or the result which is its final end. As, however, no one would estimate the piety of an action by the greater or less degree of perfection with which the result is reached, it evidently cannot be decided by the result, and hence it can only be decided by the impulse which originated it. But if so, the piety evidently depends simply on the question, whether that impulse be pious ; accordingly he concludes, as the impulse must be a feeling, that though the action may belong to piety, the essence of the piety is only in the feeling from which it springs.

3rd. Schleiermacher goes on to argue, that whilst piety does not consist in knowledge or in action, it does consist in feeling. Whilst neither knowledge nor action in themselves, and independently of the feeling with which they are related, are pious, there are, he affirms, states of feeling, such for example as godly sorrow, which are pious in themselves, and irrespectively of the knowledge and action to which they are related. Further to prove that piety is essentially a feeling, he says that if it be not a feeling, it is either a condition in which knowledge, feeling, and action are bound together, or it is not : if it be not, and feeling be ex-

cluded, it must be described either as a knowledge generating action, or as an act proceeding from knowledge; but in such a case the question arises, whether the piety be in the knowledge or in the act, and also, how the knowledge can possibly produce the action without the medium of intervening feeling: if, on the other hand, the three, when interwoven, be supposed to bear the character of piety, it will follow, that as it has been already shown that in such a case neither the knowledge nor the action is in and for itself the piety, the essence of the piety must be in the feeling which determines the character both of the knowledge and of the action.

Such is the substance of Schleiermacher's argument: he believes, that though knowledge, feeling, and action may all belong to religion, neither the knowledge nor the action is pious in and of itself, the piety of both being wholly determined by the feeling, but that the feeling is pious in and of itself, and is that which determines the piety of the knowledge and of the action.

Now, I admit, that neither knowledge nor action in and of itself can be characterized as pious: knowledge cannot—for a man may thoroughly understand all the doctrines of Christianity, and yet be evidently destitute of piety: also action cannot—for two persons may perform the very same action, but whilst one does it from love to God, the other may do it to obtain the praise of men, and hence the action, which in one is justly characterized as pious, cannot be so in and of itself, because in the other it exists without being pious.

But may it not be said of feeling as well as of knowledge and action, that it is not pious in and of itself? Let us examine an exercise of what Schleiermacher calls "the immediate self-consciousness," say

for example, "the feeling of dependence." To view this feeling independently of the knowledge with which it may be connected, it must be viewed independently of the particular object to which it is directed. But is the feeling of dependence considered in the abstract pious? Is it not its relation to God which renders it so? Would it not, supposing the creature were its object, be as utterly destitute of piety as the action of a pious man would become, if prompted by some other motive than love to God? If, however, the feeling of dependence is not pious, abstractedly considered; if its piety is determined by its direction, it follows, that as its direction must in part, at least, be determined by the knowledge present to the mind at the time, the piety of the feeling is partially dependent on knowledge. If we are asked to go deeper, and are told, that if we will search into the origin of the knowledge which determines the character of the feeling, we shall find feeling to have given birth to it, and, therefore, that after all, the feeling, as it originally existed, is the sole determining cause of the piety which now exists, I answer, first, that our present business is not to ascertain what is the mental faculty or faculties to which the possibility of a developed religion is ascribable; this we shall presently investigate: but our first concern is to ascertain what religion is, as to its essence, *when it is actually developed*; hence, if we have shown that in the developed religious life, feeling is not in and for itself pious we have accomplished our present object. Still, I answer, *secondly*, that reserving for a future lecture the inquiry whence the idea of God originates, and granting, for the sake of argument, that it is ascribable to feeling, the feeling which gives it

birth will, previously to the birth of the knowledge, and therefore in and for itself, be destitute of the character of piety, unless it can be regarded as pious simply because supposed to have an instinctive tendency to rise to God. Now, without granting the fact, that we have a feeling possessed of any such instinctive tendency, let me remark, that if we had, and if it was supposed to be the originating source of religion, it yet could not be of itself characterized as religious, because, as a mere instinct and independently of its effects, it would not involve the exercise of any of the feelings in which religion, as we have defined it, essentially consists, viz., those which are founded upon the relationships in which we stand to God. Supposing, then, an original instinct to which the religious feeling of dependence is primarily attributable, *that instinct* is not itself religious; accordingly, inasmuch as when religion is developed, the feeling of dependence, if considered abstractedly, is, as we have seen, not to be regarded as religious, the feeling of dependence is, neither in its origin nor in and for itself, religious, any more than is the knowledge which determines its religious character, or the action which is its result.

I have specified the feeling of dependence in preference to any other, because Schleiermacher regards a particular form of this feeling, viz., the feeling of absolute dependence as that in which the essence of piety consists. He maintains that this feeling is in and for itself pious, because he believes that it cannot exist in relation to any other object than God. If, indeed, he could show from the nature of the feeling *not merely that it ought not, but that it could not possibly exist except in relation to God*, I allow that he might legi-

timately infer that the feeling is pious in and for itself. Let us, then, investigate the argument he gives us, to prove that the feeling cannot exist except in relation to God. It is substantially as follows :*—Every intellectual exercise of mind involves, he says, an object as well as a subject. With regard to every such subject, I may, he says, feel either that I have some kind or degree of control over it, or that I am in some manner, and to some extent, under its control ; but in most cases it is felt that the control is reciprocal, that of the object, however, being in an inverse ratio to that of the subject. Now, where the control of the object exceeds that of the subject, there will, he says, be the feeling of dependence ; and where the control of the subject exceeds that of the object, the feeling of freedom. But there is, he remarks, no object, in the contemplation of which, man has the feeling of absolute freedom ; there is no such object in the natural world, for there is no object in nature over which he has absolute control ; there is no such object in the social and political world, for there is no relation which he is able absolutely to control ; neither is there any such object subjectively existing, for his power over his own mental acts is restrained by the influence which the external world has in their production, whilst over the external world he has, as has been previously shown, no absolute control. The feeling of absolute freedom is, therefore, impossible to man. But not so, he says, the feeling of absolute dependence, for, though in the contemplation of a finite object, it is, he tells us, impossible, it is not so in the contemplation of the infinite God. Here man must, he remarks, feel that he is under absolute control—in other words, that he is

* *Christliche Glaube*, vol. i. pp. 15—32.

absolutely dependent. Seeing then that the feeling of absolute dependence can only arise from the presence of the idea of God, it can, he argues, exist in relation to no other object, and therefore is, in its own nature, peculiar to piety; and as, moreover, it must exist whenever the idea of God is present, it is, he adds, characteristic of every form of piety, there being no possible form in which the idea of God is not included.

In remarking on the preceding reasoning, I observe that its force depends on two assumptions—one, that wherever the idea of God is present, there *must* be the feeling of absolute dependence—the other, that that feeling can *only* exist in relation to God. Let us examine each separately. The first is evidently founded on the supposition, that, whenever the attention of the mind is directed to an object, the question must necessarily force itself upon it, as to the kind and degree of control which the object has over the mind, or the mind over the object; or, at least, that this question must necessarily force itself on the mind when God is the object of thought. I apprehend, however, that experience is in opposition to such a supposition. Many ideas are daily present to every mind in which the attention is never directed to the control, either of subject or object, and in which no feeling is produced, however partial, either of freedom or dependence: nor even when we think of God do we always think of his absolute control over us, nor always feel the dependence to which such thinking might give rise. The supposition is, moreover, contradicted by the reason of the thing, as well as by experience; for it surely will not be maintained, that no idea can be present without our contemplating it in every possible aspect. Are we not so constituted as now to seize hold of an

idea simply in one aspect, and now simply in another? But if an idea can be present without being contemplated in every possible aspect, it may be present and yet not attended to in the particular aspect relating to the feeling of freedom or of dependence. Granting, then, that the idea of God, viewed in one of its aspects, would produce the feeling of absolute dependence, it is possible, since it is not necessarily viewed in such aspect, for it to be present without exciting that feeling. But if so, and if, as viewed in other aspects, it would produce other appropriate feelings, it will follow that there may be developments of religion of which that feeling does not form a part; and hence, that the feeling under discussion cannot be characteristic of every possible form of piety.

But let us examine the other assumption of Schleiermacher, viz., that the feeling of absolute dependence can *only* exist in relation to God. It proceeds on the supposition that this feeling must be impossible in the contemplation of a finite object; but let me ask whether this is the case. Suppose I have no idea of God at all, or even that I have at some moment no thought of God, (and this last supposition must, at all events, be deemed possible,) may I not, at that moment, have an idea of a finite being, whose power, though limited, is sufficient to control me absolutely? As we are finite beings, we can conceive of finite power, not only beyond our own, but sufficiently beyond our own to exercise an absolute control over us, without being itself infinite. I do not say that the actual existence of such a power is possible, because there can be no finite power which is not itself under the control of God, and which, therefore, can possibly be able, absolutely, to control another; but I do say, that if there be no present thought of an infinite

being exercising a universal control, the idea of a finite power, possessed of absolute control over a *finite* being, is possible, and if so, it would suffice, as well as that of an infinite being, to produce the feeling of absolute dependence. If, however, the feeling of absolute dependence can possibly exist independently of the contemplation of the infinite God; if it can even exist, as I apprehend it can, in the contemplation of some fellow man who is superstitiously supposed to be invested with supernatural power, it is not in its own nature, not in and of itself, not when regarded abstractedly, to be pronounced pious.

Dependence then is only pious when rightly directed, and it cannot be rightly directed but by knowledge. The same thing may be said of every other feeling. Schleiermacher speaks of godly sorrow for sin, but may there not be sorrow, which, *so far as the mere feeling is concerned*, is precisely the same in nature as godly sorrow for sin, and which yet is neither godly nor sorrow for sin? If any think that there cannot, it arises, I conceive, from the difficulty of conceiving of the feeling abstracted from all its relations. If we analyze godly sorrow for sin, we shall find it to consist of three parts: a knowledge of the true evil of sin, a knowledge of our own sinfulness, and a mental pain produced by the twofold knowledge, and related to it. Let then the mental pain be, by itself, regarded independently of its producing cause, and of the relations in which it stands to that cause, and it will not, I think, be found to differ from pain experienced on other occasions; though even if it did differ, as it would then cease to bear any relation to sin, it would not be sorrow *for sin*; and as it would not be connected with any true view of the evil of sin, it could not be *godly* sorrow for it. But if there may

be other sorrow, which so far as the mere feeling abstracted from all its relations is concerned, is of the same nature as godly sorrow for sin ; or even if the godly sorrow for sin itself, if abstracted from all its relations, would cease to be godly sorrow for sin, the feeling is not pious in and of itself, but only *as directed by knowledge to a certain object*.

But we are asked whether piety is not measured by feeling, and if so whether this is not a proof that it is essentially a feeling. We do not dispute that feeling enters into the essence of piety ; all that we dispute is, that it constitutes its *whole* essence. So far from believing that there can be piety without feeling, we have represented piety as consisting in the exercise of those feelings towards God which arise from a perception of the relations in which we stand to him ; but yet we maintain that the piety is not in the feelings, considered apart from their relations, but in the feelings *as sustaining certain relations* to the existence of which knowledge is absolutely necessary ; and believing this, we do not allow that the piety is, or can be, measured by the mere feeling. Let two men exercise a feeling of sorrow for sin : we will suppose the feeling in the two cases to be of precisely the same intensity. But one of them may have only a partial view of the evil of sin, whilst the other has a much more correct view of its real sinfulness. Is the piety of both equal, simply because the feeling in the two cases is equally intense ? Surely if the perception of the evil of sin is essential to godly sorrow for it, a truer and fuller perception of its evil will make the sorrow proportionately more truly godly. If it will, there is another measure for piety, besides the mere intensity of feeling which may be experienced.

Piety, then, or religion, when developed, does not belong simply to feeling; it equally belongs to knowledge. Let either the one or the other be wanting—let there be no knowledge, or no feeling, and the essence of the piety is destroyed. It may in like manner be shown that “action,” by which we mean an exercise of will, enters into the essence of piety; for if we were to suppose a religious feeling, say godly sorrow for sin, in which the will does not acquiesce,—a feeling which does not influence the will, but in reference to which the will is kept from being influenced by some counter-acting motive,—such a feeling would not constitute religion, nor entitle a man to be called religious.

We have spoken of piety, or religion, *as developed*, but we may be asked whether it is not susceptible of different developments, now, for example, of confidence in God, now, of gratitude towards him, now, of sorrow for sin against him; for, it may be said, if it is thus susceptible of different developments, they must have some common characteristic which entitles them to the epithet religious; if so, that this common characteristic must comprehend the whole essence of religion, everything else being an accident; and, hence, that except this common characteristic belong to the whole nature, the essence of religion can only belong to a part of our nature. I admit all this, but I think that if we investigate the different developments referred to, we shall find that the common reason why they are denominated religious, is that each is an exercise of a feeling towards God, which arises from such a consideration of some relation in which we stand to him, as is sufficiently powerful to procure the acquiescence of the will. But if so, the common reason will be found to belong to the

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whole nature—to the *knowing*, the *feeling*, and the *willing*.

We have thus far seen that there is no development of religion which manifests any mental power or susceptibility peculiar to such a development, in other words, any separate religious power or susceptibility. At the same time, as the powers and susceptibilities manifested in a religious development do not necessarily nor always produce it, the question may be asked, what it is which determines them so as to produce it. Is it, or is it not, some original religious power whose office it is so to direct the movements of the other powers, as to lead to the production of a religious development?

In investigating the question, whether the religious life is to be ascribed to such an original power, let me first ask, whether the supposition of such a power would satisfactorily account for the result. If its existence be supposed, the question arises, in what relation it would stand to the will. Would it act independently of the will, would it govern the will, or would it be governed by the will? If the supposed original power act independently of the will, the religion of a man cannot depend on his own will; and hence we are reduced to this absurdity, that an irreligious man ought to be what his will has no power to make him. If it govern the will, we are virtually brought to the same conclusion; for previously to its first exercise it is independent of the will, and hence is not under its control. And if it be governed by the will, it then does not, in and of itself, account for that particular determination of the exercise of the other powers, which is the immediate cause of a religious development; for here the will acts before this original power can act, and if the action of the will be a prerequisite to

religion previously to any action of the power referred to, the question may be put, why the will would not be equally able so to direct the movements of the various powers of the mind as to produce a religious development, without any assistance from the original power referred to, as with its help; for if it does not direct the will, but moves only as the will directs, we are compelled to ask why it is supposed that the will cannot *immediately*, as easily as *mediately*, direct the powers which, by means of the supposed power, it is thought mediately to govern. No answer can be given to such a question. Not only, then, is there no religious development which manifests any peculiar original religious power, but even if we were to suppose such a power to exist, there is no relation in which it could stand to the will, which would imply that it could produce religion in and by itself, or even that it was necessary in order to its production. The supposition of the power does not account for the result.

I know of only one objection that can be advanced against the preceding reasoning. We have assumed, that if the supposed religious power be concerned in the production of the religious life, it must act independently of the will, or as its governor, or under its governance. This assumption may be denied: it may be maintained that there is a fourth supposition possible, viz., one in which the supposed power does not act independently of the will, and is not governed by it, but yet is not the *governor*, but simply the *guide* of the will. It may, perhaps, be argued, in support of this objection, that even if the will was able, without the help of any separate religious power, so to direct the movements of the mental powers and susceptibilities as to produce piety, it yet would need some guide to teach it how to

use its power, so as to produce the result. But let us grant for a moment, that the supposed religious power is such a guide, and as by hypothesis it acts previously to knowledge, it acts simply as a blind instinct. I say, a blind instinct, because the only difference between instinct and reason is, that in the former case we are led blindly, we know not whither or why; whilst in the latter case we are led by knowledge,—led where we know both the whither and the why. If, however, the supposed religious power be nothing more than a blind instinct, the essence of the piety produced by it must, evidently, consist in our following one of the instincts of our nature. But not only is this evidently different from the piety which, as we have just now seen, is actually developed in man, but if it were not, we should be shut up to the absurd conclusion, that there was no more real virtue in man's religion than in the obedience yielded to instinct by a brute: both would be mere acts of submission to blind instinct.

Religion, then, as developed in man, is not attributable, directly or indirectly, to a separate original religious power or susceptibility. But the question may be asked, whether, if this conclusion be correct, the existence of religion in man can be accounted for. Here the point to be explained is this: How it is,—seeing that the possession and development of the ordinary powers of the mind do not *necessarily* produce religion,—that the exercise of them ever takes the determinate form by which religion is produced? We have seen that, when religion is developed, it implies an exercise of all the mental powers and susceptibilities; can it then be accounted for, on the supposition that there is no original power by which the particular exercise was pro-

duced, that they have been so exercised as to lead to this result? To show that it can, we must first be able to account for the idea of God, and next for those peculiarities in the idea, or those other circumstances, which have rendered it influential. The question, whether we can account for the idea of God without supposing a peculiar religious power, will be investigated in a future lecture. We shall therefore now simply inquire whether, after we have gained some idea of God, a special religious faculty be requisite to invest the idea with the peculiarities which render it influential, or in any other way give it power.

First, then, we ask, whether in the case of religious men, there be any peculiarities in their idea of God, for which we cannot account without supposing a separate religious faculty. The only conceivable peculiarities which could render the idea more effective in producing religion are these three—increased comprehensiveness,—more frequent presence to the mind,—and greater vividness. But as to the first of these,—*increased comprehensiveness*,—the fact that we have faculties for investigating external nature will surely be considered as sufficient to account for it. Whether external nature when investigated by these faculties, would or would not suffice to give us our first idea of God, it will not, I think, be disputed, that after we have that first idea, our ordinary faculties would be able to gather from external nature enlarged views of the nature and character of the Divine Being. As to the second peculiarity named,—*more frequent presence to the mind*,—it may be explained in the same way in which we should explain the frequent presence of any other idea. Men become interested in particular ideas through some motive which acts on the

will, and thus leads it to direct attention to them. In no case is any separate faculty supposed to be necessary: and why in this case more than in any other should a separate faculty be imagined necessary? All that is necessary is motive and the exercise of will; and the motive may be one that influences the mind, not merely in reference to religious but to many other ideas, and the exercise of will as the result of motive is as common irrespectively of religion as in reference to it. The third peculiarity—*greater vividness*—may be explained in the same way as the second: it depends on the degree of attention given by the mind to the idea, and this depends on there being some motive to excite the will to direct attention to it, and on there being an exercise of will as the result of such motive.

There is then no peculiarity in the idea of God rendering it operative in producing religion, for which we cannot account otherwise than by supposing the existence of a separate religious faculty.

Nor is there any other influence exerted on the mind for the production of religion, which cannot be explained without the supposition in question. If God awakens within us a religious feeling, it is not by the impartation of a new faculty, nor by awakening a faculty previously existing in a dormant state, but simply by directing anew faculties already existing and already developed. He can direct our power of knowing to himself, and our power of willing and feeling, without giving us any new power either of knowing, willing, or feeling, and without awakening any dormant power; but a new direction of existing powers will produce a new effect on the mind, and hence is sufficient to account for that effect.

I have thus investigated the question, whether we have, or have not, a separate original faculty to which our religion is to be ascribed. In doing this I have first explained what religion is in its developed state, and have shown that it belongs to the whole nature, and not, as Schleiermacher maintains, to the feeling only; to accomplish this, I have inquired whether any particular development of religion, or the common characteristic of all its developments, manifests, when analyzed, any power or susceptibility but what is exhibited in states of mind which bear no relation to religion; I have investigated, in particular, the feeling which Schleiermacher represents as peculiar to religion, and as constituting its essence, and have shown that it is not necessarily peculiar to religion, and does not enter into every form of religious development; and I have next discussed the question, whether, though religion as developed may manifest no powers nor susceptibilities but what are developed independently of religion, there may not exist some religious power or susceptibility to which may be ascribed the peculiar exercise of the powers manifested in a religious development; and I have shown that there is no such power or susceptibility, and this in two ways,—one by proving that such a power, supposing it to exist, would not suffice to account for the effects produced; the other, that the production of the effects can be fully accounted for, without supposing that there is any such power. Such is a brief summary of the course of argument by which I have attempted to prove that there is no separate religious faculty or susceptibility.

Before, however, I conclude the discussion, I must notice two additional arguments adduced by Mr. Morell in favour of the proposition that there is an original

element in the nature of man, from which the religious life springs ; or that religion (*essentially* speaking) is an original constituent of the human soul. They are, first, the *universality* of the tendency to fear or to worship the spiritual *in some form* : and, secondly, that admitting the religious life to be first *awakened* by means of external agencies, there must still be some inward faculty or sensibility to which these outward influences appeal.*

As to the first of these arguments,—the universality of the tendency to fear or to worship the spiritual in some form,—let me observe that there are two different senses in which we may understand the universality referred to, to be maintained,—one, that the spiritual, in some form, is everywhere *actually* feared or worshipped ; the other, that it is everywhere feared or worshipped, *as soon as the idea of it is presented to the mind*. If the latter be all that is meant, it will prove nothing more than that a certain idea is adapted to produce a certain influence on the mind ; or rather, that the mind is so constituted as to be susceptible of a particular influence from a certain idea. But this would be no evidence of a separate religious faculty. Is not, we ask, the mind so constituted as to receive an influence from all its ideas ? If so, are we to maintain that its susceptibility is, in the case of each distinct idea, owing to a separate faculty of our nature ? If this cannot be maintained, it can be no proof of there being an original element in our nature from which the religious life springs, that there is a tendency to fear or worship the spiritual *as soon as the idea of the spiritual is presented*. If, however, Mr. Morell be understood as holding not simply, that there is a tendency to fear or worship

* Phil. of Rel., page 65.

the spiritual as soon as the idea of the spiritual is presented, but that the spiritual is in some form everywhere *actually* feared or worshipped, I do not believe it to be borne out by fact; but even supposing that it is, it would simply prove, that some cause universally existed for producing the effect, not that that cause was *necessarily* a separate original principle, power, or element of human nature. Whether we can account for the idea of God, without supposing it to be owing to any separate religious faculty, remains for future investigation; but if we can, and can also account for the fact that the idea is, in some form, prevalent if not universal amongst men, the argument, that the spiritual is universally (supposing it to be a fact) feared or worshipped by man, would not prove a separate religious faculty.

As to Mr. Morell's second argument, that, admitting the religious life to be first awakened by means of external agencies, there must still be some inward faculty or sensibility to which these outward influences appeal, I remark, first, that it assumes the point to be proved, at least if any stress is intended to be placed on the term "*awakened*," for if we were to admit that the religious life is developed by the *awakening* of something previously dormant, we of course must admit the pre-existence in a dormant state, of the power or susceptibility, which when awakened, is termed religious life. The first admission includes the second; but the first admission will not be made by any who do not previously hold with Mr. Morell, that there is a separate religious faculty belonging to man. But, secondly, if the argument is not intended to rest on the term "*awakened*," but merely on the self-evident fact, that external agencies could do nothing for the production of

religion, except there was in the mind such a susceptibility to their influence as would render them adequate to accomplish the object, I remark that whilst admitting this fact, it will not prove the point in dispute; for supposing that religion can be produced, as we maintain it can, by the action of external agencies on the ordinary powers and susceptibilities of the mind, there is here no separate religious power or susceptibility, and yet there is *that* in human nature on which external agencies can work, and on which by working they can produce the effect spoken of.

These reasons lead me to regard the two arguments of Mr. Morell as insufficient to establish his doctrine, that the religion of man is to be ascribed to some "inward susceptibility which exists as a primary element in the original scheme of our spiritual nature."

I have already remarked that the question we have discussed belongs both to psychology and to the science of religion. We have investigated it, on the principles of psychology, and with the use of the help which psychology affords. The fact that the same question belongs to both sciences, is a powerful evidence of their intimate relation, and the discussion of such a question must, I think, tend to confirm the argument of the first lecture, and to show how valuable the help of psychology is to the decision of disputed questions in theology.

There are several other questions of like importance to which I might call attention, but the only one, bearing a relation to the religious life, which I shall propose in the present course of lectures, refers TO THE SELF-DETERMINING POWER OF THE WILL. I need not say that this has for ages been the controversy of the church; I

only wish that it had always been discussed with the mildness and forbearance so characteristic of the christian spirit, and with the humility which becomes those who ought to feel that they are not infallible. I trust, however, that a better spirit is now coming over the church in the conduct of religious controversies, and that I shall not forget, that in the matter before us, there are many men on both sides of the question worthy of general esteem and affection.

I shall rejoice if I can throw any additional light on this difficult topic; at the same time, whilst it will be my endeavour to put it into a clearer form, I shall not hesitate to use arguments which I regard as valid, merely because they have been used before. Some of the best arguments have, especially since the days of President Edwards, been often handled; still it is, I think, possible to suggest some additional considerations, and perhaps equally so, to put, at least in some cases, old arguments in a more convincing light.

By "*will*" I understand the power which the mind has of action: a "*volition*" is this power in actual exercise. In reference to this power,—the power of will,—it has been asked, whether anything external to itself, either in the mind or out of it, is necessary to occasion its exercise;—in other words, whether the will may and does not, sometimes at least, act simply of itself, and irrespectively of any influence produced upon it from without. To this question different answers have been returned. Some have affirmed that motive is *physically* necessary to enable the will to act, and that it determines with absolute physical necessity the measure and direction of the action; thus reducing the mind to a mere machine, and virtually ascribing all our actions to fatal-

ism. Others have affirmed that motive, though not physically, is *morally* necessary to the exercise of the active power of the mind, and determines with a moral necessity the measure and direction of the action : *in other words*, that motive is necessary to determine the action of the will, not because the will is physically unable to act without motive, but because it would be unwilling to act without it : the will could will, if it pleased, without any inducement, but except there be an inducement it will not please to will. A third class affirm that the will is both physically and morally able to act without motive, and hence that its action, neither physically nor morally, depends, either for its existence, its measure, or its direction, on motive ; and this is what is meant by the self-determining power of the will. We do not now enter into the question, whether there is any absolute physical necessity for the presence of motive before we can exercise will, because the general consciousness of mankind will at once testify that there is no such necessity. When a man wills to act in any way, he is conscious of the physical power to will in an opposite way, though he has no motive to do so. The only question, then, which we now propose for investigation, is, whether motive be morally necessary in order to action, or whether man be morally as well as physically able to act irrespectively of all motive.

And here I must premise what will, probably, be, at first view, doubted by some, *that the question has reference to all our actions*. Either the will is, *in every case*, the sole cause, occasion, and end of our actions, or it is *in no case* their sole cause, occasion and end. For suppose that it was in some cases and not in others, there must be a reason for the difference. That reason must be either

totally irrespective of the will, or it must be in the will, either as uninfluenced by motive, or as under the influence of motive. But if the will is, in some cases, the sole cause, occasion, and end of our actions, and not in others, the reason of the difference cannot be totally irrespective of the will, because such a supposition would destroy what (we have taken for granted) is not disputed, and what would undoubtedly be maintained by every advocate for the self-determining power of the will—viz., the physical power of the will to act irrespectively of motive; for on the supposition that the question, whether the will is to act with motive or without, is decided *irrespectively of the will*, the will is evidently under the absolute control of something exterior to itself, and hence, is destitute of physical power to act differently from what it does. If, however, the reason of the difference is not in anything totally irrespective of the will, but in the will itself, it is either in the will irrespectively of motive or in the will under the influence of motive. If, on the one hand, it be in the will irrespectively of motive, the will in every case decides in the first instance without any motive, whether it will or will not put itself under the influence of motive; and hence, in every case, the original decision, the primary movement of the will to which the action is to be ultimately attributed, is totally without motive. If, on the other hand, the reason of the difference be in the will under the influence of motive, every action must be primarily attributable to motive; for if any action be done without motive, it is, by the supposition, to be ultimately ascribed to a previous decision of the will, which previous decision has been occasioned by motive. The true question, therefore, is, whether the will *always* acts without any regard to

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motive, except when, without any motive at all for doing so, it determines to put itself under the influence of motive; or whether the will *always* acts under the influence of motive, except when, under that influence, it resolves to act without regard to motive. In the first case it has a self-determining power, moral as well as physical: in the second case it has no self-determining moral power.

The arguments that the will has not a self-determining power of the latter kind, are as follows:—First, *our consciousness testifies that many of our actions are under the influence of motive, and this without any previous determination of the will to put itself under such influence.* If the will had a self-determining power, there would, as we have seen, if at least motive ever influenced it at all, be, in *every* case in which it was so influenced, a double volition, one to decide whether it would be influenced by motive, *this first decision being necessarily irrespective of motive*,—the other, a decision to act, *this being, as the result of the previous volition, under the influence of motive.* Hence, if we are conscious that many of our actions are under the influence of motive, we must in every such case be conscious, provided the will has a self-determining power, of a double volition. But is it not a fact, that whilst we are conscious of actions performed under the influence of motive, we are not conscious of a double volition previous to their performance? I may be conscious of a volition to remove my arm from an uncomfortable position, and of this volition being occasioned by a desire to be delivered from what is uncomfortable; but I am not conscious of any previous volition, occasioned by no motive at all, to put my will under the influence of this motive. If then

it be true, that, if the will has a self-determining power, such a movement of my arm could not take place without a double volition, my consciousness bears testimony that the will has not a self-determining power, for it tells me that there was no double volition. The only answer that could be given to this argument is, that the movements of mind are so rapid as sometimes scarcely to excite attention, and that in such cases the consciousness is immediately forgotten. But let me ask whether, if there was, *in every case* in which action is influenced by motive, a double volition, and if the first volition was always irrespectively of motive, it would not be natural to expect that the consciousness of it would in some cases be remembered; if it would, let me further ask, whether we ever remember a case in which we are conscious of a double volition, where the first had no respect at all to motive. If not, there is some reason to conclude that a double volition, the first without motive, does not precede every action of the kind referred to; and therefore, since it has been shown that, if the will has a self-determining power, there must in the cases in question, be such double volition prior to action, that it has no self-determining power.

Secondly. Not only does our own consciousness testify that, without any double volition, many of our actions are performed under the influence of motive, *but it will be found to be the common judgment of mankind, that there is an essential connexion between action and motive*,—a common judgment which may be presumed to be founded on a common experience. That such is the common judgment of mankind is evident from the fact that we find men everywhere judging of the motives of others from their conduct. Thus we find them regarding it as cor-

roborative evidence that a man is innocent of a crime laid to his charge, if there is no conceivable motive which could induce him to commit it; and, on the other hand, as confirmatory evidence that an individual is guilty if he had strong motives for committing it. Now, if the will had a self-determining power, there would, as we have seen, be no essential connexion between motive and action; it would be a mere accident if there ever was any such connexion. Hence, unless experience has led all men astray, and the common judgment of mankind is false, the will cannot have a self-determining power. If it be said, in reply, that the common judgment of mankind might with equal success be appealed to on the opposite side of the question, because it would be found to testify that the will has a self-determining power, I answer that I do not believe that it would testify anything of the kind. It is, I allow, the common judgment of men that they can will as they please; but not that they will ever please to will irrespectively of motive; they may generally believe that they have power, by which they mean *physical* power, to will in opposition even to all motive; but they do not believe that they have the moral power, in other words, that they will ever be willing to exercise their physical power without any motive to do so. The judgment of mankind, then, if thoroughly investigated, will be found to be, that their will has a physical power to act irrespectively of any influence of motive, but that its moral power or willingness to act depends on motive.

A third argument used to prove that the will has no self-determining power is, *that every change implies a cause*. I shall have occasion, in a future part of the course, to investigate the origin of this judgment amongst

mankind, and the reason of its universality. I shall here simply remark that the fact of its universality is a strong evidence of its truth, especially as no counter evidence can be produced. Our reasoning may, then, we think, be fairly founded on the supposition, that the judgment referred to is worthy of belief, and on this supposition we shall proceed.

Now, wherever there is any particular exercise of will there is a change. If the will be supposed ever to be entirely dormant, any action would be a change; and if it was not dormant, a change of action would be a change. If, then, every change implies a cause, to what cause, we ask, is action to be attributed, when the will has been previously dormant, and to what cause is change of action attributable when the will was not previously dormant? If we are told that the will itself is the only cause, I reply that, if by will we are to understand simply a power to act, a power to act since it does not necessarily produce action, at least on the hypothesis that the will is sometimes dormant, cannot of itself be sufficient to account for action; and that, even if the hypothesis be denied that the will is sometimes dormant, still, as a power to act does not necessarily produce one particular determination of the power rather than another, a power to act cannot, of itself, be sufficient to account for the particular action. So far then as, in the one case, action is not accounted for by the supposition that the will is its only cause, and as, in the other case, the particular action is not accounted for by that supposition, we are reduced to the necessity either of adding another cause to the will, so that the two combined shall be sufficient to account for the whole effect, or to admit, so far as that part of the effect

is concerned, for which the will as sole cause does not account, that there is a change in existence for which there is no cause. Let us illustrate both the cases alluded to. We will first suppose it possible for the will to be dormant, and will imagine a man to be in a state of total mental inactivity. His will is at rest. The will, however, after being at rest for some time, is exerted, and as the result he moves his body. There is evidently a change in the will ; it was at rest, but it is now in action. Why this change? Are we answered that it is owing to the fact that the will has power to act ; we reply that the will has also power, according to the hypothesis, to refrain from acting ; and hence that we want it to be explained, not only to what power the action is to be attributed, but to what cause the exercise of that power is to be ascribed. The will accounts for the power, but it does not of itself account for the power being exercised at that time. Except then a motive be introduced, there is in nature a change, and yet no cause for the change. The same illustration will serve for the second case, if instead of supposing the exercise of will to be a change from a state of inactivity, we merely suppose it to be a change of exercise. Here we have not to account for the exercise of the will ; this is accounted for if the will be supposed to be necessarily active, but we have to account for a particular change in its exercise ; and for this the will, as sole cause, does not account. And accordingly, as before, if we do not introduce a motive, there is in nature a change, and no cause for the change.

If it be said that the will is something more than mere power, and that it includes in itself the whole cause requisite to produce the effect, I answer that to

make it anything more would be to make it synonymous with mind, and so to comprehend all the mental faculties and susceptibilities. If any one chooses to do this, he may, of course, make the will comprehend motive, and then no one would dispute with him whether the will has or has not a self-determining power. What we maintain is, not that the mind may not find in itself both the power and the motive to act, but that the power to act will not be exercised without the motive, and this is, we think, established by the principle that every change implies a cause.

Some who hold that the will has a self-determining power have misrepresented this principle,—they have described it as affirming not merely that every *change* implies a cause, but that every *existence* implies one; and hence have said that on this principle a First Cause cannot exist. Before, however, the principle can properly be applied to existence, the question must be asked, whether the existence be a change; for if not, it does not imply a cause for the same reason that every change implies one. Accordingly, we believe the principle to be utterly inapplicable to a First Cause, which, having been eternally existent, is so far from being essentially a change, that it is essentially incapable of being so considered; hence it may exist though there be no previous cause to which it can be attributed.

Having thus stated direct arguments to prove that the will has not a self-determining power, let me now notice some objections to the doctrine I have advocated. One is, that there are cases in the experience of every man in which the will must be supposed to act without motive. Of these cases there are two kinds: one, when we act, though it is a matter of indifference to us whether we

do so or not—as, for example, when I move my hand, though it is indifferent to me whether I continue or change its former position ; the other, when we do one of a number of possible actions, although, whilst we have motive to do one of them, we know of no motive for the particular one in preference to any of the rest—as, for example, when a man takes one of a number of apples placed before him, though all are equally inviting. But in cases of indifference, such as those mentioned, the slightest motives would be sufficient to influence the will, motives so slight as to attract no attention, and therefore to escape from recollection as soon as they had produced the effect. Accordingly, a motive may possibly exist, even though immediately afterwards it cannot be remembered ; and if it may possibly exist, the arguments already adduced are sufficient to prove that, in the cases specified, it must have existed.

Another objection urged by some, is, that the self-determining power of the will is necessary to make man justly responsible. They argue that, without such a self-determining power, it does not depend on the will itself, but on the circumstances in which the will is placed, what its action will be ; but that if the action does not depend on the will itself, it would not be just to make man responsible for it. This argument might have some force if will was the only power requisite to responsibility. If man could have been justly made responsible without being made rational, and without being endowed with a capacity for emotion, it might have been urged that if the will had not a self-determining power, as it would be unsusceptible of the influence of motive, it would be both without moral and without physical

power to act, except as controlled from without; and therefore, as its action would in no sense depend on itself, it ought not to be made responsible for it. But it will not be maintained that in such a case it would be just to make man responsible, even though a self-determining power was committed to the will. If man had no capacity to understand his obligation to God, he could not deserve blame for disregarding it; it would be equally just to make the irrational animals responsible, as to make man responsible if he were irrational. If, however, man's responsibility depends not on his will only, but on the union of all his powers, his actions may depend on himself, that is, on his knowledge, on his affections and desires, as well as on his will, without depending on his will alone; and the fact that they thus depended on himself would be sufficient to justify his being treated as responsible. Still it may be said that either his knowledge, affections, and desires are under the control of his will, or not; that if not, it does not depend on himself what his knowledge, affections, and desires are, and therefore, that so far as they influence his actions, his actions cannot primarily spring from himself; the consequence being that his actions are really out of his own control: and that even if, on the other hand, his knowledge, affections, and desires are under the control of his will, they are, except the will has a self-determining power, under the control of the previous knowledge, affections, and desires, which determine its controlling influence; the consequence being as before, that as his will is first influenced by the knowledge, affections, and desires, which are independent of it, the actions, if traced to their first spring, are out

of his own control. This objection is an important one, and I will try to make it as clear as I can. If a man is influenced by the state of his own mind, and if his will has no power to resist the influence, and had nothing to do with producing the state of mind which influences him, the actions when traced to their source are not found to have a subjective origin, but to originate entirely from without; but if his actions originate entirely from without, they are not dependent on himself, and hence he ought not to be considered responsible for them. And there is equal reason for this conclusion, even if the will had to do with producing the state of mind which influences the man, provided the will only acted from the influence of a preceding state of mind, and had no power to resist its influence, for such a supposition only throws the objective origin of the actions a step further back. This objection would, I admit, be very forcible if urged against the doctrine that the will has not a self-determining *physical* power; but it will be found on investigation to have no force when urged against the doctrine that the will has not a self-determining moral power. I need not again say, that by the physical power of the will is meant the power to act as it pleases. Now, we do not deny that it has power to determine its own actions if it pleases, and to do so irrespectively of motive; what we deny is, that it has a self-determining moral power, or that it will ever please to determine its own actions irrespectively of motive. In the cases, therefore, referred to above, the will, according to our doctrine, has the physical power to resist the influence spoken of, but not the moral power, in other words, not the willingness to exert its physical power. Even then if the actions could, by tracing them

through all the previous mental process or processes to which they are attributable, be ultimately ascribed to objective influences, as the will whilst it had the physical power to resist these influences did not exert it, the man is justly responsible for the effects which have followed.

Some further arguments in favour of the views we have expressed will suggest themselves, and perhaps also some additional difficulties and objections will be met, whilst we proceed to show the relation which the psychological question we have discussed, and the manner in which we think it ought to be solved, bears to the science of religion.

First. It is connected with the science of religion, (that is, of subjective religion,) because there could be no such thing as subjective religion, provided that our actions originated in the self-determining power of the will, and were attributable to no other cause. I have shown, that if the will has the self-determining power claimed for it, not merely some, but all our actions, when traced to their primary origin, are attributable to the exercise of that power. As far then as their first origin is concerned, motive has nothing to do with them, and if not motive, the knowledge, the affections, and the desires, can have nothing to do with them. But it is the motive which gives moral character to our actions; they would have no moral character if they were done without motive, except indeed the absence of motive be regarded as itself blameworthy; but this it could not be, on the supposition of the self-determining power of the will, because in that case the primary decision of the will, *the decision of which alone I am now speaking*, is necessarily without motive; and if necessarily without motive, it cannot be blameworthy for being without it.

Consequently since all our actions are primarily attributable, if the will has a self-determining moral as well as physical power, to that power independently of all reference to motive, none of them can have any moral character. I will put this reasoning into another form. We take for granted here what we think we have satisfactorily proved in a former part of the present lecture—that either ALL our actions are influenced by motive, or that they ALL primarily originate in a self-determining act of the will which is independent of motive. If the latter, a self-determining act of the will must necessarily be the primary cause of action, and therefore actions cannot be blameworthy simply as having no respect to motive, seeing that they can only result from a self-determining power, which cannot *possibly* have respect to motive. But actions which are done without motive, and which are not blamable for being so done, are in their own nature neither the object of praise nor censure. And hence, on the supposition that the will has the self-determining power claimed for it, no action whatever can bear any moral character. Even if immediately done from motive, it is only because the will has, without any motive, previously decided to put itself under the power of motive ; and it is, it must be remembered, this original decision of the will, seeing that it is the primary cause of all that follows, which must decide the moral character of the action.

And not only for the reasons given are all our actions really without moral character, if attributable to the self-determining power of the will, but the state of the mind is in that case also without moral character. It will be admitted that the state of the mind derives its whole moral character from its relation to the will ; for suppose

I could feel gratitude for a favour done to me, without my will having anything to do with it, either in producing it, in approving it, or in being influenced by it; my feeling not being in any sense voluntary, and producing no effect upon me, could not entitle me to commendation; nor would a contrary feeling, so long as my will had nothing whatever to do with it, render me worthy of censure. I have in neither case any power over my own state of mind; if it be good in itself it is not owing to me, and if it be evil it is not owing to me. But the state of mind, when all the actions are attributable primarily to a self-determining power of the will, either bears no relation at all to the will, and therefore, for the reason just stated, must be without moral character; or, if it bears any relation to the will, it is only to an act of will which was without motive, and therefore without moral character, a relation which would not suffice to give a moral character.

But can that be subjective religion which consists in a state of mind utterly destitute of moral character; and in connexion with which there are no actions but what are equally destitute of moral character? Here is a man who, if he has any feeling towards God, has it, so far as he himself was concerned in its production, by a mere accident, not by design, and is still, except by a like accident, totally uninfluenced by it: no one would call that man religious, and yet he may have all the religion possible to human nature, provided the will has a self-determining power. Nay, we may go yet further: not merely would a state of feeling appropriate to our relation to God be undeserving the name of religion, if it existed in the circumstances just named, but in those circumstances it would

be impossible that such a state of feeling should exist. Feeling that does not influence the will, and influence it irrespectively of any previous decision to which it may, without motive, have come to put itself under its influence, is no feeling at all. To say that I love another, and yet that my love has no influence in deciding me whether to do or to refrain from an action which affects his happiness, is a contradiction. It enters into the essence of feeling to move the will, and it would not be what we understand by feeling if it did not move it. Provided then the will originated all our actions, independently of motive, except when without motive it had resolved to put itself under the influence of motive, (and this I repeat is necessary, if the will has a self-determining power,) not only would appropriate feeling towards God, supposing it could exist, be unworthy the name of religion, but it would be impossible for any such feeling to exist. Accordingly, the psychological question we have discussed is connected with the science of religion, because if the will has a self-determining power there can be no such thing as religion.

Secondly. It is further connected with the science of religion, because it teaches us how religion may be produced and strengthened. Admit that religion is possible on the supposition that the will has a self-determining power, and it can only be possible provided the will does its part: that cannot possibly be religion which exists independently of the will, and produces no influence whatever upon it. But if the will must act in order to the existence of religion, how is religion to be produced if the will has a self-determining power? We may present the most powerful motives, but no motive will produce any influence till the will has decided that,

in the case in question, it will be governed by motive ; how then is this first decision to be obtained ? No motive will obtain it, for, by hypothesis, it is a decision made without motive. No power then at all can obtain it ; no power extraneous to the party, for, the will being physically free, it is inaccessible to physical force, the only force possible where motive has no influence ; and no power belonging to the party can obtain it, for his will, being independent of motive, receives no influence either from his knowledge or his affections ; the only power he has is that of the will itself, and this power, being exercised without motive, is exercised independently of his knowledge, and of any of his affections. He cannot then be religious except as a matter of *pure accident*,—of *mere chance*. If his will should, without motive, happen to decide to listen to motive, all well and good. If it should happen to decide the contrary, (and this must be equally possible when there is nothing either objective or subjective to prevent such a result,) the individual must necessarily be inaccessible to any religious influence.

How different the case on the supposition that the will has no self-determining power, but is essentially governed by motives ! We know in such a case at once how we may produce or strengthen religion, either in ourselves or in others. We have simply to present those motives which are calculated to move the will. I admit that the objective presentation of motives may fail, but it is not because the will is inaccessible to motive, but because it is accessible to the influence of a variety of motives, some of which counteract the influence of others : thus the affections and desires control the will, but what would excite an affection or desire in one state of mind would not do it in another ; and when an

affection is excited, it may be sufficiently powerful to move the will when there is no other affection exerting a contrary influence, but not sufficiently powerful to move it in opposition to counter influences.

Permit me to digress for one moment to observe, that whilst the supposition, that the will has no self-determining power, teaches us how it may be influenced, the fact that in such a case it is exposed to a variety of influences from within as well as from without, shows how important it is to those who would so present motives as to accomplish their object, to study mind, and the different influences to which it is subjected, that whilst they present inducements to a certain course of conduct, they may also lead it to resist the affections and motives which would produce a counteracting influence.

But to return. Let it not be supposed that we are here setting aside the necessity of Divine influence. The influence of motives which ought to govern the will depends on the state of the heart; and hence it is, that that new heart and right spirit, which God alone can bestow, are so essential in order to the production of real religion. Still, as God works with us, in other words, gives the heart which will feel the influence of motive at the time when the motive is presented, we must use moral means if we desire to see the heart renewed,—those moral means by which we may hope to influence, provided the will is governed by motive; whereas there are, as we have seen, no means by which we can possibly influence it in the first instance, if it has a self-determining power.

If it be allowed that Divine influence is necessary for the production of inward religion, I may remark, *thirdly*, that the psychological question we have discussed is

further connected with the science of religion, because it is only on the supposition that our actions are not regulated by the self-determining power of the will, that Divine influence can possibly be the first cause to which our religion is to be attributed. If actions were all primarily regulated by the self-determining power of the will, the will must, in its primary movement, be unsusceptible of any influence, for in that case its nature renders influence impossible till without influence of any kind it has of itself decided to yield to influence. But if it be primarily unsusceptible of influence, either physical or moral, it must be essentially unsusceptible in its first movement of the influence of God. God might, indeed, alter its nature, might destroy its self-determining power; but without doing this he could exert no influence over it. The consequence would be, that it would be entirely dependent on an act of will performed by the party *without any influence at all*, whether God could possibly influence his will; and, therefore, if he became religious, he would owe the result not primarily to the power of God, but primarily to the accidental self-determination of his own will.

The question, then, whether the will has or has not a self-determining power, has three different relations to the science of religion; for on the solution of this question depends, as we have seen, first, the possibility of religion; secondly, whether man can use any means to produce it; and thirdly, whether it can possibly be primarily attributable to Divine influence. But the question, I may remark in conclusion, also sustains a relation to theology, *or the science relating to God*, for, as it has been often remarked, it depends on its solution whether foreknowledge is possible to God. If all the actions of

the will be primarily attributable to its self-determining power, they must be contingent on what is *in its own nature* pure accident, and therefore cannot possibly be foreseen. But if, on the other hand, they be attributable to the influence of motive, they may be foreseen by a Being who is perfectly acquainted with the state of the heart, all its affections, all its susceptibilities, and with the external circumstances in which it will be placed, together with the kind and measure of influence they will exert. Thus when God created Adam he knew his nature, for he himself had made it; he knew what the first circumstances would be in which he would be placed, for he himself determined those circumstances; accordingly, he knew what his first action would be, provided that action was performed under the influence of motives; knowing his first action, he would know what the natural effect of that action would be on his mind and on his external circumstances, and accordingly he would know what the next action would be; thus he would know what the external circumstances would be as the result of every action, not only of Adam, but of other men, and knowing their nature, the effect of their actions on their nature, and the effect of external circumstances, he would know how motives would influence them at any and every specific future time; and knowing all actions and all circumstances, he would know what motives would present themselves, or be presented, and hence would know all results. Foreknowledge is possible if the will be governed by motives, but it is, as it seems to me, *in its own nature* impossible on the opposite supposition. Here then is an important relation between the psychological question, whether the will has a self-determin-

ing power, and the theological question, whether God has or can have perfect foreknowledge.

So much for the much-controverted question relative to the self-determining power of the will. I have explained what I mean by the will, and the import of the question in reference to its self-determining power. I have shown, *and this is a very important part of the argument*, that the question necessarily refers to the primary origin of all our actions, or that it is impossible that some of our actions should *primarily* originate in a self-determining power of the will, and others in the influence of motives. I next stated the evidence that the will has no self-determining moral power. Here I first appealed to consciousness; secondly, to the common judgment of mankind; and, thirdly, to the principle so generally admitted and acted upon by men, that every change implies a cause. I then noticed objections; in particular,—that there are cases in the experience of every man, in which the will is supposed to act without motive,—and that a self-determining power is supposed to be essential to responsibility. And, finally, I showed the connexion between the question as a branch of psychology and the science of religion.

Some may think that the truth may lie between the two extremes, and that neither, on the one hand, the will may at any time exercise a self-determining power, nor, on the other, whilst always influenced by motives, be ever *necessarily* influenced by them. If the term “necessarily” has simply reference to physical necessity, this is the very theory we have been advocating; but if it be supposed to refer to moral as well as physical necessity, a little consideration will convince us, that if the

preceding reasoning has any force, it is as completely opposed to such a supposition as it is to any other view of the self-determining power of the will; for if the will is not with a moral necessity influenced by motives, it must, as we have shown, depend simply on itself, and this without any influence at all, whether it chooses to be so influenced or not; and hence it can only be so far influenced as it first has decided to be. I do not say that the decision immediately preceding the final one may not be under the influence of motive, but as, by the hypothesis, it is not *necessarily* under its influence, such influence can only, as we have seen, be the result of a determination previously made to put itself under it; if so, and we go back, we cannot stop, except we reject the hypothesis, till we arrive at a primary decision which is come to by the mere self-determining power of the will. Take any case, and if we investigate the whole mental process by which it was preceded, it will be found ultimately resolvable, either into one in which the will is *wholly* controlled by its self-determining power, irrespectively of all motive, or one in which the will receives its bias solely from motive, and irrespectively of any self-determining power.

I am aware that many of my brethren, in whose wisdom and judgment I have great confidence, disagree with me in these views, but I believe the disagreement, if investigated, would be seen to be more apparent than real. Thus, in an able article, which appeared in the "Biblical Review," for April, 1848, it is maintained that the choice of men does not *necessarily* result from motive, but yet it is admitted that it may be its *certain* result, for it speaks of "*the presentation of motives, which cer-*

tainly, yet without necessity, influence choice." A necessity which is opposed to certainty must be a physical opposed to a moral necessity, and it is only a moral necessity for which we contend. We do not believe that the will is ever influenced by physical force, but that physically it is perfectly free. Accordingly, we hold with the writer of the article alluded to, that in conversion the only influence *directly exerted on the will* is moral, though we also believe that God does not simply set forth objective motives in his word, but so works on the susceptibilities of the mind as to give their due power to motives, which otherwise, in consequence of the depraved condition of the affections and desires, would be utterly powerless. But that even here, we and the writer spoken of, are *substantially* one, is evident from his remark that "the motives to good, which are requisite to call forth that choice which is required of man, can only be rendered effective by the promised help of Christ given by his Spirit abiding in us."

No doubt that the question, even after all the attention and discussion it can possibly receive, is not free from difficulty. But whatever may be its remaining difficulty, there are two truths which seem to me to be established too firmly for any objection or difficulty to shake; one that the will is determined by motive, including under motive the subjective feeling as well as the objective appeal to the mind,—the other, that man is righteously responsible for all his actions. I believe, for the reasons already given, that these two truths are inseparably connected. Sir William Hamilton, though a firm believer in the *full* freedom of the will, is constrained to admit that "if a person be an original, undetermined cause

of the determination of his will, it is impossible to see how a cause, undetermined by any motive, can be a rational, moral, and accountable cause.”*

I think I have made it plain what I mean by motive, but lest there should be any misapprehension, I will quote an able note appended by Dr. Williams to the valuable work on the will by President Edwards, in which will be found, very distinctly explained, both the sense in which Edwards used the term motive, and in which I wish my use of the term to be understood.

“Our author does not mean by motive the object presented to the mind according to its intrinsic worth, but he takes into account also the state of the mind itself in reference to that object, according to which will be the *appearance* of it. Therefore, strictly speaking, the motive denotes the object as it stands in the view of the mind. If we do not maintain this distinction, the dispute will soon degenerate into a confused logomachy : and we should be forced in defending this position, that the will is ‘necessarily determined by the strongest motive,’ to adopt this, the most absurd of all conclusions, that the will of every man in the present state always chooses what is really best, or never errs in its elections. Whereas the world is full of errors and delusions : things the most excellent in themselves are commonly rejected, and others the most worthless are preferred. But this could not happen, except on this principle, that the *reality* of worth differs in those instances from the *appearance* of it. In such cases the *difference* is not in the object, but in the mind, when the choice takes place. For instance, suppose the blessed God, in his true character as revealed in the Scriptures,

* Hamilton's Reid, p. 602. See Note by the Editor.

the chief and unchangeable good, be proposed to the contemplation of a wicked man, and his will *rejects* that good. Now, as the mind is incapable of rejecting a good or choosing an evil *as such*, it is plain that the proper and immediate cause of difference between the reality and the appearance of good is in *the state* of the mind. Here lies the essence of an erroneous choice,—the will preferring an object which is *apparently* but not *really* preferable. Hence it follows irrefragably, that *the state of the mind* is the true and proper source of a right and wrong choice. This is it that influences the appearance of an object so as to stand in the apprehension and practical judgment of the mind as worse or better than it *really* is. Therefore the true state of the mind and the real state of the object of choice united are the genuine parents of the *objective appearance* in the mind, morally considered, or according to the qualities of good and evil : and this offspring—OBJECTIVE APPEARANCE—is what our author calls the strongest motive.”*

* Edwards' Works, vol. i. p. 49. Note by Dr. Williams.

LECTURE III.

PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO INVESTIGATIONS RESPECTING GOD.

[In the preceding Lecture controverted questions relating to religion were, with the aid of psychology, discussed. In this, and the next Lecture, attention is given to controverted questions relating to God. The object of this Lecture is to investigate *the origin* of the idea of God. The idea we have of God is first explained. It is then shown that it cannot possibly be our own creation. The question is next examined whether it is in any sense innate; here the three senses in which an idea may be conceived to be innate are pointed out, and it is proved that the idea of God is not innate in any of them. It is then asked whether the idea is to be ascribed to a supersensual intuition; Morell's views on this point having been stated, and the nature of a supersensual intuition explained, arguments are urged in favour of a negative reply to the inquiry. Cousin's theory of an Impersonal Reason, the source to which he assigns it, is next described, and his arguments for the impersonality of reason are shown to be insufficient. It is finally shown that the idea may be empirically acquired.]

IN my last Lecture I discussed, with the help of psychology, some controverted questions relating to religion. I now proceed, with similar help, to treat of the most important questions connected with our knowledge of God, considered as prior to, and therefore independent of, any supernatural revelation.

There are three questions in reference to the idea of God to which I shall invite your attention. First,

What is man's idea of God? Secondly, Whence have we obtained it? and, Thirdly, What ground have we for regarding it as objectively true?

The first question—*What is man's idea of God?*—may at first view seem difficult to solve, because very different ideas of Deity are found amongst mankind. The idea of some is low and grovelling, that of others high and noble; some have but an obscure notion, whilst the notion of others is comparatively clear; and even when there is no other difference, the idea of some is more contracted and narrow than that of others. The difficulty, however, will be in great measure obviated, if we only include in our question so much of our idea of God as essentially distinguishes him from all other existence. I acknowledge, that, even if we thus confine our inquiry, we shall find the idea considerably differing amongst our fellow men in point of fulness; still we shall nowhere find disagreement, the disagreement between the ideas which different men have of God, having chief if not sole reference to points which are not at all distinctive of him. Thus confining our inquiry, we shall have nothing to do with any notions which represent God as possessed of attributes, which are either the property or the possible property of any creature. Accordingly, if any think of God as a being in human form and endowed with human passions, we have nothing to do with such a notion; whether common or not, whether erroneous or not, it is not distinctive of God, and hence does not enter into that idea of Deity which we are now seeking. In like manner, if any think of God as a being *simply superhuman* in power, wisdom, and goodness; this, since it is possible for a creature to be superhuman in these attributes, does not enter into

the idea which it is our present business to ascertain. All then that we ask is, what is the idea of God which is found more or less amongst mankind, so far and only so far as it essentially distinguishes him from all creatures ?

God is believed to be *First Cause*. Here is an idea essentially distinctive of God. By *First Cause* we mean the primary original cause of all things, the cause to which all other causes owe their existence, whilst it is itself uncaused. If there be such a First Cause it cannot possibly be a creature, for a creature, *as such*, owes existence to a prior cause ; consequently, the idea is *in its own nature* distinctively applicable to that which is not creature.

God is believed to be *Necessary*. Here is another idea which is essentially distinctive of God. By a necessary being we mean one to whose nature existence essentially belongs ; one therefore to whom nonexistence is an impossibility ; one, the supposition of whose nonexistence would involve in itself a contradiction. And this cannot possibly be predicable of any creature : if a being owes his existence to another, existence cannot essentially belong to him ; his nonexistence cannot be an impossibility ; the supposition of it cannot involve a contradiction. The idea then must, *in its own nature*, be distinctively applicable to that which is not creature.

God is believed to be *Eternal*. Here is a third idea which is essentially distinctive of God. All creatures have of necessity had a beginning of existence ; if they had not, their existence could not be owing to another, and therefore they would not be creatures. That, then, which has had no beginning of existence, which has existed not only for myriads of ages but from ever-

lasting, can be no creature. The idea is one which is, *in its own nature*, distinctively applicable to that which is not creature.

God is believed to be *Independent*. Here is a fourth idea essentially distinctive of God. An independent being is one who does not depend on anything out of himself, either for existence, for perfection, or for happiness. This is the case with no creature. A creature, *as such*, depends not only for existence on another, but also for the kind and manner, and, therefore, for the perfection and happiness of his existence. The idea, therefore, of an Independent Being is, *in its own nature*, distinctively applicable to that which is not creature.

God is believed to be *Absolutely Infinite*. Here there is an additional idea distinctive of God; for absolute infinity comprehends infinity in every possible relation, and therefore infinity of power and infinity of presence, as well as infinity of duration. *Infinite duration* is synonymous with eternity, which has already been shown to be distinctive of God. If *infinite power* were not distinctive, it would be possible for creature power to be infinite,—that is, for power which is derived and dependent, to be equal to that which is underived and independent,—a supposition manifestly absurd. *Infinity of presence* is also essentially distinctive of Deity: there are two kinds of presence, active and passive, for there is presence both wherever there is a power to act immediately, and wherever the being can be immediately acted upon: the infinity of presence distinctive of God is of the former kind; it is a power to act immediately in every part of infinite space at the same moment. *Such a power is included in infinite power*; for if there was any part of space, where at any moment a being

could not act, his power would be limited, and therefore finite. *Moreover, the infinity of presence of which we are speaking includes infinite power*; for if a being can act in an infinite number of places at the same moment, the power which he possesses in any one locality is multipliable by infinity, inasmuch as he has, by hypothesis, the same power in an infinite number of localities. But if the infinite presence attributed to God both includes and is included in infinite power, it must be as distinctive of him as infinite power is.

In answer then to the question, What is man's idea of God? we reply that God, according to man's idea of him, is distinctively First Cause, Necessary, Eternal, Independent, and Infinite.

Reserving to the end of the lecture any notice of the intellectual and moral attributes of God, we proceed to our second inquiry, Whence have we obtained this idea? If we have not obtained it wholly from within, we must have acquired it, at least in part, from the objective. Let us then first ask whether the idea has merely a subjective origin. If it has, it must be either our own creation or be in some sense innate. Can it then possibly be our own creation? It undoubtedly cannot, if we may measure our power by the teaching of experience, for our past experience will tell us that we can receive ideas by the power of intuition, can analyze them when received, and can make new wholes out of their elements, but it will also tell us that we have never exercised nor been ever conscious of possessing a power to create any new material of thought whatever. Can we conceive it possible for a man born blind, to create for himself the idea of colour; or, for a man born deaf, to create for himself the idea of sound? But if it

be impossible to man to create ideas so simple as these, how can it be possible for us to create ideas so much greater, as those comprehended in the notion of a God?

But if the idea of God is not our own creation, is it in any sense innate? There are three senses in which an idea may be supposed to be innate; one, if it be something originally superadded to our mental constitution, either as an idea in the first instance fully developed; or as one undeveloped, but yet having the power of self-development: another, if the idea is a subjective condition of any other ideas, which we receive independently of the previous acquisition of this idea, and is thus proved to be in some way embodied in or interwoven with the powers by which the mind receives those ideas: a third, if, without being a subjective condition of other ideas, there be any faculty or faculties of the mind, the exercise of which would suffice, independently of any knowledge acquired from without, spontaneously to produce the idea. In the first case, the idea is given us at our first creation, without its bearing any special relation to our mental faculties; in the second case, it is given us as a form, either of thought generally or of some particular species of thought, and is therefore embodied in mental powers by which we are enabled to receive the thought; in the third case, it is, as in the second, interwoven in the original constitution of some mental power or powers; not, however as in the preceding case, simply as a prerequisite to their exercise, but by their being so formed as by exercise spontaneously to produce the idea.

Is then, we ask, the idea of God innate in the first of these senses? that is, Is it something originally super-

added to our mental constitution, either as an idea fully developed, or if undeveloped, as having the power of self-development? That it is not fully developed at birth will, I apprehend, be admitted. The mind of a new-born child does not appear to have the power of thought requisite for any intellectual idea whatever, much less for such an idea as that of God. Indeed, long after the mind has begun to receive ideas, there are few, if any, who manifest that they have any notion at all of First Cause, Necessity, Independence, Infinity, or of anything else essentially distinctive of God. But if the idea is not fully developed at birth, may it not exist though in an undeveloped state? If this is maintained, and if the idea does not belong to the second or third form of innateness, to which we shall afterwards attend, and therefore is neither a form of thought, nor is spontaneously produced by the exercise of any mental faculty, we require to be told what is meant by an idea existing in the mind in an undeveloped state. I cannot conceive of any intelligible sense which the phrase will bear. If all that is meant is that there is some power in the mind by which, when it has attained a sufficient degree of maturity, we shall be able to lay hold on the idea; such a power, seeing that, by hypothesis, it neither gives us the idea as a form of thought, nor spontaneously produces it, must, if it gives it to us at all, be either creative or intuitive; it cannot however be creative, for we have already seen that the mind has no power to create the idea: nor can it, if the idea is innate, receive it by intuition, for intuition must have an object either within the mind or without; and in the case before us there is, by the hypothesis, no object in the mind, since the power spoken of is supposed to be the *only* reason why

the idea is pronounced innate; and if the object were without the mind, the idea would be received from without, and therefore would not be innate. Independently, however, of all this, such a power as the one supposed would be anything but an undeveloped idea existing in the mind. Indeed, if the idea was innate in this sense, and was neither a form of thought, nor the spontaneous product of the exercise of any mental faculty, it must have the power of self-development, and be therefore developed independently of the exercise of the ordinary faculties of the mind. But if so, we should find it universally developed, at least in adult age, and developed irrespectively of the cultivation of the ordinary faculties. So far, however, from this, many have been found in mature age, especially where the ordinary faculties have been uncultivated, without any *distinctive* notion of God; for even if we were to grant that there is everywhere a notion of some superhuman power, it must be remembered that, as superhuman power is the possible attribute of a creature, the idea of such a power is not essentially distinctive of Deity.

The idea of God, then, is not innate in the first of the three senses to which I have adverted; let us then ask whether it is so in the second,—that is, whether it be a subjective condition of other ideas which we have the innate power of acquiring. If it be, we must have some mental power or powers the exercise of which presupposes and implies that we either already have the idea of God, or, at least, that we have it in connexion with the first exercise of the power or powers referred to. But what mental power is there the exercise of which implies of itself our previous possession of the idea of God? The powers and susceptibilities of

our mind are those of the intellect, the will, and the emotions. As to the susceptibility of emotions, we have, I conceive, no emotion but what might, in some degree at least, have been called forth if the thought of a God had never entered our minds. If it be said that this is not the case with the moral emotions, it must first be shown that the moral emotions are the offspring of a distinct susceptibility from that from which other emotions spring; for if their distinctiveness arises not from a distinct sensibility, but only from a difference of object, it must be remembered, that the possession of the susceptibility does not include the possession of every idea adapted to produce a peculiar influence upon it. And even if it could be shown that the moral emotions are the offspring of a distinct susceptibility, it must further, in order to prove that their exercise involves of itself an idea of God, be shown that there never existed a moral emotion, unless accompanied with a distinctive idea of Deity, and this would imply that, under no circumstances, could the moral feelings of self-satisfaction or of remorse be produced, except in connexion with the idea of God; a proposition which, I apprehend, very cursory observation would suffice to overthrow. Not only so, but even if it was granted, both that the moral emotions resulted from a distinct mental susceptibility, and that they were never exercised except in connexion with the idea of God, it must still be shown, before it could be thence argued that the idea of God was innate, that the distinctive susceptibility of emotion, which it is thus supposed impossible to excite independently of the idea of God, is ever excited, or can possibly be excited, before that idea has been otherwise acquired. But can this be done? Is

it not, on the contrary, true that we never find any moral emotion with which the idea of God is associated till after that idea has been, or at least may *possibly* have been, acquired previously to its existence?

We believe, however, that there is no moral, any more than any other emotion, which cannot exist, so far as its essential elements are concerned, where there is no idea of God present to the mind. If it be said, that there must any way be the idea of God in order to the existence of *religious* emotions, let me reply, that there is not only no evidence that religious emotions proceed from a different susceptibility from that to which other emotions owe their existence, but that there is no so-called religious emotion which has not been exercised towards beings real or ideal, which are inferior to God, and respecting which the party has had no notion *essentially distinctive* of Deity; and therefore that religious emotions may exist without involving the distinctive idea of God. I do not say that none of them involve the idea of the supernatural, but, as I have already remarked, the idea of the supernatural is not necessarily distinctive of God, and hence is not the idea to which our present inquiry refers. Our susceptibility of emotion, then, whether the susceptibility generally, or the susceptibility of religious emotion, does not depend upon or imply our possession of the distinctive idea of God.

Nor, let me add, does our power of will. I am not aware that it has ever been maintained that the idea of God is prerequisite to an exercise of will, nor can I conceive of the shadow of an argument by which such a proposition could be supported. If the idea was thoroughly banished from our minds, we should be still able to will.

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In fact, the inferior animals which are incapacitated for the idea, do, as we know, exercise will.

Accordingly, if there is any mental exercise which implies the pre-existence of the idea, as it is neither an exercise of emotion, nor an exercise of will, it must be intellectual,—either an exercise of intuition, of memory, of judgment, or of reasoning. The idea of God, however, is not pre-essential to an exercise of intuition, for many of our intuitions, not only do not presuppose, but have no relation to the idea. If it be said, that it is pre-essential to the higher intuitions, I reply, not only that we have no evidence that such intuitions exist, (making no further remark on this point at present, as their existence will be a subject of after investigation,) but that even if their existence was granted, the idea of God, so far from being a prerequisite to their exercise, and therefore innate, would be an external object to which they were directed. Neither is the idea prerequisite to an exercise of memory, of judgment, or of reasoning. All these powers are exercised where there is no idea of God; nay, may it not be said of many minds capable of the highest exercise of them, not only that God is not in all their thoughts, but that the powers referred to are fully exercised by them when the idea of God is far away?

For these reasons we do not believe that the idea of God is innate in the second of the three senses alluded to. It is not a subjective condition of the exercise of any mental faculty or susceptibility, whether pertaining to the emotions, the will, or the understanding.

It only remains that we investigate the question, whether the idea can be innate in the third sense,—in other words, whether any of our powers be so constituted as spontaneously to produce the idea. In order that

this question may be answered in the affirmative, the idea must be allowed to be produced independently of any knowledge gained directly or indirectly from without ; *otherwise it would not be wholly innate.*

But if we leave out everything adventitious, and regard simply the ideas which any power could give us *irrespective of the object about which it may be exercised*, the only supposable idea would respect the kind of power exercised, the mode or manner in which it is exercised, and the fact of its being exercised by ourselves. But none of these ideas necessarily include the idea of Deity. The idea then is not innate in any sense of the term, and we have previously shown that it is not our own creation. Its origin, consequently, cannot be owing entirely to the subjective.

But granting that it is owing, partially at least, to the objective, the first question presenting itself to us is, whether we have received it by direct intuition of the objective reality. To this origin some eminent philosophers have attributed it. "To the intuitional consciousness (writes Morell*) there is no idea more positive, more sure, more necessary than this. Reason up to a God, and the best you can do is, to hypostatize and deify the final product of your own faculties ; but admit the reality of an intellectual intuition, (as the mass of mankind virtually do,) and the absolute stands before us in all its living reality." The doctrine of an intellectual intuition, by which we gaze upon and gain a full knowledge of the absolute, has been held by many other thinking men from the time that it was put forth and supported by the power and genius of William Joseph Schelling. It may seem presumptuous to attack a doctrine which is so sup-

* See Philosophy of Religion, p. 39.

ported, but we bow to the authority of no man, and believe that it behoves us all to use the powers which God has given us for the discovery of truth, even if they lead us to a conclusion directly opposite to that which confessedly has highly distinguished and powerful advocates. Not, however, that all the philosophy and learning of the past and of the present age are on the side of an intellectual intuition. Were it necessary, we might name men of no inferior power, who have taken an opposite view, but we wish to follow truth, and not names, however eminent. We proceed then at once to the inquiry, Have we an immediate intuition of God? To prevent all misapprehension in reference to the meaning of this inquiry, let me remark that the intuition supposed is not *sensual*;—no one maintains that we have a sensual intuition of God; it is simply intellectual, that is, an intuition in which the intuitive power is supposed *immediately* to apprehend, lay hold of, perceive the Deity in what has been called “the atmosphere of reason,” in like manner as in sensual intuition, the perceptive power apprehends and lays hold of objects in the material world around us.

In discussing this question, I shall not notice Mr. Morell’s remark, that, “if we reason up to a God, the best we can do is, to hypostatize and deify the product of our own faculties,” further than by observing that if by thus reasoning up to God we can gain a true idea of him, and this we hope hereafter to show,—we do not deify a creation of our own minds; we only discover, by means of our faculties, the existence of a being necessarily deified. The remark referred to proceeds on the supposition that we cannot discover God except by an intuitional

power, a supposition which assumes the point in dispute between us.

In order to ascertain whether we have such an immediate intuition of God, let us ask, *first*, whether it is possessed by all men ; and if not, whether, *secondly*, there is sufficient evidence that it is possessed by any. If all have an immediate intuition of God, it must be allowed that if men would interrogate their experience they would find a consciousness of the intuition spoken of ; for consciousness accompanies the exercise of all our faculties, and it is the only direct evidence we have or can have of their exercise. Still it may be said, that the consciousness of an object of intuition may not be equally clear in the case of an intellectual as in that of a sensual intuition ; partly, because the power of sensual intuition may be more fully developed ; partly, because, supposing the intellectual power to be equally developed, the objective may, in its own nature, be further removed from our reach than it is in the case of sensual intuition ; and partly, because the mind, in consequence of the undue influence which it allows sense to exercise over it, attends more easily and fully to the intuitions of sense than to those of the intellect. But let me observe in reply, that whatever difference these supposed causes may produce between the two classes of intuitions, it could not be sufficient, so far to destroy consciousness, in the case of one of the classes, as to render the fact, whether there was a conscious exercise of any intuition whatever, questionable. It might have the effect of *obscuring the object of intuition*, but it would not render it doubtful to us, whether we had any intuition of it at all : the utmost effect could only be of a like kind

to that produced by obscure sensual vision ; if the power of perception by the sense of sight was obscured, either because it was imperfectly developed, or had received any injury, or because there was some obscuring medium between the eye and the object, we might be rendered dubious as to the kind of object on which we were looking, but should not be dubious as to the question, whether we had any vision or not. Grant this, and we ask whether it is not an incontrovertible fact that numbers, even at those times when they most diligently interrogate their consciousness on the subject, are utterly unconscious that they ever had any intellectual intuition whatever. They are utterly unconscious, not merely that they have ever had an intellectual intuition of God, but that they ever had an intuition of anything that could *possibly* be God. Still we shall be told that the majority would not properly interrogate their consciousness ; they do not, it will be said, understand, nor could they easily be made to understand, what is meant by an intellectual intuition, and hence would never put any other question to their consciousness, than whether they had an intuition which afforded them sensual evidence of the presence if not of God, at least of what, though perceived only obscurely, might possibly be God. I admit that, amongst the bulk of men, there would be found no conception at all of what is called an intellectual intuition ; but let me ask whether this fact is not itself an argument, that the bulk of men are destitute of any such intuitions. Surely if all had the intellectual intuitions spoken of, experience would give them some idea of what such intuitions were.

The fact that mankind generally are not conscious of an intuition of God, and indeed have no idea what an

intellectual intuition means, is, I think, sufficient evidence that the intuition of God is not possessed by all men. Still as an intuitionist may say, that the power may belong to human nature, even though it be undeveloped in the majority, let us ask, whether we have sufficient evidence that *any* have an intellectual intuition of God. I do not wish to be considered as questioning the honesty and sincerity of those who, as they attribute the idea to this source, must be supposed to testify to their own consciousness of such an intuition. I believe it to be possible for men, after being led to accept the hypothesis that the idea of God is owing to intellectual intuition, so to loose the reins of their imagination as to deceive themselves into the belief that they have the intuition contended for. If, however, it really existed, the hypothesis would not precede, *as I apprehend it does in every case*, the supposed consciousness, but the consciousness would exist and teach the truth of the doctrine before any hypothesis respecting it had ever been heard of. Moreover, if the intuition really existed in the few, since we might then expect to find it in all cases where the intellectual powers were strong and generally developed, let me ask, would it be, as I think it is, an indisputable fact, not simply that the uninstructed and weak-minded are conscious of no intellectual intuition of God, but that many men of philosophic mind and of manifest power of thought, have been equally unconscious of any such intuition.

Were we, however, to grant that there are some who have an intellectual intuition of God, it would not of itself suffice to account for the possession by others of a distinctive idea of Deity. I have already remarked that we cannot create new material of thought, and,

therefore, that all that imagination and genius can do is to make new combinations out of elements of thought previously acquired. But just as we cannot create new material, so, if we have material of thought unpossessed by others, we cannot possibly communicate it to them. If indeed, we could create new material for ourselves, we might be able to teach another how to create it, and thus be indirectly the means of communicating it; but what we have no power to do for ourselves we could not teach another to do. If any imagine that we could communicate a new element of thought in any other way than analogically, the slightest consideration will convince them to the contrary; for whilst our only modes of communicating ideas are by arbitrary signs or pictorial representations, we could have no pictorial representation of anything which was beyond our power of intuition, nor could there be any arbitrary sign of a new element of thought which could possibly be intelligible to a party who was perfectly ignorant of such element. If it be said, that although arbitrary signs could not directly convey new elements of thought to the mind, they might do so analogically, by comparing them with known elements, I observe, that this can only be done when the unknown can be learnt from the known, that therefore, except this is the case with the idea of God, it could not be done, and that, if it is the case, the idea would be acquirable without intellectual intuition. If, however, it is so acquirable, intuition must be unnecessary to account for the idea. Moreover, the intuition of God, supposing it to exist in some men, would too nearly resemble the ideas of other men, to render it conceivable that it should be confined to individuals of unusual mental power.

Accordingly, since one great argument for intellectual intuition would be done away if the idea could be otherwise acquired, and since the idea of God, provided it be owing, in the case of the few, to immediate intuition, must be supposed essentially to differ from every other idea which we can possibly form, it must be impossible for any intuitive idea of God to be communicated to those who are destitute of the intuition; consequently, the supposition that intuition is the origin of the idea to the few, would not account for the fact that a distinctive idea of God is possessed by the many.

Cousin holds some peculiar views in reference to the power to which he would attribute our idea of God. He maintains that we owe it to an Impersonal Power which he designates Reason.

His theory, I conceive, differs from the one just discussed, in describing the power as impersonal, and in holding that this impersonal power is not necessarily directly intuitional of the objective reality, but is a divine teacher with regard to it.

In order that we may clearly understand his theory, I must remark that he distinguishes between Reason when acting spontaneously, and when acting reflectively. In the former case it acts, according to him, independently of the will; and it is then that he regards it as no part of the individual, as no partaker therefore of individual imperfections, but as imparting the teaching of God himself; and, therefore, possessed of his infallible authority. In the latter case, or when it acts reflectively, we mix up, he maintains, elements of our own personality with its movements, and hence our imperfection is mingled with it, and renders it fallible. The following extracts from his "Exposition of Eclecticism" will ex-

plain his views in his own words :—“ Reason (he says) is impersonal in its nature ; it is not we who make it. It is so far from being individual that its peculiar characteristics are the opposite of individuality, viz., universality and necessity ; since it is to reason that we owe the knowledge of universal and necessary truths, of principles which we all obey, and which we cannot but obey.”* Again, “ It descends from God, and approaches man ; it makes its appearance in the consciousness as a guest who brings intelligence of an unknown world of which it at once presents the idea and awakens the want. If reason were personal it would have no value, no authority beyond the limits of the individual subject.” Again, “ Reason is a revelation, a necessary and universal revelation which is wanting to no man, and which enlightens every man on his coming into the world. Reason is the necessary mediator between God and man, the λόγος of Pythagoras and Plato, the Word made flesh, which serves as the interpreter of God and the teacher of man, divine and human at the same time. It is not, indeed, the absolute God in his majestic individuality, but his manifestation in spirit and in truth ; it is not the Being of beings, but it is the revealed God of the human race.”†

Is this theory true or false ? I do not see, even if we were to allow the impersonality of reason, that it would necessarily follow that it is Divine, and therefore infallible. Even if it be impersonal it may be the creation of God, and may partake of creature imperfection. But passing this by, it must be evident, that, except the impersonality of reason is proved, the theory cannot stand.

* See Exposition of Eclecticism, by M. V. Cousin, translated by Ripley, p. 69.

† Ibid. p. 79.

For if it be not impersonal, it is plainly our own voice, and not the voice of God ; but if so, and it be the source of the idea, it cannot, seeing that our previous reasoning has proved that it neither creates nor intuitively perceives the idea, give it us in any other way than inferentially from the teaching of experience.

What then are the arguments which have been adduced to prove the impersonality of "Reason?" They are founded on two assumptions: first, that two things are requisite to the personality of a power—*one, that it is under the control of the will,—the other, that it is characterized by individual peculiarities*; and, secondly, that it is an unquestionable fact that the truths of "Reason" are, *in their own nature*, absolutely necessary, and that they are taught to all alike. All this being assumed, the first argument adduced for the impersonality of "Reason" is, the necessity and universality of the truths which it teaches. It is argued, that if we had any control over our "Reason," we should have a control over the truths which it teaches; and that if our will had any control over these truths, they must, to the extent of that control, be contingent, and hence could be neither universal nor necessary; wherefore it is concluded, that since they are universal and necessary, our will can have no control over them, therefore can have no control over the power which teaches them, and consequently that that power must be impersonal. A second argument is, that the truths of "Reason" are not personal property. It is argued, that if "Reason" was characterized by individual peculiarities, its truths must be personal property: first, because the "Reason" would not be alike in different men, and if not alike, would not teach the same truths; accordingly, the truths taught would not be common

property, and therefore the man's own; and, secondly, because, if the "Reason" was under the control of the will, its truths would, in part at least, be ascribable to the party himself, and therefore be to that extent his personal property. If, then, the truths taught are not personal property, there are here two distinct reasons for believing in the impersonality of "Reason." And that they are not personal property, Cousin thinks unquestionable. "No abuse of language (he says) has ever gone so far as to ascribe to ourselves the revelation of reason. We say *my* action, and consequently *my* virtue, *my* crime. We impute them to ourselves; we are responsible for them, and we feel that we are so because we feel that we are their cause. We say *my* reason, but we say this merely to express the relation of reason to the *me* in consciousness. We say *my* error, and very justly, for our own errors are often our own acts, and this makes us sometimes reproach ourselves with them. But I ask, Who has presumed to say *my* truth? Everybody feels, everybody knows, that truth does not belong to him nor to anybody else."*

In investigating the force of this reasoning, let us first inquire whether the assumptions on which it is founded are sound. The first is, that these two things are essential to the personality of a power: one, its being under the control of the will, the other its being characterized by individual peculiarities. Now let me premise, that the only sense in which it is important to my present argument to disprove the impersonality of "Reason," is that which represents it as forming no part of our mental constitution, as being, though dwelling within us, not us, but a Divine and therefore Infallible Teacher. I ask,

* Exposition of Eclecticism, translated by Ripley, p. 13.

then, first, whether "Reason" must necessarily be *thus* impersonal if it is not under the control of the will.

There are three different senses in which our will may conceivably exercise a control over a mental power : first, if it can make, change, or modify the laws according to which the power acts ; secondly, if it can work it in different ways, so as to make it produce what effects it pleases, and hence so as to make it, provided the power be in any sense a source of knowledge, teach what it pleases ; and, thirdly, if without having any control in either of these senses, it has simply a control over the use of a power—that is, if it can exercise the power or let it lie by, as it pleases. In which of these senses, then, is it necessary that the will should have a control over the "Reason," in order that it may be considered as a personal power—that is, a power which forms an essential part of our own mental constitution, and is not the indwelling within us of a Divine teacher ?

So far as the first-named sense, viz., *a control over the laws, according to which it acts*, is concerned, the proposition will scarcely be maintained that such a control is essential to personality, for we have no power at all, the laws of whose action our will can make, change, or modify. If we had, we could illimitably increase such power ; for suppose x to be a power, the laws of whose action we could make, change, or modify, and suppose this power to be bounded by y , it follows that its being bounded by y is a law according to which x acts ; and hence, if our will could change or modify the laws of its action, it could remove the boundary of y beyond y , say to z , and then its being bounded by z would become the law of the action of x . But as the power x continues personal, my will, by hypothesis, retains still the power

to alter or modify the law of its action, and hence it could, as before, remove the boundary, and so on *ad infinitum*. As we must all admit that our will has no such power as this over any of our faculties, to make it a *sine quâ non* to the personality of a power would be equivalent to a denial that we have any personal power at all. But there is a still further reason for denying that such a control can possibly be essential to the personality of a power. It will be universally admitted, that our will is a personal power; yet, over the laws of its own action it has no control: it cannot make any new law, nor can it either change or modify any existing law; if, however, this is the case with a power *indisputably personal*, the control spoken of cannot be essential to personality.

Let us, then, ask whether the control of the will in the second-named sense, is essential to personality: viz., *such a control over the manner of the operation of a power, as to make it produce what effects the will pleases*. Now, if such a control as this existed over any power, it would really imply a control in the sense just discussed, viz., over the laws of its operation; for how could the will make a power do anything it wished, except it so controlled the laws according to which the power acted, as to make its acting produce the result it desired? The argument, then, by which we have shown that no control over the laws according to which a power operates is essential to its personality, equally proves that such a control over its operations, as will make the power produce whatever we wish, cannot be essential. This argument, we may, perhaps, be told, would simply apply to complete control, and hence would not prove that a *partial* control of the kind referred to may not be essential to per-

sonality. By such partial control, however, can only be meant, either such a control over the operation of a power as to cause it to produce a partially different result from what it would have done had the laws of its operation been uncontrolled, or else nothing more than this, that when a power can, according to its natural constitution, be worked in more than one way, the will has a control over the particular way in which it shall be worked. In the first case, we are thrown back on the first-named sense in which the will may be conceived as controlling a power, a sense already shown to be nonessential to personality; in the second case, the will has really no other control over the result than this, that if a power is originally constituted so as to be able to work in more directions than one, say either in the direction of x or y , and will produce a if worked in the direction of x ; and b , if worked in the direction of y ; it has power to decide whether it shall work in the direction of x or of y , and, therefore, whether it shall produce a or b : but here observe, that it has no control whatever over a or b ; if the power works in the direction of x , a , whether the will chooses or not, will be the result, and b , if it works in the direction of y . The only control, therefore, exercised in such a case, would be of the third class named, viz., a control over the use of the power, and this we will for the present admit to be essential. Neither, then, in the first nor in the second sense referred to, is any control of the will over a power essential to its personality; and, accordingly, there is no sense in which it can be essential but the third, viz., *the control which it exercises over a power when it can use it as it pleases.*

So much for the control of the will over a power, one of the two things assumed by Cousin to be essen-

tial to its personality. The other is its being characterized by individual peculiarities. There are three points of view in which a power may be considered as so characterized: one, if there be individual peculiarities in its original constitution; another, if there be such peculiarities in the manner in which it is used; and, thirdly, if there be such peculiarities in the effects produced by it.

The personality of a power cannot, however, possibly depend on the first point, viz., *peculiarities in its original constitution*. Suppose the Creator to give to each of two men a power precisely alike, and to give the same power with some unimportant differences to two other men; it cannot be said that, simply on account of such differences, the power is personal in the two last cases, and in the two former impersonal.

As to the second point of view, viz., *peculiarities in the manner in which a power is used*. If such peculiarities be merely in the particular use made of a power, it would imply nothing more than what is included in the sense in which we have, for the present, allowed that the control of the will may be necessary to the personality of a power, viz., *over the use of the power*; but if the peculiarity be supposed to be in some alteration made by the party in the laws of its action, it would involve a peculiarity in what we have already proved to be nonessential to the personality of a power, viz., *a control of the will over the laws of its movements*.

And so far as the third point of view in which a power may be considered as characterized by individual peculiarities is concerned, viz., *peculiarity in the effects produced by it*, it could only arise either from peculiarity in the original constitution of the power, or a control

of the will over the effects which it produces ; and we have already shown that the former is not essential to personality, and that the latter is not essential, except so far as it is implied in a control of the will over the use of the power.

I have thus disposed of the whole of the first assumption lying at the basis of Cousin's argument, with this single exception, that it may be requisite to the personality of a power that the will is able to make use of it. I do not admit that even this single exception need have been made, provided our discussion is confined to that special view of impersonality which I named at the outset as the only one of any importance to the present argument ; for it must be evident that a power might enter into the essential constitution of our mind, be a part of that constitution, and not extraneous to it, and yet might only act spontaneously, and not be subject to any control at all on the part of the will. As, however, this exception will not interfere with my present argument, I pass it by.

Having thus disproved the first assumption which lies at the basis of Cousin's arguments in favour of the impersonality of reason, let us notice the second assumption, which also lies at their basis, viz., *that the truths of reason are in their own nature absolutely necessary, and that they are taught to all alike*. Here are included several different assumptions—one, that the supposed power called "reason" exists,—a second, that truths *in their own nature absolutely necessary* are taught by it,—and a third, that the truths which it teaches, it teaches to all alike. As the first of these is the point of controversy between us,—the question in dispute being whether we have any such power as the "spontaneous

reason" spoken of, or, indeed, any other power entitled to the name of reason, except the power of reasoning,—we of course cannot admit it. I am ready to allow that, if, on investigation, we cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truth except by supposing the existence of such a power as the one spoken of, this fact would be itself an argument that such a power must exist; but previously to the investigation I cannot allow its existence to be taken for granted. If we do not admit the assumption just noticed, we of course cannot grant the next—viz., that truths in their own nature necessary are taught by it—for it implies the former. It may be a matter of indisputable fact that we have a knowledge of some necessary truths, but it is a matter not of indisputable fact, but to be decided only after full investigation, whether this knowledge be derived from the exercise of the ordinary powers of the understanding on the teaching of phenomenal experience, or be owing to the direct teaching of such a power as "spontaneous reason." In reference to the third assumption included—viz., that the truths which reason teaches, it teaches to all alike—we not only cannot admit, for the reasons just given, that the necessary truths referred to are the truths of reason, but we cannot even grant as a first principle that these truths are taught to all alike. No doubt necessary truth is everywhere the same, and hence the knowledge of it, wherever it is perfect, will in all cases be precisely the same knowledge; but I question whether the knowledge of necessary truth may not exist in an imperfect state, and hence whether the knowledge does exist in all alike. So far, then, as the two assumptions lying at the basis of Cousin's arguments for the impersonality of reason are concerned,

we find that we can only admit thus much of the first, that where a power is personal the will has some control over the use of it; and thus much of the second, that we possess some knowledge of necessary truths.

Having discussed the assumptions on which the arguments of Cousin are founded, let us proceed to the arguments themselves. The first argument is, "*the necessity and universality of the truths taught by reason.*" This argument being based on what we have already shown to be a disputed fact, viz., that these truths are taught by "reason," is, till the fact is decided, inadmissible. Let us, however, for a moment grant that they are taught by a power called "reason," and ask whether the argument would even then suffice to prove that that power was impersonal. In support of the argument it is maintained, that if we had any control over our reason, we must have a control over the truths taught by it, and hence that such truths could neither be universal nor necessary. This argument evidently proceeds on the principle that a control over our reason implies something more than a control over the use of it—either a control over the laws of its movements, or a control over the results of its movements; for otherwise a control over our reason would not imply a control over the truths taught by it. But we have already shown that a control, in neither of the two last-named senses, can be necessary to the personality of a power. Accordingly, the argument fails to prove the impersonality of reason.

The next argument for its impersonality is, that its truths are not personal property. I pass over as before the assumption that the truths referred to are taught by reason. Taking this, for the sake of argument, for

granted—I suppose that its truths are said “not to be personal property,” because they are independent of us, and of any power that we possess; it being thence inferred that they must be given to us by a power which is independent of us. But let me remark, in reply, that what reason gives to us, allowing it to be the teacher of the truths referred to, is *not the truths themselves, but the apprehension of them*. Now, if the truths of reason are independent of us, this is not the case with the apprehension of them. True, we cannot manufacture an apprehension of *objective truth*, because such an apprehension implies the existence of something *independent of us* to be apprehended; but yet, though the independent existence of the objective truth is an essential condition of our apprehension of it, it is not the cause of that apprehension, nor can anything be the cause independently of our power of apprehension; and it surely will not be maintained, that the power of apprehension is independent of us; if it was, it would follow, not only that our minds are naturally incapable of apprehension, but also, that, as misapprehension can only be attributed to the imperfection of the power of apprehension, misapprehension would not be our own property, any more than apprehension. If, then, the “Reason” which gives us the truths referred to, differs from the power by which we apprehend them, it can only be supposed to give them us by placing them within the reach of our power of apprehension; and this would imply that our power of apprehending these truths was a supersensual intuition, and that the “Reason” spoken of was something which presented the objects to such intuition. If so, I admit that the “Reason” spoken of might be independent of us, but the argu-

ments already adduced to prove that we do not owe the idea of God to a supersensual intuition, will equally prove that there is no power which presents it to such an intuition. These remarks will, I think, suffice to prove that the argument, that the truths of "reason" are not our personal property, is insufficient to demonstrate the impersonality of the power to which our knowledge of them is ascribed. This will, however, be still clearer, if we look at the reasoning of Cousin in support of this argument. He argues, first, that if our Reason was characterized by individual peculiarities, it would not teach all men the *same* truths, and therefore that the truths taught by it would be the personal property of each individual; and, secondly, that if the Reason was under the control of the will, its truths would at least in part be ascribable to ourselves, and therefore be thus far personal property. This reasoning, it will be at once perceived, is grounded on an assumption which we have already shown to be baseless—viz., that Reason is impersonal except it is characterized by individual peculiarities, and except it is under the control of the will as to the truths which it teaches.

If I am reminded of my admission, that in order to the personality of a power the will must be able to use it at pleasure, and am told that it thence follows, that if the movements of reason are spontaneous it must be impersonal, let it be remembered, first, that I only made the admission for the sake of argument. I believe a power to be personal if it enters into the essential constitution of the mind, whether it acts spontaneously, or under the control of the will. But let me reply, secondly, that allowing the admission, the "Reason" spoken of by Cousin is not, even according to his own account of it, hence

proved to be impersonal. Does he not tell us that this Reason has two classes of movements,—one *spontaneous*, and the other *reflective*? If so, let him tell us whether the *spontaneous reason* is the same, or a different power from the *reflective*? If he says, “the same power,” he must admit the control of the will, because, in that case, the will can, when it pleases, make the spontaneous power reflective. If he says, “a different power,” it must be on the supposition either that the same power cannot act both spontaneously and reflectively, or that the peculiar character of the spontaneous action is so essentially different from that of the reflective, as to evidence an essential difference in the power to which the two actions are to be attributed. The first of these suppositions is incapable of proof, for it cannot be shown to be impossible for a power, which left to itself acts spontaneously, to be subject to the will whenever the will chooses to exercise its authority. To prove the second, it must be first assumed that the truths taught by spontaneous reason are in their own nature essentially different from the truths taught by reflective reason; but to assume this is to assume the very point which the impersonality of reason is adduced to establish, and one, therefore, which cannot be here assumed without reasoning in a circle.

I have in the preceding reasoning shown, first, that nothing else can be required to constitute a power personal but its being an essential part of the constitution of our mind, and if you please, its being, to some extent, under the control of the will as to its exercise; though, as I have remarked, it may be justly questioned whether the latter is essential to such a personality of a power as is excluded by the supposition of its independency on our mental

constitution, and of its being really the indwelling of Deity. I have further shown that we cannot admit, as the foundation of an argument to prove that reason is thus impersonal, that the truths taught us by it are in their own nature absolutely necessary; because such a foundation assumes the question in debate,—that we receive our knowledge of the truths referred to from some distinct power, and not from the exercise of the ordinary powers of the understanding, or the teachings of experience. All we can admit is, that we have a knowledge of some necessary truths *somehow* acquired. And I have hence shown that the impersonality of reason cannot be proved, either on the ground of the necessity and universality of the truths taught by it, or on that of its truths not being our personal property. To make the argument more perfect, I have shown that even if it be essential to the personality of a power, that the will has some control over it, the “Reason” spoken of by Cousin is not impersonal.

But I may still further remark, in conclusion, that even were we to grant that what man considers necessary truth was acquired by a peculiar faculty called “Reason,” it would not thence follow that that faculty was no part of our own individuality; for in order to such a consequence, it must be maintained that the personality of a power necessarily deprives it of all power to acquire necessary truth; if so, it will follow that if there be an impersonal power called “spontaneous reason,” in order to our acquiring such truth, our consciousness, which is surely a part of ourselves, and therefore personal, could not receive it, and hence that we must remain as ignorant of it as though there were no such power as the “spontaneous reason” spoken of.

Besides, if our personality cannot receive necessary truth, it could never be proved that what man considers necessary truth is really so; for grant that our personality controls and distorts truth, and how are we to know that our personality has not led us to regard as necessary truth what is really and in its own nature only contingent? It is reasoning in a circle, if we first assume that whatever appears to us necessary truth, has not been interfered with by our personality, and therefore is necessary truth, and if we thence argue that, as we have necessary truth, it cannot have been acquired by a personal power. If truth appears to us to be necessary, we must ask, before we can conclude it to be really objectively necessary, whether its appearing to us to be so is owing to a personal power or a power not personal. If we assume that it is owing to a power not personal, we assume the very thing which the reasoning founded upon the assumption is wanted to prove; and if we do not assume it, how can we know, supposing personality distorts our intellectual vision, how far our vision is distorted, in imagining a certain truth to be necessary. And let it not be said that we can prove that it is not distorted by appealing to the judgment of other men; for if personality in one man distorts his intellectual vision, there may be something generic in the personality of the whole human race which causes a similar distortion.

For these reasons we do not believe that Cousin has established his point, that man has a "spontaneous reason," which is separate from his own personality, and is the voice of God within him. This, then, is not the source of our idea of God. If it be said that we have not referred to all that Cousin has stated in defence of

his theory, I reply, that as his other remarks are rather in the way of objection to the supposed derivation of the essential element of the idea of God from another source, I have reserved the notice of them to the discussion on which we now enter as to the true origin of the idea of God.

I have shown that the idea is not innate, that it is not intuitive, that it is not owing to a spontaneous reason, and I now proceed to show that it may be acquired independently of any of these sources. We must remember at the outset, that it is not our business *at present* to inquire whether the idea is objectively true; this we reserve for the next lecture, and now confine ourselves to the inquiry, how the existence of the idea, be it objectively true or not, may be accounted for. I wish it, also, to be borne in mind, that we are not called upon to show that the idea may not be accounted for in more ways than one; our purpose will be answered if we can show any one way which will account for it, whether that be the only way or not, and therefore whether, as a matter of fact, it be or be not in any instance the true historical origin of the idea; for as the question at issue is, whether the existence of the idea *necessitates* the supposition of some faculty of the mind beyond those which are manifested in every-day life, and the existence of which none dispute; if we can show that the idea may exist without such a supposition, the question is decided, for we shall have proved that the existence of the idea of God does not necessitate the supposition referred to.

I have already described the distinctive idea of God as consisting in an idea of him as *First Cause, Necessary, Eternal, Independent, and Infinite*. Let us then examine each element separately, and ask, whether phenomenal

experience, in conjunction with the powers of understanding, is sufficient to account for it.

We ask, then, first, whether we can account for the idea of *First Cause*. If we can account, first, for the idea of cause, then for the reception of the principle of causality, and, finally, can show how the principle of causality leads to the idea of First Cause, our object will be accomplished. We assume, as the foundation of our reasoning, that we have a power of intuition (by which we mean a power of perceiving phenomena, both objective and subjective), that we have a power of memory, that we have a power of judgment (by which we mean a power of *immediately* perceiving relations existing between phenomena), and that we have a power of reasoning (or of perceiving such relations mediately); that we have also the powers of analyzing, abstracting, generalizing, and re-compounding, and that we have every other power which the possession of these involves. We also assume that we have the power of will, or of originating, as efficient cause, our own actions, and that we are susceptible of pleasure and pain, that is, of emotions.

Taking all this for granted, we ask, first, whether we can account for our possession of the idea of cause. The idea of cause is, I conceive, synonymous with that of power. This is admitted by Cousin. "What (says Cousin) is power, if not the power of producing something, that is, a cause?" Now, I admit that we cannot gain the idea of power, *or of cause*, from the mere observation of external phenomena; we may thus gain the notion of the constant conjunction of two things, but not of one as the producing cause of the other. But let us suppose that we exercise our will and originate

any mental or other action, we are conscious both of exertion with the view of producing something, and of that something as then produced. Here the correspondence between the object for which our exertion was put forth, and what immediately followed, would naturally, by the mere influence of curiosity, excite the question, why this correspondence? and thus lead to the supposition that a possible relation existed between the two; such a supposition would involve another, viz., that if the exertion had not been put forth, what followed would not then have taken place—in other words, to the supposition of the exertion as a cause of what followed. If so, we should here gain the idea of cause. Should it be said that the putting forth of exertion with a specific object implies that the idea of power or of cause was previously acquired, I reply, that we could conceive of cases in which, *without any idea of power*, exertion would be instinctively put forth; thus, if a sensation of uneasiness existed, there might be an instinctive effort, independently of any idea of power, to rid ourselves of such a sensation; such instinctive efforts are put forth by infant children before any idea of power can be supposed to exist. Accordingly, the intuition of phenomena may lead, as it appears to me, to the idea of power or of cause.

Cousin denies this. He says that an analysis of our consciousness of personal causality will show it to contain three elements; in a movement of the arm, for example, there is the consciousness of a *personal volition*, of a *movement produced*, and of *the relation of causation between the volition and the movement*. Two of these elements, viz., the personal volition and the movement, are, he maintains, variable and accidental;—*variable*,

for the volition may have more or less energy, and the movement may be more or less forcible; and *accidental*, for they may or may not exist—their existence is an accident; and they may at two different times totally differ—the mode of their existence is an accident. But the third element, the relation which exists between the other two, is, he says, neither variable nor accidental; and hence he argues that it cannot be acquired from a phenomenon, a phenomenon being in its own nature variable and contingent, and therefore that it must be acquired by spontaneous reason. I shall here pass by his remark, that the idea of the invariable and the necessary cannot be acquired from a phenomenon, because if he means that it could not be so gained, *if we had no other mental power but that of phenomenal intuition*, I agree with him; and because, even if the idea of the invariable and the necessary could only be acquired by the “spontaneous reason” which he advocates, it would not, as we shall just now see, prove that we should, provided we had no such power, be without a consciousness of personal causality.

Let us, then, grant that the relation between a volition and a certain movement is necessary and invariable, and the question evidently arises whether a relation, *which is in its own nature necessary and invariable*, cannot be perceived by us without being perceived to be necessary and invariable. I surely may have a consciousness that I exercise a power which produces a movement in my arm, without it necessarily involving the consciousness or even the supposition that the movement is the *necessary and invariable* result of the exercise of such a power. Whether we require a knowledge of necessity and invariableness or not in order to arrive at the *principle of*

causality, we do not require it in order to gain a knowledge in *some particular instance* of ourselves as cause.

Cousin, however, will remind us that this is not the general idea of cause, but merely that of self as cause. I grant that this is the case in the first instance, but we do not stop here. Having gained the idea of self as cause, we gain other ideas of self: I suffer pain, and the experience gives me at once the idea of self as suffering; I feel pleasure, and the experience gives me the idea of self as in a state of enjoyment. I have thus different ideas of self, an idea of self as cause, an idea of self not as cause but as suffering, an idea of self not as cause but rejoicing. Accordingly, as I gain an idea of self, which does not include the idea of self as cause, and as I also gain an idea of self which does not include the idea of self as suffering or as rejoicing, I can, from a comparison of these different ideas, acquire by abstraction the abstract idea of self, that is, of self without including in it either the idea of self as cause, or of self as suffering, or of self as rejoicing. This idea being gained, I can abstract it from the idea of self as cause, or *as exercising power*, and this will leave the idea of cause, or of the exercise of power, *abstracted from self*.

Still, though I have proceeded far enough to gain the idea of the exercise of power, or of cause, apart from self, I may not yet conceive of it other than as dependent on self. I have, however, already acquired the idea of something produced by the exercise of power; this something is a phenomenon; let me, then, see a phenomenon *which I have not produced*, similar to one which I have produced, and I can imagine such phenomenon as possibly producible by me; the imagination will thus suggest the idea of self standing in the same

relation to this phenomenon which I have not produced, as to the phenomenon which I have produced. If it does, I have an idea of a phenomenon produced, and of self as the producing cause, and yet I have no *consciousness* of being the producing cause; I thus evidently make myself, in my imagination, something separate from my conscious self. But if I imagine myself as existing apart from my conscious self, I imagine, or have the idea, so to speak, of another self; for I imagine my consciousness existing apart from my conscious self, and existing as another self. But I will suppose myself previously to this to have acquired the idea of the *not-me*, as well as of the *me*, it having been gained from the immediate presentation, to my intuition, of the external world. I can, therefore, in imagination, apply this idea—the idea of not-me—to the idea which I thus have acquired of another self, and I have then an idea of a cause, like to myself as cause, but which is not myself. Accordingly, I have an idea not merely of cause, apart from self, but of cause independent of self; and having arrived thus far, I have an idea of cause different from, though similar to, my idea of self as cause. No sooner do I acquire this idea, than the perception of phenomena, like to the phenomena produced by my exercise of power, leads me to inquire whether there may be anything objectively existing corresponding to my imaginary idea of the exercise of power by something like to me, which is yet not-me. For the resemblance of something to what I know to be produced by power, leads me to ask myself the question, whether that something may not also be produced by power. Thinking the matter over, I am able to reason thus: my power has produced a certain phenomenon,

x , but there is another phenomenon not produced by my power, which is precisely similar to x ; if this phenomenon comes into existence without the exercise of power, power does nothing but what might equally exist without power, and accordingly *no*-power is equal to power ; if, however, *no*-power is equal to power, power must be a nonentity, and hence, as this is contradictory to the teaching of my experience, my faculty of reasoning leads me to conclude that the phenomenon not produced by me owes its existence to power, and, therefore, that a power or cause objectively exists, which is not-me.

I now am prepared to acquire the idea of the principle of causality : for having the idea of other causes besides myself, and having learnt to attribute all phenomena, *like to the phenomena produced by my own exercise of power*, to such other causes ; I am led by the tendency which I have to associate by the law of resemblance, to ask whether this may not be the case with all phenomena. And I reason in some such way as this : If there be any phenomena which have no cause, they exist without power, but I can conceive of them as possibly produced by power ; if, however, they can possibly be produced by power, and yet can exist without power, *no*-power has, as before, as much power as power has ; it is therefore equal to power, in other words, power is a nonentity. Hence the principle of causality is received, and as soon as this is the case, the idea of non-intelligent external causes may be accounted for. Thus far, indeed, the causes the idea of which we have supposed ourselves to have acquired, are similar to ourselves ; but still, as we also have, in the way already pointed out, acquired by abstraction, the idea of power or action in ourselves apart from that of any other

attribute we possess, we must have a like idea of power or action in others, apart from any other attribute they may possess. Such an idea is that of "producing cause" in the abstract. This being gained, and as we had before gained the principle of causality, we are naturally led, whenever we perceive a phenomenon of whose cause we are ignorant, to inquire to what cause it is to be attributed; and finding from observation that this phenomenon is uniformly preceded by another phenomenon, we ask, knowing of no other cause, whether the latter may *possibly* be the cause? Associating as we do faculties like to our own with the idea of cause, we may at first ask, whether the phenomenon uniformly preceding the one, the cause of which we are investigating, may possibly have the faculties we have been accustomed to associate with cause, and this will give the idea of a material phenomenon as possibly a living intelligent agent; the idea which M. de Biran supposes is actually our first idea of an external material cause, this being found to be the idea of children and of savages. But after experience has taught us that a material phenomenon is destitute of many of the attributes of a living, intelligent agent, like ourselves, we may come to consider it as simply possessed of power independently of any other attribute possessed by us; and afterwards, when experience has further enabled us to gain the idea of mediate as well as of immediate power, we may progress another step, and, instead of attributing, as before, the producing power to a material phenomenon, we may gain the idea of such a phenomenon as simply a medium through which producing power is exercised.

I have thus demonstrated how, independently of any revelation of "spontaneous reason," we may gain the idea

of cause and the principle of causality. These being gained, it will not be difficult to account for the idea of First Cause. We all believe ourselves to have only recently come into existence; partly because our memory extends only to a brief past; partly because our external circumstances have been and are in accordance with the supposition of a recent origin; partly because we have the testimony of others that our existence has to their observation had a phenomenal commencement; and partly because we daily see the commencement, in beings apparently constituted like ourselves, of all the phenomena of existence. Whether it be admitted or not that these are the grounds of our conviction, it will, I think, not only be admitted that we have such a conviction, but that its origin is, or may be, empirical. But if our existence has had a commencement, the principle of causality naturally leads us to ask, to what cause is it to be attributed? If we attribute it to our parents, we believe them to be constituted like ourselves; and for several of the reasons which led us to the conviction that we had a beginning, we consider them to have had, like us, a commencement of existence; hence, we ask what was the cause of their existence; and thus ascending, from cause to cause, we shall arrive at the idea of an uncaused cause, or a First Cause. If any doubt whether we could thus ever arrive at this idea, let me observe, that all positive ideas necessarily include in themselves their corresponding negatives, for I cannot have any idea of x without distinguishing it from $non-x$, and therefore without having the idea of $non-x$ included in the idea of x . Accordingly, as we cannot ask whether our own being had a commencement without previously gaining the idea of a commencement—an idea

acquired from the daily experience of beginnings of thought and beginnings of fresh phenomena generally—so we cannot put the question just referred to without also having the idea of non-commencement. Hence, as soon as I put that question in reference to any power or cause, I have an idea both of that power or cause as conceivably commencing, and also of it as conceivably without commencement. But, if I can conceive of anything as without commencement, I do not conceive of it as caused, because to be caused includes in itself the idea of commencement. As soon then as I have the idea of a thing as having no commencement, I have the idea of it as uncaused; and hence, if I have the idea of such a thing as a cause of other things, I have an idea of an uncaused cause, or First Cause. And I conceive that the human mind would, in ascending from cause to cause, receive the supposition of such a First Cause, from finding that it was one in which it could better rest, than in any other, as the origin of all finite existence.

We have thus accounted for the existence of the idea of First Cause. Its objective truth, I must again remind you, remains for future investigation. Our present business is to inquire whether we can also account for the other elements of the idea of God. And, first, can we account, without any other assumption than what we made in reference to the idea of "First Cause," for the idea of "Independent and Necessary Existence?" Here I shall begin by showing that experience is able to give us ideas of what is *relatively possible*, *relatively impossible*, and *relatively necessary*. Thus, if I find that I produce a certain effect by the exercise of power, my experience teaches me that my power is sufficient to

produce it; in other words, that the effect is *possible in relation to my power*. If I find that my utmost effort fails in producing some other effect, my experience teaches me that my power is insufficient to produce it; in other words, that the effect is *impossible in relation to my power*. If my experience has taught me, with the aid of my reasoning faculties, that my power is something and not nothing, and that therefore what my power produces cannot exist without the exercise of power, it teaches me that there is *in relation to the thing so produced a necessity* for the exercise of a producing power. But when I have the idea of anything as relatively necessary, or as necessary in one relation, I may evidently have the idea of it as necessary in more relations than one: if, for example, I think of First Cause as necessary to account for finite existence, I may think of it as necessary in other relations, and therefore as necessary to account for its own existence, which is equivalent to the idea of a necessity for existence inherent in the thing itself. But if I regard it as necessary to account for all finite existence, and also as existing by a necessity inherent in itself, I regard it as necessary in all conceivable relations; in other words, as, so far as my conception goes, absolutely necessary.

I may, then, thus gain a supposition of the absolute necessity of First Cause, and I am led to receive it in some such way as the following:—After having gained the idea of First Cause as necessary to account for finite existence, I view it as necessary to account for *all* existence including its own, and this because I find it impossible to account in any other way for the existence of a First Cause, and because I find the supposition of a First Cause existing otherwise than by a necessity inherent in

itself to involve a contradiction, seeing that if it does not belong to the nature of First Cause to exist, its existence must depend on something out of itself, and therefore depend on the exercise of power prior to its own, in which case it evidently would not be First Cause.

We have, then, thus far gained the idea of First Cause as necessarily existing ; and now let me show how we may gain the idea of it as independently existing. It must be remembered, that we have already attained the idea of an existence caused, and of an existence uncaused, and thus have gained a notion of existence as depending on a prior cause, and of existence as independent of such a cause. Having arrived here, we can conceive of other relations of dependence and of independence, than that of the relation of an existence to a prior cause, for we find existences which appear to us to depend not merely on some exercise of power in bringing them into being, but on the existence of some conditions or prerequisites without which their being would be, in the nature of things, impossible. For example, when we have gained an idea of matter as occupying space, we believe not only that the existence of matter depends on a prior cause, but also on the existence of space as a condition, without which matter, according to our idea of it, would be, in the nature of things, impossible. We thus gain a general idea of the dependence and independence of existences, and we apply this idea to First Cause, because we conceive of First Cause as prior to, and therefore conclude that he must be independent of, all other existence.

We have now accounted for the idea of God, as *First Cause, Necessary, and Independent*. Let us next

try to account for the ideas of *Eternity* and *Infinity* in their relation to God. Eternity has reference to his infinite duration, and infinity to his presence through infinite space. Here, then, are three different ideas, space, duration, and infinity, for which we have to account previously to our accounting for our application of infinity and eternity to God.

Locke maintained that the idea of space was derived from sight and touch; and although Cousin disputes his doctrine, I think that it may be shown that the idea may at least be traced to touch. Touch gives me the idea of *extension as an attribute of body*, for suppose I was without the idea, and was to move my finger along a table or any other extended body, I could not fail to receive it. And touch gives me the idea of *solidity or resistance as another attribute of body*, for if I place my hand on a solid body, I immediately have the idea of resistance. These two ideas, then, I receive by touch from body, and receiving the two I have the idea of body. But after I have derived the idea of extension in relation to body, experience teaches me that there may be extension where there is no resistance; for I can move my hand after resistance has ceased in the same way as I did when I derived the idea of extension from body. I have thus two ideas of extension, one connected with resistance, the other without any connexion with it. *The idea of extension without connexion with resistance*, is, I conceive, the simple elementary idea of space.

But this, it will be said, is not the idea of "infinite all-comprehending space." I admit that it is not, but all that I want at present is, the idea of space *independently of the question of its infinity*. Should it be said that we cannot have the elementary idea of space referred

to without at once and immediately receiving a revelation of reason as to its infinite and all-comprehending extent, I ask for proof. That we cannot *now, after we have learnt to associate infinity with space*, think of space without thinking of it as infinite, is no evidence that this is the case when the first elementary idea of space is received. Hence, the only question which seems to me necessary to solve is, whether, after gaining the elementary idea referred to, it can be explained how, without appealing to the aid of spontaneous reason, we come to associate infinity with space; and to this question we shall attend after we have inquired into the origin of our idea of the infinite. In the meantime, all that I at present care to account for, is the first simple idea of space to which I have alluded.

Cousin would probably object to the explanation we have given of its origin, because we have made it to follow the idea of body, whereas, he would say that the idea of body presupposes that of space. "The idea of space (he writes) is the logical condition of the admission of the idea of body. Take (he goes on) any body you please, you can admit the idea of the body only on condition that you admit at the same time the idea of space; if you do not, you would admit a body which would be nowhere, which would have no place, and such a body is inconceivable." I reply, that if the idea of body, does, as Cousin maintains, presuppose that of space, by which he means infinite space, it can only be either because this idea is included in that of body, or because we cannot, as he argues, conceive of body except in connexion with place, nor of the place of body except in relation to infinite space. Let us, then, examine each of these suppositions. Our idea of body is that of some-

thing resisting and extended ; it must then be admitted at once that we cannot conceive of body without receiving the idea of extension. To conceive of something extended, and not to conceive of extension, is a contradiction. But, as we have already remarked, there are two different ideas of extension—one of “extension in connexion with resistance,” the other of “extension without resistance.” The former of these ideas does not presuppose the latter,* and if not, the idea of body does not presuppose that of pure space.

Still, is it not impossible to conceive of body except in connexion with place, or to conceive of the place of body except in its relation to infinite space? In reply to the former part of the question, I must remark, that I cannot see the impossibility. True, if a body exists, it must be somewhere, but yet I may have a notion of it as existing, before I have any notion at all of what “somewhere” means ; I may have the idea of it as extended and as resisting, before I have any other notion at all respecting it. Nor, in reference to the latter part of the question, is it necessary that my first idea of the place of body should be of place *in its relation to infinite space* : on the contrary, as, at least, it seems to me, my first idea of the place of body would be of its place simply *in relation to myself*, an idea which may be supposed to be acquired as follows. Let me imagine that an external body is brought into contact with my own body ; I have not only an idea of it as something extended and resisting, but as sustaining a relation to me, for it resists *me*, and resists *me in its whole extension*. But let me suppose that this body is removed from me ;

* It does not even include it till we have first learnt to separate the two ideas—extension and resistance.

I become conscious that it ceases to bear the same relation to me as before, for now it does not resist me in any part of its extension. I have, however, I will suppose, acquired the elementary idea of space, that is, of extension without resistance; and I will further suppose, that, after consciously moving my hand through space, it comes into contact with the body which was just now removed from me; I become again conscious of the body as sustaining a relation to me, but yet as sustaining a different relation from that which it previously sustained; for, in the one case, without any action on my part, it resisted me in its whole extension; and, in the other case, it only resisted me when I moved my hand from myself through space. I thus attain ideas of two different relations in which body may stand to me, one in which there is no intervening space, the other in which space intervenes. These ideas are substantially those of contiguity and distance—that is, not of place relative to space generally, but merely relative to myself—and if, as I have shown, we may have the idea of body previously to that of pure space, and therefore independently of the idea of infinite space, we assuredly may add to it the idea of place *in relation to ourselves* without that idea having any reference to universal space. Hence, we conclude, that the idea of body does not necessarily presuppose that of “all-comprehending infinite space,” and hence that our first idea of space may follow that of body, and be nothing more than that of “extension without resistance.”

Before proceeding further with the idea of space, we will inquire into the origin of our idea of *duration*. It must be admitted that I may be conscious of a present object of attention, and that I also may have the memory

of a number of past objects of attention. This of itself will give me the idea of a present in distinction from a past, as well as the idea of a present as successive to a past. Let me next be conscious of two distinct present objects of attention; say, for example, tooth-ache, and an individual passing by me. The individual, I will suppose, is succeeded by a second, and the second by a third, and so on; and that during the whole succession the tooth-ache continues. Take then my experience in any after part of the succession, and I am not only conscious of two present objects of consciousness, the tooth-ache, and the presence and passing by, say of a fourth individual, but I am conscious of the memory of one of these objects, the tooth-ache, as an object of past as well as of present attention, and as continuing an object of attention during a succession of other objects. Thus experience may give me not only an idea of past and present, and that of succession, but also, in connexion with them, the idea of continuance.

If any think that our first idea of continuance or duration is, as Royer-Collard supposes, that of our own duration, I do not object. Still, as, whether that theory be correct or not, the idea of continuance may be acquired in the way I have described, its attainableness independently of any intuition or revelation of "reason" is, I think, shown irrespectively of it. Some will tell us that we could have no idea of the continuance of any object of our consciousness without we had first the idea of the continuance of our own consciousness; but let me reply, that whilst there can be no doubt that the continuance of anything as an object of consciousness involves the continuance of consciousness, the continuance of consciousness is one thing, and the idea of its con-

tinuance another thing. If the mere fact of present consciousness, together with the memory of past consciousness, suffice of themselves to give me the idea of the continuance of my consciousness, as I believe they would, I shall thus acquire, according to the theory of Royer-Collard, the idea of the continuance of my consciousness, or of my own duration; and if, on the other hand, they would not, phenomenal experience may give me in the way I have pointed out the idea of the continuance of an object of attention before giving me that of my own continuance. I may perhaps, however, be told that the idea of the continuance of myself or of anything else is not the idea of *time*, because the former, it is said, is simply the idea of contingent and limited continuance, whilst that of time is of something necessary and illimitable. I answer, as I did before in reference to space, that we are not at present tracing the whole process by which we have arrived at our *present* idea, but simply discovering an elementary idea, which, however it may differ from the idea *ultimately and now possessed*, will be found, as we think we shall presently show, to be an important step towards it.

We have thus far, then, accounted for the elementary ideas of space and duration. Let us next trace to its origin, or at least to its possible origin, the idea of infinity; its acquirement being requisite to carry the simple elementary ideas of space and time, to which I have referred, to their present perfection. Here I must first ask whether we have a positive, or merely a negative idea of infinity. Cousin maintains that our idea is positive; and if he be right there can be no doubt that it could not be gained without either a direct intuition or an immediate revelation; for though the

finite can, as I shall presently show, give a negative idea of infinity, I admit that it could never *of itself* give an idea so infinitely different from itself as the positive idea must be. A negative idea is the idea we form of an object when all that we know of it is, that it is the contradictory of some other object with which we are acquainted in one or more particulars. To form such an idea it is plain that we need only analyze that other object into its parts, and, retaining the part with which the negative idea agrees, add a denial of the other parts. This idea is called negative, because nothing is known of it beyond what is known of its corresponding positive, except negation ; and the idea with which it is compared is on the other hand called positive, because what is known of it, beyond what is known of its corresponding negative, is strictly positive. If this be the true explanation of a negative idea, the negative idea of infinite extension, may, in the way just pointed out, be gained from the finite ; thus, take the idea of finite extension which we are supposed to have previously gained, and we find the two elements of extension and limitation ; we retain one, the extension, and deny the other, the limitation ; and thus if we can conceive of limited extension, we may also negatively conceive of extension which is not limited. In like manner we may gain the negative idea of infinite duration, for if we can conceive of limited duration, we may in the same way as before negatively conceive of duration which is not limited.

To form, however, a positive idea in either of these cases, we must not only conceive of the absence of limit, but of the positive quality which exists in opposition to limit. If then we have a positive idea of infinity we must be able to conceive of this positive quality in

relation both to space and time. If, however, I ask what positive idea I have of it in relation to space, I shall find that I have none, and that if I try to form one, the only result will either be an idea of determinately limited, or of indeterminately limited, space. I may form a positive idea of space extending itself to myriads of times the distance of the most distant star perceivable by the telescope, but this is only an idea of *determinately limited space*. Or I may form a positive idea of space extending its limits into an obscurity which I cannot penetrate, but it is then only an idea of *indeterminately limited space*; for even if I suppose the limits to be impenetrable, my idea, so far as it is positive, is only that of a limited space, though indeterminately limited. But the idea either of determinately limited or indeterminately limited space is as completely different from the true positive idea of infinite space as finity is different from infinity.

The argument of Cousin, to prove that the idea of infinity is positive, is founded on conclusions which we have already shown to be false in relation to space and duration. We cannot, he argues, have the idea of body without presupposing, and therefore without our receiving in connexion with it, the idea of space, that is, he holds, of universal all-comprehending space; but this idea of space includes the idea of the infinite, and hence he infers, we cannot have the idea of the finite without at the same time receiving the idea of the infinite. Accordingly, he maintains, that the idea of the finite and of the infinite suppose each other, and, consequently, that the idea of the infinite is no more the negative of the idea we have of the finite, than the idea of the finite is the negative of our idea of the infinite. The whole of

this argument, it will be perceived, rests on what we have shown to be a false basis, viz., that the idea of body presupposes that of infinite space. The idea of space therefore is not, on this ground, if at least our preceding reasoning be sound, to be regarded as a revelation of reason ; and, accordingly, Cousin is mistaken, when he pronounces it to "fall under the immediate and direct action of one of the faculties of the mind," except he can give other evidence that this is the case than that which we have investigated.

I have thus shown that our idea of infinity is simply negative, and that the negative idea is attainable from the idea of finity, being simply the contradictory of the limited in space, or the limited in time. But how, if this is correct, do I come to believe in the infinity of space and the infinity of duration ? Let us suppose that we have attained the idea of limited extension, and wish to ascertain the full magnitude of extension, or of space, we soon find that we cannot suppose a limit to possible extension without contradicting ourselves ; for let me suppose any limit, and let me suppose myself to reach it ; I cannot imagine myself to move beyond it, for if I did, I must imagine extension beyond extension. But if I cannot move beyond it, there must be resistance, and extended resistance to any effort I make to do so ; and if there be resistance, and extended resistance, at the end of the supposed limit of space, there must be body beyond space, for extended resistance is my idea of body. But if there be body beyond space, there must be extension beyond extension. If, by the exercise of my reasoning faculty, I thus find it to be a contradiction to suppose a limit to space, I may, by the exercise of that faculty, thus acquire the idea of the infinity of space.

By the exercise of the same power I may acquire the idea of the infinity of duration ; for let me suppose it finite, there must have been a moment when duration began to be, and if duration began to be, there must have been some cause for its beginning ; and, therefore, as cause must be prior to effect, the cause for duration must have been prior to duration. But that cause which was thus prior to duration either must have had a beginning or not ; if no beginning, it must have had duration ; and if it had a beginning, it must have had a cause which either must have had no beginning, and therefore duration, or have had a prior cause. But a succession of causes implies duration, and therefore, if duration has had a commencement, there must have been duration prior to duration. Accordingly, I may by the mere exercise of the logical faculty of reasoning on the facts of consciousness, come to the conclusion that space and duration are both infinite.

If, however, I have an idea of God as First Cause, and an idea of duration as infinite, I have premises whence, without any revelation of spontaneous reason, my power of reasoning will enable me to acquire the idea that he is eternal ; for if I suppose him to have had a beginning, as he must have had if not eternal, his existence must be supposed by me as originally a change, and consequently to involve the idea of a prior cause, and this I must perceive to be contradictory to the idea of First Cause. In like manner, as I have now already acquired an idea of First Cause, necessarily existent, and have also acquired an idea of space as infinite, my reasoning powers will enable me to discover that there is no space throughout infinity to which First Cause is not related ; for if I suppose any such space, I must suppose

that he could not be necessary in that portion of space, or he would be related to it ; but if there be any portion of space where he is not necessary, I must perceive that the necessity of his existence could not comprehend all conceivable relations, which is contradictory to my previously acquired idea of First Cause. Besides, if he does not everywhere exist ; in other words, if he exist in some parts of space and not in others, my reasoning powers will teach me that if he exists necessarily in certain parts of space, and not in all, there must be something in those parts of space where he exists to render his existence necessary, which is not found in other parts of space, and, therefore, that the necessity of his existence is dependent on something external to himself. But if so, I must perceive that he would not be independent, and, therefore, as this is contradictory to my previously acquired idea of him, that he must be related to infinite space. In accounting thus for my idea of infinity in relation to God, I am, I must again repeat, neither proving its objective truth, nor deciding on the true historical origin of the idea. I am merely proving the possible acquirement of such an idea by the exercise of the ordinary powers of the understanding on the teachings of phenomenal experience.

I have thus accounted for the idea of God as *First Cause, Independent, Necessary, Eternal, and Infinite*. I have shown that the idea is not our own creation, that it is not innate, that it is not owing to immediate intuition nor to any revelation of reason, and that it is attainable by the simple exercise of our reasoning faculty in reference to phenomena within the sphere of phenomenal intuition.

I have thus far, however, said nothing of the intelli-

gence of God, his wisdom, his holiness, his goodness, his justice, his truth. No doubt these attributes, as they exist in Deity, are essentially distinctive of him, for there is probably no one attribute of Deity, which can possibly exist in any creature in the same way in which it exists in the Creator. If so, when we speak of the intelligence, the wisdom, the holiness, the goodness, the justice or the truth of God, we speak of something altogether beyond us as to its essential nature, and only known to us by its effects. Let this be granted, and it is only because we know what the attribute in man is which produces such and such results, that when we find similar results produced by Divine operations, we give the name of that attribute to their unknown cause; not however, I conceive, if we have any just idea of God, to indicate the essential nature of the attribute, but simply to express its resemblance to one of our own attributes, in the only one point in which we know anything about it, viz., as to its effects. Accordingly, we believe that God, who knows us altogether, knows that we cannot comprehend him as he is, that it is impossible in the nature of things for the finite to comprehend the infinite. Hence, in the revelation he has made of himself in his word, he has adapted his communications to our finite understanding, by representing himself not in the full glory in which he actually exists, which would be altogether unintelligible to us, but in the only way in which we are capable of comprehending him. Accordingly, because a man under the influence of such a feeling or such a passion, would act in such and such a manner, he represents himself as possessed of such a feeling or passion, not to indicate that the feeling or passion found in us really exists in him, he being

incapable of human feelings and passions, but only to teach us, that there is in him a principle which will produce similar actions to those which in us would be produced by the feeling or passion spoken of. And so is it, I conceive, with the attributes to which I have referred. We cannot understand the principle as it exists in him; it is too high for us to attain unto it; hence, we have simply an approximate revelation, such a revelation as we can understand, a revelation of God as possessed of certain attributes which in men would produce such and such results; not to teach us what the real nature of his attributes are, but simply the fact that there are attributes in him which, in this one point, resemble certain attributes in us, viz., in producing similar results.

Whether, however, this be the case or not, we form our ideas of those attributes of God to which we are referring, at least so far as we form any notion at all of them, from the attributes which we ourselves possess. Such ideas are necessarily very imperfect; they are rather distinctive of us than of God, and can only be made in any way distinctive of God, by appending to them such negative ideas as those we have discussed in the present lecture, all our distinctive ideas of God being negative. Thus, when we speak of the intelligence of God, our idea is merely of our own intelligence, and the only way in which we can make it at all distinctive of Deity is by adding the idea of infinity, and thus putting it beyond the possible reach of our positive conception, and so with every other attribute.

If, however, the distinctive ideas of God, to which I previously adverted, can only be traced to their origin by the help of psychology, much more will psychology help us to explain the source of those imperfect and

partial ideas of him, which we owe entirely to our own mental constitution. And ought not this fact to convince us how little, how very little we can possibly know of God, how far short our brightest and noblest conceptions must be of his infinite glory and majesty! In the words of an eloquent divine, now deceased, we may justly exclaim,

“ His essence is altogether hidden from the most profound investigation, the most laborious research, the most subtle penetrations of his creatures. With respect to this it may be said, ‘ Who by searching can find out God; who can find out the Almighty to perfection? ’ We know that he possesses certain attributes (which we distinguish by different names drawn from analogous excellencies among men) exclusive of all limit or imperfection found in human nature. We ascribe to him every idea of virtue and spiritual beauty exalted to infinite perfection. But how the Divine Being himself exists in an essential and eternal nature of his own, without beginning as well as without end,—how he can be present at the same moment in every point of illimitable space without excluding any of his creatures from the room it occupies,—how, unseen, unfelt by all, he can maintain a pervading and intimate acquaintance and contact with all parts and portions of the universe,—how he can be at once all eye, all ear, all presence, all energy, yet interfere with none of the perceptions and actions of his creatures; this is what equally baffles the mightiest and meanest intellect, this is the great mystery of the universe, which is at once the most certain and incomprehensible of all things: a truth at once enveloped in a flood of light and an abyss of darkness! Inexplicable itself, it explains all besides; it casts a

clearness on every question, accounts for every phenomenon, solves every problem, illumines every depth, and renders the whole mystery of existence as perfectly simple, as it is otherwise perfectly unintelligible, whilst *itself* remains an impenetrable obscurity! After displacing every other difficulty, it remains the greatest of all, in solitary, insurmountable, unapproachable grandeur! So truly 'clouds and darkness are round about him.' 'He maketh darkness his secret habitation; his pavilion to cover him, thick clouds.'''*

* Hall's Works, vol. vi. p. 36.

LECTURE IV.

THE OBJECTIVE TRUTH OF OUR IDEA OF GOD.

[The object of this lecture is to prove the objective truth of our idea of God, in other words, that a Being really exists who corresponds to the idea we have of God. For this purpose the reality of the facts on which the after argument is founded, is first proved by showing that the testimony of consciousness is uniformly true. What is essential to the validity of an argument founded on these facts is then pointed out, and, finally, the argument itself is adduced.

Here it is first shown what attributes must characterize First Cause, as such, *provided he exists*; Secondly, that First Cause does exist; Thirdly, that he is one, and possessed of will, consciousness, and intelligence; and, Fourthly, that he is also holy, just, good, and true.]

IN my last lecture I described the idea we have of God so far as it is distinctive, and showed the possibility of its being empirically gained, and, therefore, that our possession of it is no proof either that it is innate, that it is owing to a supersensual intuition, or that it is to be ascribed to an impersonal reason. We proceed now to a question of first importance in reference to this idea,—Is it or is it not objectively true?—in other words, Is there a being really existing who corresponds to the idea we have of God?

As we deny the innateness of the idea, and the existence either of a power of metaphenomenal intuition, or of an impersonal reason, our argument must be

founded on the reality of the facts taught us by phenomenal experience. Accordingly, the first question to be discussed is, whether what such experience teaches us is to be depended upon ; and this evidently resolves itself into the inquiry, whether we have sufficient reason for believing the testimony of our consciousness.

Some will regard such an inquiry as unnecessary ; they will argue that as we are led by the constitution of our nature to credit our consciousness, its veracity ought to be assumed as a first principle. And they may add that we have high authority for such a course, Dr. Reid having assumed as one of his first principles *the existence of every thing of which I am conscious* ; and Sir W. Hamilton, *that the data of consciousness are in the first instance to be presumed true, and only to be disallowed if they can be proved to be false.*

The question, however, as to the utility of the inquiry, depends, I conceive, on the possibility of pursuing it. If we can go deeper than the objectors wish, and can find any reason either for believing or disbelieving our consciousness, it cannot be useless to enter on the investigation ; true philosophy never assumes anything as ultimate if it can go beyond it. And as to the authority of Reid and Hamilton, we may adduce the former to prove that the proposed inquiry is not impracticable ; for although Dr. Reid represents “ the existence of every thing of which I am conscious ” as a first principle, he allows that there may be differences of opinion about first principles, and that such principles may admit of proof *ad absurdum* ; and Sir W. Hamilton is a witness that the inquiry is not unnecessary, for whilst he maintains that the deliverances of consciousness are to be presumed true till proved

false, he also holds that such deliverances are divisible into two classes, one of which is possibly an object of doubt, and may in some cases be even proved to be false.

In entering on this investigation, we shall be compelled to assume that two contradictories cannot be both true. This may seem self-evident, but as the advocates of metaphenomenal intuition and of impersonal reason will tell us that it is a truth which could only be transcendently ascertained, I will endeavour to show how it may be ascertained without either of the transcendental powers referred to. Phenomenal experience gives me a notion of error; thus, if I suppose myself to see a human being standing at some distance, and on going nearer find that what I thought was a man is a block of wood, I perceive that my first impression did not correspond to the external reality, in other words, that it was *erroneous*; phenomenal experience in like manner gives me a notion of truth, for if after having acquired in the way described a notion of error, I, on a subsequent occasion, suppose myself to see a human being standing at a distance, and find on approaching that my impression corresponds with the external reality, I acquire a notion the opposite of the former, in other words, the notion of the *truth* of my impression.

I am not here inquiring whether my supposed discovery of the accordance or non-accordance of my impression with the external reality is correct or not; it is sufficient that I believe it to be correct; thus believing, it suffices, without any transcendental power, to give me an idea of what truth and error mean. Having gained in this, or some similar way, notions of truth and error, my judgment (the power of intuitively compar-

ing my ideas and perceiving their resemblance or otherwise) perceives the disagreement between them. If it be asked what reason have we for believing in the reality of the disagreement thus perceived by the judgment, I admit that the reality of the difference between truth and error is an ultimate principle. This it must be because *it is necessarily involved in reasoning and investigation of any description whatever*. Accordingly, we believe it, not simply because the constitution of our nature leads us to confide in the immediate intuitions of our judgment, but also because it would be impossible to argue the question whether the distinction existed, since such an argument, were it entered into, must necessarily assume that the distinction did exist. But if truth differs from error, our ordinary powers of reasoning will enable us to infer that two contradictories cannot be both true: for let A and B be two contradictories, and let them both be true; to affirm A is evidently the same thing as to deny B, otherwise they would not be contradictories. As then A is true, it follows that the affirmation of A is true; and hence, as to affirm A is the same thing as to deny B, the denial of B must be true. But again, because B is true, it follows that the affirmation of B is true. Hence, since both A and B are, by hypothesis, true, both the denial and the affirmation of B must be true; consequently, B is true and not true at the same time. But if so, as B does not differ from B, B being in the two cases identical, the truth does not here differ from the non-truth; in other words, there is no distinction between truth and error, contrary to what, as we have seen, is necessarily assumed in all reasoning.

If, however, two contradictories cannot both be true,

it will follow that if one is true it must annihilate the other. Accordingly, we may adduce an argument (which Sir William Hamilton has brought forward for another purpose) to prove that our consciousness really exists, viz., that I could not doubt the fact "that I am conscious" without the doubt involving a self-contradiction, for doubt is itself a manifestation of consciousness, and therefore if I doubt whether I am conscious, I must doubt whether I do doubt, the latter doubt being contradictory to, and, therefore, annihilating the former doubt.

But if I am conscious, *I must exist*; for if consciousness is a reality it is something, and hence cannot, without a contradiction, be supposed to belong to nothing. Moreover, if I am conscious, I must not only exist, but there must likewise exist, either subjectively or objectively, some object of consciousness, for it would be a contradiction to say that I was conscious, and yet not conscious of anything. If, however, there be any object of which I am conscious, I must have some knowledge of that object, for to say that I am conscious of an object and yet know nothing about it, would be to say that I am conscious of that of which I am not conscious, which would be a contradiction.

Grant all this, and it will follow that I must possess and exercise powers of intuition, of judgment, and of memory:—*of intuition*, for if I have the knowledge of any object which has either a subjective or objective existence, and have the knowledge of it as an object of my consciousness, I must have the intuition of it, (a subjective intuition, if it exists subjectively; an objective intuition, if it exists objectively,) since to know an object as an object present to the consciousness, is to know it

immediately, and, therefore, intuitively :—*of judgment*, for if I have any knowledge at all of an object of consciousness, I must distinguish between such object and nothing ; and, therefore, as '*distinguishing*' is an act of judgment, I must possess and exercise judgment ; moreover, I cannot be said to have a knowledge of an object of consciousness, except I distinguish between its parts, and between it and other objects of consciousness ; but if so, here is an additional proof of my exercising, and, therefore, possessing the power of judgment :—*and of memory*, for if I possess and exercise the power of judgment in the way just described, I must have a remembrance of the past as well as an intuition of the present, since it would be impossible for me to distinguish between a present object of consciousness and the absence of that object, if I had no remembrance of it ever being absent, or to distinguish between a present object of consciousness and other objects, if I had no remembrance of any other objects.

We have, then, proved that our consciousness ~~has~~ has a real existence, and if so, that we exist, and that we possess and exercise powers of intuition, memory, and judgment. And now let me add that these are powers which cannot be exercised without an accompanying exercise of consciousness. Consciousness so essentially enters into the idea of any act of intuition, memory, or judgment, that that could not, according to the meaning we attach to the terms, be called an intuition, a remembrance, a judgment, from which consciousness is excluded.

There are, then, certain mental exercises which have a real existence, and which could not have a real existence except they were accompanied with consciousness—that is, except consciousness testified to their existence.

But if so, a part of the testimony of consciousness must be true, for its testimony is evidently true in reference to the existence of those mental exercises which, as we have seen, do really exist.

Whenever, however, consciousness bears witness to any mental exercise, it bears a fourfold testimony respecting it ; *first*, to the nature of the mental exercise, or to the question whether it is an exercise of intuition, of memory, &c., or has any other specific character ; *secondly*, to the relation of the mental exercise to myself, or that it is an exercise of *my* mind ; *thirdly*, to the nature or kind of phenomenon which is the object of the mental exercise, whether, for example, it is sensible or intellectual, or, if sensible, what are its particular sensible qualities ; *and fourthly*, to the real phenomenal existence of the object in relation to the mental power whose exercise is directed to it ; in other words, to the reality of there being such an appearance to my mind as there seems to be when I exercise an intuition or any other mental power ; this, however, being a testimony, it must be observed, not to any other reality than *that of relative appearance*—a testimony simply *to the reality of a phenomenon in its relation to me*.

Seeing, then, that there are mental exercises to whose existence consciousness testifies truly, it must bear in reference to them, the fourfold testimony borne by it, wherever it bears any testimony at all. The question then may arise, whether its fourfold testimony in regard to such exercises is *all of it* worthy of credit. A very little consideration will enable us to answer this question in the affirmative. There is, in the cases supposed, a mental exercise to whose existence consciousness bears a true testimony : let, then, such exercise be

of any kind you please, say, an exercise of intuition, and then, the exercise to whose existence consciousness bears a true testimony is an intuition; but it enters into the essence of a real intuition that the party is conscious of it *as an intuition*; in such a case, then, consciousness, when it testifies to the nature of the exercise, must testify to it *as being intuitive*, or there would be an intuition without any consciousness of it, which is contradictory: hence, its testimony as to the first point named is true. If, however, an intuition exists, there must be a subject of it, for it is impossible for there to be an intuition possessed by no one; and, further, the subject must be the party who is conscious of the intuition, for it would be a contradiction to say that there was an intuition, of which consciousness was an essential element, and yet that the intuition was possessed by one party, and the consciousness of it by another; the intuition, therefore, must belong to the party who is conscious of it; accordingly, the testimony of the consciousness of the party to the relation of the intuition to himself—the second point named—is a true testimony. Further, it is impossible for an intuition to exist without a *specific* object, for object enters essentially into the notion of intuition: accordingly, if consciousness must accompany a really existing intuition, it must have respect to its object, for it would be a contradiction to say that I was conscious of a certain intuition or perception of an object, and yet unconscious of any object being perceived; but if the consciousness that accompanies an intuition must have respect to the object, it cannot bear a true testimony with respect to the existence of the intuition, if it bear a false testimony with respect to its object; for an intuition with one object is evidently a different

intuition from an intuition having another object, and, therefore, the existence of the latter intuition is a different existence from that of the former: hence, the testimony of consciousness with regard to the kind of phenomenon which is the object of the intuition must be true, if it bears a true testimony to the existence of the intuition, and this is the third point named. Once more, if there be a really existing intuition, there must be a real phenomenal presentation to my intuitive faculty, for if there be no presentation, subjective or objective, there can be no relation of the object to the intuition, and, therefore, there can be no intuition; accordingly, if my consciousness bears a true testimony to the existence of an intuition, to the relation of that intuition to me, and to the kind of phenomenon which is the object of it, it must bear a true testimony with regard to the real phenomenal existence of the object in relation to me, which is the fourth point named. Hence, we conclude, not only that there are mental exercises with regard to whose existence consciousness bears a true testimony, but that, so far as these exercises are concerned, its whole testimony respecting them is true.

Some will, perhaps, think that we have not included, in the four particulars named, the whole testimony of consciousness; they will tell us that, in the case of the intuition of external phenomena, we are further conscious of an externality independent of us—in other words, of the real objective existence of the object of the intuition. But let us inquire whether this is the case. Take, for example, the intuition of a church: does consciousness here testify not simply that there exists an intuition, that it is my intuition, that a church is the object of it, and that that object exists phenomenally in relation to myself,

but further, that the object exists externally to and independently of its relation to my intuition ? I admit that this idea accompanies our intuition of external phenomena, and that it is now so associated with the testimony of consciousness in all such cases, that it requires thought and attention to distinguish it from it. If, however, I can show how it comes to be so associated, without being a part of the testimony of consciousness, I think I shall have given good reason to conclude that we owe it to some other source than its *direct* testimony. Let us suppose, then, that consciousness bears no direct testimony to the externality of an object of intuition, beyond what is implied in its being object ; in other words, that it bears no testimony to the externality involved in the *independent* existence of an object in relation to myself. The question is, whether, if so, the idea can be accounted for, and if it can, whether its association with every intuition of external phenomena can be explained ?

Both these questions may, I think, be answered in the affirmative. We will suppose the principle of causality to have been received in the way pointed out in the last lecture, and I will endeavour to show, first, how I may gain the idea of the independence of the object of intuition on myself, in the case, for example, of such an object as the one just named—that of a church. Let me premise that, after having acquired the idea of a church, there may be three different exercises of mind having a church as the object ; there may not only be the intuition of the external object, but there may be the memory of that intuition, and there may also be the imagination of a church. Now, let the judgment compare the testimony of consciousness and memory as to these three

mental exercises. As the result, I find that in reference to the intuition of the external object, I am conscious that I have an intuition, and that the object of the intuition is phenomenally a church ; I have here, however, no present consciousness of exerting any mental power, for either producing the object or keeping it before my intuitional faculty, nor have I any recollection of exerting such power previously to or in connexion with my first consciousness of the intuition. In reference, however, to the imagination of a church, I am not only conscious of an intuition, and that the object of the intuition is phenomenally a church, I am also conscious of making a mental effort to produce and to keep the object before my intuitional faculty, whence I infer that I am the sole cause of the presentation of the object to myself, and, therefore, that the presence of the object is dependent on me as its cause. And in reference to an exercise of memory with regard to some church, which was formerly an object of intuition, I am, as in the former case, conscious of a mental effort in respect to the object remembered, an effort, if not, as before, of producing, yet of recalling and of keeping the object before my mental intuition, whence I infer that I am a cause of the presentation of the object to myself, and, therefore, that the presence of the object to me is dependent on me as its cause. As I thus find, on comparing these exercises of mind, that I have ground in two of them for regarding the object as dependent on myself, and no ground in the other case, or in that of the intuition of an external phenomenon, I infer, on the principle of causality, or that like causes produce like effects, that, if in the last case there had been a dependence of the object on me, I should have had a similar ground for

believing its dependence to what I had in the other cases; and, hence, conclude that the object is independent, but if independent, that its externality to me is not a mere externality of object to subject, but an externality altogether independent of myself.*

* Although a digression from the present argument, the question is not uninteresting, whether the idea thus acquired of an externality altogether independent of the subject, in other words, of the independence of an object of intuition on self, is objectively true. This question resolves itself into two others, viz., whether my consciousness bears a true testimony in reference to the mental effort which in cases of imagination produces and retains the object of intuition before the intuitive faculty, and, in cases of memory, recalls and retains such object, and whether the principle of causality is to be depended upon as true; for if both these questions can be answered in the affirmative, it evidently follows that, as where dependence on self really exists it produces that consciousness of mental effort which warrants the conclusion that it exists, so where this effect is not produced the cause does not exist, and, therefore, that as in cases of the external phenomena there is no consciousness of mental effort in producing or retaining the object of intuition, such object is not dependent on self. Let us, then, briefly notice each question. In reference to the first, we appeal to the argument which the present note interrupts; if that argument is sound, the testimony of our consciousness is true. The second question will require a little further discussion. I showed in the preceding lecture how the principle of causality may be supposed to be gained by man. But is that principle true in nature, or is it not? in other words, is it true or false, "that every change implies a cause or a producing power to which it is to be attributed?" In showing how man may have come to embrace the principle, we were led to remark, that if power exists, the principle must be true, because if it were not true the same changes which are produced by power might take place when no power was exerted, and if so, power would have no more power than non-power, and therefore, as non-power is in its own nature without power, power would be without power, in other words, power would not exist.

If any do not see the force of this argument, they must admit that that which is produced without power cannot *require* power in order to its production; but that surely cannot be called power which produces nothing more than what requires no power in order to its

Having shown how the notion of the independence of the object on self is acquired, let us now ask, how this idea comes to be associated with every intuition of external phenomena. I answer, in two different ways: first, because, in *no* such intuition is there any consciousness of effort in producing, recalling, or retaining the object of the intuition before the mind; as it was the absence of such consciousness which first gave the mind the notion of the independence of the object, it can be no wonder that that idea is connected with every case characterized by the absence referred to: secondly, because experience teaches that in the cases just referred to, where the consciousness of effort on the part of the mind is wanting, the intuitions are more lively than in other cases. Hence, after the mind has found by experience, that, in every case of intuition, in which the absence of the consciousness of effort, with respect to its object, gives the idea of the independence of the object, the phenomenon is presented in a more lively manner to the mind than in other cases, the party is led to associate

being produced, and if so, there is no such thing as power, if the principle of causality is false.

Does, then, power exist, or does it not? We have already proved that the exercises of intuition, of memory, and of judgment really exist. But such exercises are in their own nature activities, for if I have an intuition of an object there is a mental action; if my mind were *merely* passive, I could not exercise intuition, and the same may be said of memory and judgment. But an activity is a power in action; to say that there is action without power is to say that there is a power in exercise, and yet no power, which is a manifest contradiction. Accordingly, as acts of intuition, memory, and judgment really exist, power must have a real existence, and hence the preceding reasoning is sufficient to prove that the principle of causality must be true. We have thus noticed both the questions, an affirmative reply to which we showed would be sufficient to prove the real independence of external objects of intuition on the intuitive mind.

the lively presentation with the idea of the independence of the object.

Having thus accounted, on the supposition that consciousness bears no direct testimony on the matter, both for the acquisition of the idea of the independence of an object on self, and for the association of such idea with our intuitions of external phenomena, I think that we may fairly infer that the direct testimony of consciousness is confined to the four particulars previously named.*

* Some, perhaps, will think that the doctrine maintained above, viz., that consciousness bears no direct testimony to the independence on self of an external object of intuition, is in opposition to Sir Wm. Hamilton's doctrine of "Presentative Realism." But a few remarks will satisfy them that its truth is perfectly consistent with the doctrine of "Presentationism." *The grand question, it must be remembered, between the Presentationists and the Representationists is not whether, in perception, I am or am not immediately conscious of the independence on me of the object of intuition; but whether the object of which I am immediately conscious be the external object itself or a mere subjective representation of it.* If so, it cannot but be evident that the question, "What is the object of which I am immediately conscious?" is perfectly distinct from the question, "Whether I am immediately conscious, or otherwise, of its independence on me?" The first question refers simply to the direct object of my consciousness; the second, to the particular points of view in which my consciousness directly embraces such object.

Although this is not the place for a full investigation of the question of presentationism, I may perhaps be permitted to state an argument in its favour, which, except it can be met by some stronger argument on the opposite side than any that has come under my eye, appears to me unanswerable. If representationism be true, there must be two distinct mental exercises in every case of perception, one for the intuition of the representative idea, the other for deriving the representative idea, which is the immediate object of intuition, from the external object represented by it: but we are utterly unconscious of any such last-named mental exercise; how, then, can we have any proof that it exists? Indeed, so far from having any proof of the existence of a mental exercise of which we are unconscious, all the knowledge we have of mind leads us to the conclusion that all our mental exercises are accompanied by consciousness, and, there-

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We have then proved that there are mental exercises in reference to which the *whole* testimony of consciousness is true. But if our reasoning is thus far sound, we shall be able to go further, and to show, that the *whole* testimony of consciousness in reference to *every* mental exercise, must, likewise, be true. For suppose any case whatever, in which consciousness bears testimony to the existence of a mental exercise, our preceding reasoning proves that, because consciousness exists, there are mental exercises which, at that time, really exist, (for consciousness could not exist if there were no mental exercise,) and which, because they are in their own nature necessarily accompanied by consciousness, (for all mental exercises are so accompanied,) must have a true testimony borne to them by consciousness; in every case, then, in which consciousness bears testimony to the existence of any mental exercise, there must be a really existing mental exercise to which it bears a true testimony. If such mental exercise be the only object to which consciousness testifies, the truth of its testimony evidently follows; if it be not the only object, but there be some other, the consciousness must fore, that where there is no consciousness, there is no mental exercise. I admit that there may be momentary acts of consciousness which excite so little attention as immediately to escape the memory; but this is only the case with those acts which instantaneously follow each other in rapid succession, and is never the case with an act so long continued, as one must be, by which a representative idea is (if our intuition of external phenomena be merely through the medium of such ideas) retained, as it sometimes is, before the mind for a considerable period. If any one thinks that a consciousness of such a mental exercise exists, let me add, that in that case we should have a conviction, which we have not, that the *immediate* object of intuition is dependent on us, and, hence, a conviction, that if there is anything independent, the immediate object is representative of such independent reality.

bear a double testimony ; and if so, there must be a double act of consciousness, because each distinct testimony borne is evidently a distinct act. Leave then out of consideration the act in which its testimony is true, and attend separately to the other act. By a like course of reasoning it may be proved that either this testimony is true, or, as before, that there is a double act, one of which is true. As we may pursue this reasoning *ad infinitum*, we must eventually come to a case in which there is only a single testimony of consciousness, (for it will not be supposed possible for consciousness to bear an *infinite* number of testimonies at the same time,) and, as, in such a case, its testimony must be true, it follows that there is no case in which it can possibly be false.

To the conclusion at which we have arrived, two objections may possibly be adduced : one, that our senses sometimes deceive us ; the other, that we falsely imagine ourselves, in dreams, to have the intuition of external phenomena. It will be said, that in both these cases consciousness bears a false testimony, and, therefore, that it cannot be true that there is no case in which its testimony is false. Let us, however, examine each of these cases, and inquire whether, in either of them, it is really true that a false testimony is borne by consciousness.

First, we investigate the cases in which we are deceived by our senses. Here, I must premise, that the testimony of our senses is twofold, one, *spontaneous and immediate*, the other, *only mediate and the result of experience*—the latter being what is sometimes called “the acquired testimony of sense.” All, however, that our consciousness *immediately* testifies, in reference to any object of sensual intuition, is, what is spontaneously

and immediately testified by sense; it bears no direct testimony to that which sense does not, except mediately and as the result of experience, attest. Take, for example, the distance of an object which is only, in the latter way, testified by sense. Experience teaches me that when the intuition of an external object has such and such peculiarities, it indicates that it is at such and such a distance; hence, these peculiarities become a sign to me of that distance, and thus, sense, when it testifies to them, indirectly testifies to the particular distance of which they are the sign. Here I have no immediate consciousness of the distance; I have only a consciousness of the presence of those peculiarities in the external object which experience has led me to regard as the sign of a certain distance. But if this be correct, many cases of supposed deception of the senses are accounted for, without impugning the testimony of consciousness.

There are other cases of deception which occur when the bodily organs of sense are diseased, or when the imagination is unusually active; thus, under the influence of a disease of some organ of sense, an external object may present a different appearance to what it does when the organ is in a state of health; or, we may, under unnatural excitement of the imagination, suppose ourselves to have the intuition of external objects, though they are simply the creation of our fancy. I remark, in reference to the first-named cases—*where there is disease in the bodily organs*—that, as the testimony of consciousness is in no case to the object as it independently exists, but simply as it exists phenomenally to the mind, and that, as a disease in an organ of sense changes the relation in which the sense stands

to the object, and thus changes its phenomenal appearance, consciousness is perfectly true when it testifies to the peculiar phenomenal appearance, which, *in relation to the diseased state of the senses*, really exists. And I remark, in reference to the second cases named—*where the imagination is unusually active*—that consciousness testifies most truly when it bears witness to the peculiar liveliness with which the object is presented to the mind, and that this is the only peculiarity in its direct testimony. True, it may not testify, with the same distinctness as in ordinary cases of the imagination, to the mental effort to which the object owes its existence, (for this would have given the idea of the dependence of the object on the mind,) but it herein acts only according to the ordinary laws of mind; according to these laws, the consciousness of any mental exercise is more or less lively according to the degree in which attention is given to it, and in the case supposed, the attention must have been diverted more than usually from the consciousness of the effort, because the object, being more than ordinarily lively, drew the attention in an extraordinary degree from the effort to itself. When this is remembered it will be no matter of wonder that, without supposing consciousness at fault, the liveliness of the object presented to the mind, seeing that the mind has learnt from experience to regard it as a sign or token of the independence of the object, leads it for a moment, at least, to regard the object as having an independent existence. Consciousness, then, bears no false testimony; and even on the point in which its testimony seems less distinct, the indistinctness is not owing to any error with which it can be charged, but to circumstances which diverted the attention from its evidence.

The deception, we experience in dreams, is susceptible of a like explanation. The imagination is often, in partial sleep, unusually active, and is exercised with little effort; accordingly, the attention is directed not to the effort, but to the lively picture presented, and this lively picture gives us, for the same reason as before, an idea of independent existence. Consciousness is not wrong, though the inferences drawn from its testimony may mislead. Whence we conclude that the objections to the uniform truth of the testimony of consciousness are futile, and therefore that our former conclusion is unshaken: viz., that there is no case in which its testimony can be false.

We have shown, then, that consciousness exists, that our own existence is involved in that of consciousness, and that the direct testimony of consciousness is *in every case* true.

Hence, we have facts on which we may legitimately found an argument for the existence of a Being corresponding to the distinctive idea we have of God. The validity of any such argument, the facts being granted, will however depend on three things: first, the truth of the principles on which the argument is conducted;—secondly, the assumption of nothing but the facts and principles alluded to above;—and, thirdly, the conclusion containing nothing but what is virtually contained in the premises. In respect to the argument, into which we are now to enter, we have already proved the first of these points; for we have shown the truth of these two principles on which our reasoning will be grounded, “that two contradictories cannot both be true,”* and that “every change implies a cause.”† If then we take

* This is shown, p. 150.

† This is shown in foot note, p. 160.

care to violate neither the second nor the third, our argument will be complete.

In proving the existence of a Being corresponding to our distinctive idea of God, I propose to establish these two propositions.

First. If a First Cause exist, he is necessarily characterized by all the particulars included in our distinctive idea of God: in other words, he is *Independent*, *Absolutely Necessary*, *Eternal*, and *Omnipresent*.

Secondly. A First Cause does exist.

First. If a First Cause exist, he is independent, absolutely necessary, eternal, and omnipresent. We have already shown how the notions of these attributes may be empirically gained; and by what reasoning we may be led, after they are gained, to associate them with a First Cause. Accordingly it may seem to some that we are now about to go again over ground we have already trodden. This in a sense is true, but it must be remembered that our object is different, and hence that it will occasion a considerable difference in the mode of going over it. It is one thing to show how man may first receive ideas and convictions, and another thing to prove that such ideas and convictions are worthy of the confidence he has placed in them.

To proceed then with our argument. It must be admitted that if a First Cause exists, he cannot owe his existence to a cause out of himself; otherwise he would not be First Cause. He must, then, so far as cause is concerned, owe his existence entirely to himself; and hence must owe it either to his own will or to his own nature. He cannot, however, owe it to his own will, for that would suppose his will to be prior to his existence, which would involve a contradiction. But if he

owes it to his own nature, it can only be because it so belongs to his nature to exist that he cannot but exist,—in other words, because he exists by the necessity of his nature.

The question then arises whether the necessity of existence, which thus belongs to his nature, be absolute or only relative; in other words, whether it depends on anything out of himself, or is perfectly independent of everything without. Now, if it depends on anything out of himself, it must be either as cause, or simply as condition; but the necessity cannot depend on anything without *as its cause*, because that would be contradictory to the hypothesis that he is First Cause. Accordingly, if the necessity of existence which belongs to the nature of First Cause be dependent on anything out of his own nature, it can only be dependent on it *as condition and not as cause*. Suppose then something on which, *as condition*, First Cause is possibly dependent, this something is either caused or uncaused. It cannot however be caused; otherwise, First Cause would not be *First Cause*; and, moreover, as First Cause, by the supposition, could not exist independently of the condition, he would owe his existence *mediately* to a cause out of himself, which, as *First Cause*, is impossible. If then First Cause is possibly dependent on anything *as condition*, the condition is uncaused, and therefore exists like First Cause, by the necessity of its nature: and it may in like manner be shown that such condition cannot depend on anything else as condition, but what exists by a like necessity. First Cause cannot, then, either *mediately* or *immediately*, be dependent on anything out of himself, *even as a condition of his existence*, but what exists by the necessity of its nature. Accordingly,

as it is absolutely impossible, provided First Cause cannot exist without a condition, for such condition not to exist, the existence of First Cause is dependent on nothing but what is, in its own nature, absolutely necessary; and being necessarily independent of that, except as condition, is as independent of all possible contingency and therefore as absolutely necessary as though dependent on no condition at all. For if *A* be absolutely necessary, and if, *A* existing, *B* be absolutely necessary, *B* is evidently as absolutely necessary as *A*. We do not here, let me remark, admit that First Cause does depend on any condition whatever; all that we assert is, and this we think we have proved, that, supposing him to depend on any condition, he must even then exist by absolute necessity.

It will be perceived that we have used the phrase "absolute necessity," as meaning a necessity which is independent of all possible contingency. But such a necessity must exist in every possible relation, for of course it exists in every relation which is necessary, and if it did not exist in every relation which is contingent, it would be possible for it to be set aside by contingency, and therefore would evidently be dependent on contingency. If, then, First Cause exists by the absolute necessity we have proved to characterize his existence, he must exist in every possible relation to space and to duration; but if so, he must exist in relation to *every part* of space and duration; for suppose any part of space or of duration in which he is not, he does not exist in relation to that part of space or of duration, and hence does not exist in every possible relation to space and duration.

We have thus proved that if First Cause exist at all,

he is, so far as both cause and contingent condition are concerned, perfectly independent, that his existence is absolutely necessary, and that he fills all space, and exists in all duration.

We proceed, then, to inquire whether it can be demonstrated that First Cause does exist.

I have already proved the truth of the proposition, "I exist." I, however, am not First Cause, for I am not possessed of the attributes which have been shown to characterize First Cause. If First Cause exist, he exists, as we have seen, independent of all possible contingency; but if so, the mode of his existence must be necessary; and hence I not only, if I am First Cause, must exist, but must exist *as I am*; and accordingly, as I must, in that case, exist in every possible relation to space, I must exist *as I am* in every such relation, and must therefore exist *in precisely the same mode* in relation to every part of space; but I do not exist in precisely the same mode in relation to every part of space, for I have a conscious existence in relation to one part of space of which I have no consciousness in relation to other parts. Again, if the mode of my existence is necessary, as it must be if I am First Cause, I must exist *as I am* in every possible relation to duration, and accordingly I must exist in *precisely the same mode* in relation to every instant in duration; seeing, then, that this mode must also exist in relation to every part of space, I could never exist in a different relation to the same part of space from that in which I exist in relation to it at any given moment; but if I have any power of memory, I do exist in a relation to a part of space to-day in which I did not exist to the same part of space yesterday. I cannot then be First Cause.

But, if I am not First Cause, my existence is not owing to myself, and is therefore to be attributed to some cause out of myself. But if my existence is owing to a cause out of myself, that cause is either First Cause or not. If it is First Cause, the existence of a First Cause is demonstrated. If it is not First Cause, its existence is not owing to itself, but to some cause out of itself. By similar reasoning we may ascend from cause to cause, and we must thus either reach a First Cause, or find an infinite series either of coexistent, or of successive dependent causes. Suppose, then, an infinite series of dependent causes either coexistent or successive, it is evident, by hypothesis, there is nothing in the series which is independent, and it is equally evident that, if the attribute of dependence be, as to its individual manifestation, multiplied to any extent whatever, it will not change the nature of the attribute, but merely give a multiple of it. Accordingly, if individual dependence be multiplied by infinity, it is still dependence, though existing, not as before, in one individual only, but in an infinite number of individuals. An infinite series of dependent causes is, therefore, dependent as a whole; but, if dependent as a whole, it must have a cause out of itself to which it owes its existence. If, however, it must have a cause out of itself, we cannot stop at an infinite series of dependent causes, and hence cannot stop anywhere except at a First Cause. A First Cause, then, must exist.

I have thus proved the existence of a Being corresponding to our distinctive idea of God: for I have shown that, if a First Cause exists, he must be characterized by independence, absolute necessity of existence, and an existence in relation to every part both of infinite

space and of infinite duration : and I have then shown that a First Cause does exist.

The question may, perhaps, be asked, whether there can possibly be more than one First Cause. Here we shall not inquire what is the nature of the unity possibly attributable to First Cause, whether it is or is not exclusive of every idea of plurality. All that we shall attempt to show, and all, as we believe, that can be shown, independently of a supernatural revelation, is that there cannot be two or more *separate and independent* First Causes; for suppose two such First Causes, X and Y. Then because X is a First Cause separate from and independent of Y, X may produce existences which, so far as their production is concerned, are independent of Y. In like manner, because Y is a First Cause, separate from and independent of X, Y may produce existences which, so far as their production is concerned, are independent of X. But again, because X and Y are First Causes, both X and Y, according to the conclusions previously demonstrated, *must exist in every possible relation*; but to be the producing cause of any produced existence is a possible relation to such existence; X and Y, therefore, must each exist in this relation to all such existences; and, consequently, X is the producing cause of what is produced by Y; and yet what has been produced by Y is, as we previously showed, so far as production is concerned, independent of X, which is a contradiction; and in like manner, Y is the producing cause of what, because it is produced by X, is, so far as production is concerned, independent of Y, which is equally a contradiction. Accordingly, there cannot be two separate and independent First Causes.

But has the First Cause Will, Consciousness, and In-

telligence? What is Will? We know from experience that actions are of two kinds, *spontaneous* and *voluntary*. We call those spontaneous which necessarily result from the constitution of our nature, and over which we have no control, and we call those voluntary which are under our own control: thus, the beating of our heart is a spontaneous action, the movement of a limb a voluntary one. Now, the power by which we produce voluntary actions is called "the will," and hence we have only, by means of psychology, to investigate this power to ascertain what will is, as it exists in us. But is there any like power existing in God? There cannot, I reply, be any power in God *perfectly synonymous with this power in us*; because it is impossible in the nature of things for the attributes of infinite and necessary existence to be perfectly synonymous with the attributes of finite and contingent existence, the former being in their own nature infinite and necessary, and therefore impossible to anything finite and contingent. At the same time, there must be a power in God resembling the power of will in us, though infinitely excelling it; otherwise all the actions of God would necessarily spring from the constitution of his nature, and this, if we admit the testimony of our consciousness and memory, may be shown to be impossible.

For, first, since the constitution of the Divine nature is absolutely necessary, all that *necessarily* springs from it must be absolutely necessary; accordingly, those actions of God, which necessarily spring from the constitution of his nature, are as necessary as his nature is; therefore, they must have been in existence from eternity, and through infinite space, and they must continue unchangeably the same through eternity and through

infinite space. If, then, all actions of God necessarily spring from the constitution of his nature, and he has no power of control over them, there can be no variety in the effects produced. What is produced at one time must be produced at every time, and what is produced in one place must be produced in every place. If this conclusion is doubted, it can only be on the supposition, that the infinite, eternal, and unchangeable action of the necessary Being consists in the production of will; for, if it does not produce will, it only produces that which either does not act at all, or which merely acts as the necessary result of its constitution; and if so, as the action of Deity is, in that case, always and everywhere the same, there could not possibly be any difference either in the immediate or in the ultimate effect between one time and another or between one place and another.

Suppose, then, that the infinite, eternal, and unchangeable action consists in the production of will; the will thus produced must be either eternal and infinite, or temporary and finite. Suppose, first, that it is an eternal and infinite will; and, since the First Cause is always acting uniformly, it must be either always producing the one eternal and infinite will,—in which case the will is always being produced, but never produced,—or the First Cause must produce an infinite succession of like wills, in other words, an infinite succession of wills of precisely the same nature as the eternal and infinite will which it first produces. The former alternative, viz., that the eternal, infinite and unchangeable will is always being produced, but never produced, is a contradiction, for what is always being produced and yet never produced is neither eternal, infinite, nor unchangeable. The latter, or that there is an infi-

nite succession of such wills, is equally contradictory, for suppose the first production coeval with the cause, and therefore eternal, those which have been posterior to it would not be eternal; and if it be allowed that the first only is eternal and not those which succeed it, the first must differ in nature from those which follow; for, being coeval with its cause and necessarily produced by it, it must be as absolutely necessary as its cause; whereas those which follow, not being coeval with their cause, and therefore nonexistent at some time when their cause is existent, are not as absolutely necessary as their cause: but if so, the spontaneous and necessary action of the First Cause is supposed to produce effects of different kinds; in other words, it is supposed that a cause precisely the same and acting simply by the necessity of its nature produces at different times different results, which, if the principle of causality is true, is a contradiction.

Nor can the spontaneous and necessary action of the First Cause consist in the production of a succession of finite wills. For the spontaneous and necessary action supposed is either one indivisible action of eternal duration, or a succession of precisely similar actions; if it be one indivisible action of eternal duration, the effect produced by it would be always being produced but never accomplished; if on the other hand it be a succession of precisely similar actions, as the succession must have continued ever since First Cause has existed, it must have continued from eternity; and accordingly a will must have been produced from eternity—in other words, coevally with First Cause; but a production coeval with First Cause, and produced necessarily by it, is as absolutely necessary as First

Cause, and hence, as shown above, differs from any after production of First Cause ; but such a difference of production (as has been shown already) is a contradiction, if the principle of causality is true. Therefore, there can be no spontaneous and necessary action of the First Cause for the production of will : for it is impossible, if the action be indivisible ; and it involves what is contradictory to the principle of causality, if the action be divisible into an infinite series of successive actions.

If, then, the First Cause merely acts spontaneously by the necessity of his nature, he does not act in the production of will, for we have seen that he can, in that case, neither produce eternal and infinite, nor temporary and finite will, and therefore he cannot, either mediately or immediately, produce any variety of existence in the universe. Accordingly, as our consciousness and memory testify to the existence of our own will, which, as we have seen, is not First Cause, and also to the existence of variety in the universe, the First Cause cannot act merely by necessity of nature. There must consequently be some power in God analogous to the power of will in man. The nature of that power, as we have already said, we do not and cannot understand. It is as far removed from any power we possess, as infinity is from finity. The idea which we are able to form, is therefore necessarily a far distant and obscure one, being one which we can only derive from an investigation of our own will,—in other words, from psychology.

We speak of the consciousness of God, but we know no more of the *nature* of the divine consciousness than we do of the *nature* of the will of God. Consciousness in us is an inward intuition which makes us acquainted with the operations of our own minds.

This consciousness is evidently implied in every act of will ; we may act by the necessity of our nature without being conscious of the act, but we cannot act by the operation of our will without our knowing the act ; accordingly, if our actions are not spontaneous but voluntary, we must know them either by such a power as our consciousness, or some analogous power. Hence, although consciousness in God is a power infinitely higher than consciousness in man, it follows that if the actions of God do not necessarily proceed from the necessity of his nature, he must have such a power ; and it must be so far analogous to consciousness in us as to make him perfectly acquainted with his own actions.

Intelligence in us is the capacity of knowing and judging. If we have a knowledge of our own mental operations, as we must have if we are conscious, it implies a capacity of knowing ; and if we decide on the operations of our own minds, as we must do if we have a will, it implies a capacity of judging. Accordingly, if will implies consciousness, there must be intelligence wherever there is will. A capacity of knowing and judging in God, is, like every other divine attribute, infinitely superior to anything existing in us ; but yet, if the actions of God do not proceed from the necessity of his nature, if they are under his power, and if therefore he must know them and decide what they shall be, he evidently must have some power, however superior to ours, both of knowing and of judging ; in other words, he must be intelligent. Our idea of this power, like our idea of every other power of God, is, of necessity, inadequate, for we could not have any idea at all if it were not for the knowledge we have of our own intelligence.

We have thus shown that there not only exists a First Cause, Eternal, Independent, Necessary, and Filling infinite space, but also that this First Cause is possessed of unity, will, consciousness, and intelligence, and is therefore a personal God. Our knowledge, however, of all this, and the evidence we have of its truth, depend on psychology. How intimate then the relation between psychology and theology !

Were we further to investigate the moral attributes of God, we must still seek the aid of mental science. We have no ideas of holiness, justice, goodness, and truth, except what we have derived from self-knowledge and the knowledge we have of our fellow men. Such ideas are far removed from the true notions of holiness, justice, goodness, and truth, as they exist in God ; but yet they are the only conceptions we are capable of forming of his moral attributes, and they give us some distant glimpse of what those attributes really are. The evidence which we have that such attributes are existent in Deity, is partly derived, indeed, from our knowledge of created existence generally, but it is chiefly derived from the knowledge we have of the nature and constitution of our own minds. We are so constituted as to admire virtue and to condemn vice ; hence we believe, independently of any written revelation, in the existence of a principle in our Creator which leads him to approve that which he has constituted us to admire, and which equally leads him to disapprove that which he has constituted us to condemn. We are so constituted as to be pleased with justice and to be displeased with injustice ; hence we believe that our Creator must be pleased with justice and displeased with injustice. Moreover, we have a principle within us called conscience

which approves us when we do virtuously and condemns us when we do viciously ; we feel that it approves and condemns with impartiality ; and hence we believe that he, who implanted the powers to which this principle is to be ascribed, will approve and condemn impartially. Our mental and also our bodily constitution we find to be so formed as to be promotive of our happiness ; and although we are subject to various evils, yet if we trace them back to their source, we discover that some of them are attributable to ourselves, some to our fellow creatures, and some to accidental disorders in our constitution, but none to the essential nature of our constitution. Hence, and also because we see all conscious existence fitted for greater or less degrees of enjoyment, we believe there is a principle in God which leads him to seek the happiness of his creatures. Once more, we find that the constitution of our nature leads to a natural approval of truth and disapproval of falsehood, and hence we believe that our Creator must be a God of truth. No doubt the evidence we have of these and other attributes of God is greatly enlarged by the revelations made in holy writ ; hence, after we have ascertained the Divine authority of Scripture, it behoves us to learn what it teaches us of God. Even Scripture, however, can give us only an obscure and distant knowledge of the nature of his attributes. We have not powers capacitating us for receiving anything like adequate conceptions, and accordingly we find that in his revealed word God comes down to our capacity, and teaches us from what we are what he himself is ; but if so, it must be evident that as long as our knowledge is thus limited, in other words, that as long as self-knowledge is the medium of our knowledge of God, so long must

psychology be of great value and importance to theology. Whether self-knowledge will continue to be the only medium of our knowledge of God in another world, we cannot say. Perhaps there may be conferred on us, in another state of being, media of knowledge, and especially of the knowledge of God, immeasurably surpassing present apprehension.

We cannot even then know God *immediately*; this is impossible to us as creatures. We may have an intuition of the finite, but we cannot of the infinite.

“ Oh ! 'tis beyond a creature mind,
To glance a thought half way to God.”

Yet media may be furnished by which we may be enabled to take nearer and more direct views of the Godhead;—media which may possibly be repeated in progressively advancing forms, each bringing us closer and closer to God, and giving us a clearer and yet clearer idea of the glory of his perfections. It will, indeed, in this way, take us a whole eternity to become fully acquainted with God; but does not the Lord Jesus Christ tell us that eternal life is given for this very end: “This is life eternal that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent”? Accordingly, though our knowledge of God will ever be imperfect, it will ever be advancing, and so advancing that at every fresh step we may, in comparison with the one which preceded it, truly say, “I saw *then* through a glass darkly, but *now* face to face,” and, at the same time, we may with equal truth say of each step, in comparison with what is to follow, “*Now* I see through a glass darkly, but *then* face to face.”

To grow in the knowledge of God is the grand object of every inhabitant of heaven, and it ought to be the

object of every intelligent inhabitant of earth. There is no knowledge half so ennobling nor half so profitable as this. This knowledge will make us holy, useful and happy: "Beholding, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, we are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord."

The object of this lecture has been to show the objective truth of our idea of God. For this purpose we have, first, investigated the reality of the facts on which our argument is founded; in doing this we have shown, that what experience teaches us in reference to such facts is to be depended upon, by proving that we have sufficient reason for believing the testimony of our consciousness. The reality of the facts on which our argument for the existence of God is founded being thus ascertained, we have next shown what is essential to the validity of an argument founded on them. Having arrived thus far, we have first demonstrated that, if a First Cause exists, he must be independent of everything without, *as cause*, or he could not be First Cause; that if he be dependent on anything without, *as condition*, it can only be on something existing by absolute necessity, and, therefore, as he must be independent of all possible contingency, he must exist by absolute necessity; that, as such a necessity must exist in every possible relation, he must exist in every possible relation to space and to duration, and, therefore, that as a relation to any part of space, or to any part of duration, is a possible relation to space or to duration, he must exist in every such relation, and must, consequently, be eternal and omnipresent. After showing that a First Cause, if he exist, must be thus independent, absolutely necessary, eternal, and omnipresent, we proved that a First Cause

does exist. With the view of establishing this proposition, we have shown, taking our own existence for granted, because previously demonstrated, that *we* are not First Cause, since we have not the attributes just proved to belong to First Cause; that, therefore, we owe our existence to a cause out of ourselves, which, if not First Cause, also owes existence to a cause out of itself, that, consequently, if we ascend from cause to cause, we must either find a First Cause or an infinite series of dependent causes; that we cannot stop at an infinite series of dependent causes, and hence that a First Cause must exist.

We have next proved that there cannot be two separate and independent First Causes, because, if there were, each could not exist in every possible relation, as we have shown must be the case with a First Cause. Our next object has been to show that First Cause must be characterized by a power of voluntary action, in other words, by will; and this we have done by proving that if the action of First Cause was only spontaneous and necessary, there could not be finite will, nor would there be the variety which our consciousness and memory tell us exists in creation. We proved that if First Cause is possessed of will, he must be conscious and intelligent. Whence we concluded that First Cause is a personal God. Finally, we showed that this personal Deity has manifested by the way in which he has constructed our minds that he is holy, just, good, and true. As, however, self-knowledge is the only medium whereby we can attain any idea of the moral attributes of God, what an infinite distance must there be between God as he really is and our knowledge of him! His nature, his essence, and even his attributes in their full glory, are all

beyond the reach of our finite comprehension. Can the finite grasp the infinite? Can he who is of yesterday understand the eternal? Can the creature comprehend the Creator? "The knowledge is as high as heaven, what can we do? It is deeper than hell, what can we know?"

How much reason have we for gratitude, that seeing we can know so little of God as he really is, and are compelled to look to our own nature as the medium whence alone we can gain the notions essential to the chief part even of what we can know, he has been pleased, with the view of bringing himself down to our capacity, to assume, in the person of his Son, our nature! In Christ, we see "God manifest in the flesh"; in him, we behold a revelation of God adapted not only to our limited understanding, but calculated, by a oneness of nature with ourselves, to attract our sympathy and love.

"Incarnate God!

Wonder, oh, heavens! and be astonished, earth!
Yet wherefore moved? 'Twas for this high end
He made you; 'twas but to reveal himself,
(His wisdom, power, and goodness infinite,)
He laid his Godhead by, and took
The Christhood up; it was that he might show
The glory of the Godhead forth." *

"No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath revealed him."

* "The Incarnation," by T. Ragg, p. 3.

LECTURE V.

IS CHRISTIANITY FROM GOD?

[In the preceding lectures attention is given to controverted questions relating to religion and to God. In the fifth, sixth, and seventh, such questions are discussed, with what aid psychology affords, in reference to Christianity as a supernatural communication from God, and to the Scriptures as an inspired record of the communication.

The present lecture is introduced with some observations in justification of the use which we make of psychology in the discussion of questions pertaining to theology. The terms Revelation and Inspiration are then defined, and reasons are assigned for rejecting the definitions of Mr. Morell. The first question in reference to Christianity as a supernatural communication from God, viz. —whether supernatural communications are possible—is next discussed, and here it is shown that they are not only physically possible, but not inconsistent either with the unchangeableness or the truth of God. The second question—how far such communications are necessarily restricted, either as to their subject-matter, or as to the mode in which they can be made—is then investigated; and it is shown that so far as *subject-matter* is concerned, they are restricted by the limit of human power for the reception of truth, but that they are not restricted, as some maintain, to what is called the matter of thought in distinction from the form; it is also shown that so far as *mode* is concerned, they are not restricted to the *immediate* presentation of truth, but may be made mediately as well as immediately. The third question—what evidence will suffice to prove that a supernatural communication is from God, and therefore authoritative, and whether we have such evidence of the Divine origin of Christianity—is next asked, and is discussed so far as one branch of internal evidence is concerned, the remainder of the discus-

sion being reserved to the following lecture. Here it is, first, shown what would suffice to constitute adequate internal evidence; secondly, the evidence resulting from the adaptation of a professed revelation to meet an extraordinary want of human nature, is proved to be adequate; and, thirdly, it is shown that Christianity has the adaptation referred to.]

THERE is, perhaps, no theological topic more interesting, nor one which the present times render more pre-eminently important, than that which respects a supernatural revelation; and there is, undoubtedly, none in which there is a more intimate connexion between psychology and theological science. All the doubts and difficulties, worthy of notice, which have been expressed, either in reference to supernatural communications generally, or to the Bible in particular, have been more or less psychological. This is so patent in reference to the doubts and difficulties of the present age, that it needs no proof; indeed, it has led some to imagine that psychology must be a dangerous study, and that both it and ontology are in antagonism to Christianity. But let me remind such, that if Christianity be, as we believe, really from God, true science cannot be in antagonism to it. False science, fallacious theories, unfounded conclusions, may be as opposed to theological, as they are to scientific truth; but, since all the truths taught in nature must unquestionably be of God, none of them can possibly be opposed to any other truth which is also from him. Some may admit this, and yet maintain that there is so much difficulty and uncertainty about psychological science, that we cannot, and ought not, to trust to its conclusions, and that it is therefore wisest for the lover of truth to keep aloof from it. I do not say that there is no element of truth here. There is enough to make us cautious in our scientific deductions, enough to

induce us to discriminate between those conclusions which are established on irrefragable evidence, and those which are more or less doubtful; and, hence, enough to prevent our allowing any conclusions of the latter class to unsettle that in our theological faith which is otherwise built on a sufficient foundation.

But whilst there is thus an element of truth in the opinion to which I have adverted, it is mixed with error calculated to mislead us. There are, I allow, difficulties and uncertainties attending the solution of some psychological questions, but this cannot be said of the whole science of mind; on the contrary, there are investigations which are exceedingly plain, as well as those which are more abstruse—investigations which will help us on the road to truth, as well as those on which no dependence can be placed. Accordingly, we believe that our duty, as lovers of truth, is not to keep aloof, but to discriminate. By so doing we shall not only avoid the evils which those who decry psychology dread, but receive light, which will both illumine our own path, and enable us to meet and to rebut those objections to sound theological doctrine which else would disturb other minds, if they did not disturb our own.

But some may ask, whether it is not using a carnal weapon if we try to rebut theological errors by means of science; they will tell us that the only sword which we ought to employ in support of the Christian faith is "the sword of the Spirit,—*the word of God*"; and they will perhaps quote as their authority the declaration of the apostle Paul, that "the weapons of our warfare are not carnal." I need not say to the majority of those who have paid any attention to the meaning of the apostle, that his words are misunderstood if they are

supposed to forbid the use of scientific weapons. Still, as there may be some who are of a different opinion, let us inquire whether the apostle, in the passage referred to, does really forbid our resorting to science in defence of religion. If it be forbidden in that passage, it must be either because, according to the sense in which Paul has used the term "carnal," the scientific is one of its species, or because he is to be considered as referring to any weapon of which carnal men may make use.

We ask, then, first, whether according to the sense in which Paul has used the word "carnal," the scientific is included. The Greek word *σαρκικός* primarily signifies "*fleshly*," in opposition to what is spiritual, and, accordingly, it properly designates "things pertaining to the flesh." Hence, what pertains to the support of the flesh; what, like the flesh, is visible and outward; what is frail and perishable, as the flesh is; and what mental desires and affections are either fleshly in their origin, or have the gratification of the flesh as their end — all come under the designation *σαρκικός*. When, however, the word is used, as it is by Paul, with a religious reference, it is applied to whatever characterizes the unrenewed nature of man, because that concerns itself unduly *with what is carnal*, that is, either with what pertains to the support or gratification of the flesh, with what like the flesh is visible and outward, or with what is frail and perishable, as the flesh is. Hence, that and that alone is to be considered as, according to the verse referred to, a carnal weapon, the use of which is accordant with and exhibitiv of the unrenewed nature of man. But if so, as scientific reasoning does not *of itself* exhibit an unrenewed nature, and as it is, to say the least, as accordant with a renewed nature as it

can possibly be with an unrenewed, we are not, in the sense in which the term "carnal" is used by Paul, using a carnal weapon when we employ it in defence of Christian truth.

Still, we may be asked, whether scientific reasoning is not used by carnal men, and ought not any way, for that reason, to be styled "carnal." I answer that that in carnal men which indicates depraved principles, or an anti-christian state of mind, is "carnal;" but that anything else of theirs is not to be called "carnal" *merely because it is theirs*. Thus, if an unregenerated man gives to a benevolent object, the act is not "carnal" because it is his; nor should we be justified in refusing to contribute to the object, merely because he has contributed. His motive, I admit, may not be pure, and if not, it is carnal, and to be avoided; but his outward act is right, and is not, simply because it is his, to be proscribed and stigmatized. Indeed, if science were carnal it could not manifest God; and yet it does manifest him, if it be true that "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being made manifest by the things that are made." God speaks to us in his works as well as in his word; and can it be properly called "carnal" to listen to his voice in the one case more than in the other? Does any one say, that the voice to which we are to listen is not heard in psychology, but in external nature?—I ask whether the human mind is not then the work of God as well as the material world around us, for, if it is, he surely speaks to us by this as well as by his other works. Is it said that whilst we may listen to the voice of God in his works, we ought not to bring anything we hear there to the aid of faith? I ask, in reply, Why not? If our faith is in God, what we hear from him in nature may

guide and strengthen our faith as to what we hear from him in his inspired word ;—indeed, if it simply helps us in ascertaining that the voice which speaks in his word is really his, and not the voice of a stranger, it will be valuable help ; nor can the use of it be anti-christian and carnal, seeing it is help which he himself has given. For these reasons we hold that we are not using carnal weapons, if we meet and rebut theological errors by means of science.

Let us then proceed, with what help we can derive from the science of mind, to the investigation of various questions which arise in relation to a supernatural communication. The terms "*Inspiration*," and "*Revelation*," to which these questions will refer, have been differently defined. "Divine Inspiration" is by some explained as simply denoting "*an act of God, by which the natural faculties of the mind are elevated*," and by others as one '*by which ideas are supernaturally communicated*.' And "Revelation" is by some interpreted as meaning "*the immediate presentation of truth to the mind*," and by others as comprehending '*not merely the actual presentation of truth to the mind, but any unveiling of truth which brings it within the possible reach of the mind, whether it be actually presented to it or not*.' Mr. Morell belongs, in both cases, to the former class. He interprets, indeed, the word "Revelation" in two senses ; *in a general sense*, as comprehending both revelation proper and inspiration, but in a specific sense, he regards "Revelation proper," or revelation as distinguished from inspiration, as the act by which the realities of the spiritual world are immediately presented to the mind ;—and "Inspiration" as the act by which a special influence is produced on the

faculties in virtue of which the mind is able to grasp the realities presented by revelation in their perfect fulness and integrity.

My objection to Mr. Morell's definition of *revelation proper* is, that it is too restrictive, both as to the subject-matter of a revelation, and as to the mode in which it is made. His definition, it will be perceived, *confines the subject-matter to the realities of the spiritual world*. Now, let me ask, whether there is anything, either in the English word "*Revelation*" or in the Greek term "*αποκάλυψις*," which warrants us *à priori* thus to restrict it? Surely, whether anything besides the realities of the spiritual world can possibly be supernaturally presented to man or not, any other supernatural presentation, supposing it possible, would with equal propriety be denominated a revelation. But if so, the question, what is the possible subject-matter of a revelation, ought not to be predetermined by a definition. Neither ought a definition to restrict the *mode* of a revelation to *immediate presentations to the mind*. Whilst we may properly inquire, whether it be possible for Deity to make supernatural communications to man in any other way than by immediate presentations, the question, *so far as definition is concerned*, is simply whether, if such a communication could be mediately made, it would not be as much entitled to be called a revelation as if made immediately. What then is there, I ask, either in the word "*Revelation*," or in the word "*αποκάλυψις*," to decide this question in the negative? The term "*αποκάλυψις*" does not seem of itself to require any actual presentation to the mind at all, whether mediate or immediate; for if a truth naturally undiscoverable by the human intellect, is so uncovered by God as to

be brought within the reach of those who seek after it, such uncovering is, in the strict sense of the word, an “*αποκάλυψις* ;” here there is no *actual presentation* of the truth to any mind, but yet the truth is so placed within reach that many minds can find it if they will. As the act which so places it takes away the veil by which it was previously impenetrably hid, the act is surely rightly designated a “revelation.” Hence, I think that “revelation” is properly defined as ‘*a simple uncovering of truth*,’ irrespective of the questions, what kind of truth may be thus uncovered, and whether the uncovering merely brings it within the possible reach of the mind, or actually presents it to it.

Mr. Morell’s definition of the term “Inspiration,” is, like that of “Revelation,” too restrictive. He confines Divine inspiration to the act of God in producing that special influence on the faculties by which they are enabled to grasp truth which would otherwise be beyond them. But why, I ask, adopt a definition which, of itself and without discussion, excludes Divine infusion of truth? I do not decide beforehand that there is any actual infusion of truth into the human mind by God, but neither ought the contrary to be decided beforehand. Supposing that there is, would it or would it not (for it is with this question alone that the definition has to do) be properly designated a Divine inspiration, and the mind which experienced it as “*θεόπνευστος*”? As this is a question which evidently admits only of an affirmative reply, I would define Divine inspiration as a supernatural act of God, by which he either elevates the faculties for apprehending truth, or directly communicates truth to the mind.

Having defined the terms “Revelation” and “In-

spiration," we are prepared for the questions to which the supposition of a supernatural communication from God to man has given rise. The three most important are : 1, whether such a communication is possible ; 2, whether, if it be possible, it is *in its nature* restricted, either as to its subject-matter, or as to the mode in which it is made ; and, 3, what evidence is necessary to prove it to be from God, and to be authoritative to man, and whether we have such evidence of the Divine origin of Christianity.

First, then, we ask, whether a supernatural communication is possible ? This question divides itself into two, whether it be *physically*, and whether it be *morally*, possible ? There are two cases, and only two, on the supposition that intelligent creatures exist, in which it would be physically impossible ; one, if there was not a personal God ; the other, if the will of Deity was controlled by a physical necessity. The first of these cases we need not now discuss, because we have proved in a preceding lecture that Deity is possessed of the personal attributes of unity, consciousness, will, and intelligence. And as to the second case, I allow that, if the will of God was controlled by physical necessity, it would be as impossible that there should be a supernatural communication, as though God were destitute of will ; for, in that case, it would be physically impossible for him, under any circumstances, to will differently from what the physical necessity of his nature dictated ; whereas the supernatural, in its very nature, supposes something which nature uninterfered with would not do. Now, I might argue that it is impossible for the will of a personal God to be controlled by physical necessity, because the notion of will excludes the pos-

sibility of such control ; but, passing this by, we have already shown, in the argument adduced in a former lecture to prove that God is possessed of will, that his actions cannot be physically necessary ; as, then, they would be physically necessary if his will were controlled by physical necessity, it follows that his will cannot possibly be so controlled. But if the will of God is not under physical control, it is evident that he must have physical power to act differently from what he does ; and if so, a supernatural action must be physically possible ; accordingly, if he be physically able to make any communication whatever to his creatures, (and this cannot be denied, seeing that by the works of his hands and the laws of his providential government he makes communications to them naturally,) it must be physically possible for him to make communications supernaturally.

If, however, a supernatural communication from God is physically possible, let us next ask, whether it be morally possible. Those who deny the Divine Personality, will deny the physical possibility ; but some who allow that there is a personal God, and hence that a supernatural communication is physically possible, hold that, in consequence of the absolute perfection of God, it is morally impossible. They argue that changeableness is necessarily an imperfection, that therefore the supernatural, as a change in the mode of action, must be an imperfection, and that, consequently, the supernatural must be morally impossible to a perfect being.

Let me ask, in reply, what is the changeableness which is an imperfection ? Is it every kind of changeableness, or only some kinds ? Now, no doubt that mutability is impossible to a perfect nature, for, changeableness in a perfect being would imply a susceptibility

of change from, and therefore of the loss of perfection, and this would itself be an imperfection: hence, there can be no case in which changeableness of nature is not an evil, unless the nature which it characterizes be imperfect. Again, changeableness in forming and executing purposes is indicative of imperfection: for if a new purpose is formed, it indicates either new knowledge, which would imply previous imperfection of knowledge, or fickleness of disposition which,—as implying either that the disposition needed change and was therefore imperfect, or that, being perfect, it was susceptible of becoming imperfect,—evidently betokens imperfection: so, if a purpose, after being formed, is not executed, it either indicates a change of purpose, which, as we have just seen, is a characteristic of imperfection, or that the power to execute is imperfect.

But whilst changeableness of nature and changeableness in forming and executing purposes are thus signs of imperfection, this is not necessarily the case with a change of action. On the contrary, circumstances are possible in which unchangeableness of nature and unchangeableness of purpose may render a change of action necessary. Suppose, for example, that in order to the execution of a purpose there must be a number of successive acts *of different kinds*, all of them requiring Almighty power, such successive acts, although each act is a change of action, instead of manifesting any fickleness either of nature or purpose, would evidently be the result of unchangeableness, both of nature and purpose. Now, I admit, that the supernatural is a change of action, but, for the reasons stated, it does not, *therefore*, indicate any change of nature or of purpose, provided it is, as it undoubtedly

may be, simply one of the means by which the same ultimate end is to be accomplished as is proposed by the natural. If, indeed, the supernatural was intended to accomplish a new formed purpose, (and this would be the case if its ultimate end was different from that of the natural, or even if the use of it destroyed the utility of the natural,) it would indicate a changeableness characteristic of imperfection ; but if the object of the supernatural is in perfect accordance with that of the natural, and if the supernatural is so used as to detract nothing from the utility of the natural, the supernatural does not indicate any changeableness indicative of imperfection. Suppose, then, God from all eternity to have determined to accomplish some great end worthy of himself, and to have determined how he would accomplish it, and suppose that the carrying out of his determination required a number of different actions to be accomplished at different periods, there would be no evidence of changeableness, but the contrary, if at the period when one of these actions was to be accomplished, God accomplished it, even though, by doing so, he effected it supernaturally, provided, at least, that the supernatural act did not undo anything done by the natural. A supernatural action is, therefore, not necessarily inconsistent with the perfect unchangeableness of God.

But it will, perhaps, be objected that we have supposed an impossible *proviso* ; it may be maintained, that the supernatural must necessarily destroy the purpose of God in establishing the uniformity of nature. And it may, independently of this, be argued that any interference with such uniformity would be inconsistent with the Divine truthfulness ; we have, it may be said, a natural tendency to anticipate that nature will proceed in

the same course in which she has, according to our past experience, hitherto proceeded; and hence, as this natural tendency has been given us by our Creator, it may be supposed that his truth requires that he should not disturb it by altering the course of his action.

Now I admit that God has a purpose to answer by the uniformity with which he works in nature, and that that purpose would be frustrated if he was frequently to deviate from it. Thus, if we suppose that the purpose is to lead us to trust to the uniformity, in order that we may be stimulated to use the means through which he will bestow the blessings we need, his purpose would be frustrated if he were so often to change his mode of operation, that we could no longer trust to it as uniform. I admit further, that, if God having given us reason, both by the natural tendencies which he has implanted in our minds, and by the ordinary course of his operations, to anticipate, that if we use the means by which, whenever they are used, he produces a certain result, his truth might seem to require that, till he had told us the contrary, he should, without any deviation *at all*, uniformly follow our use of the means with the result he had led us to expect.

But let me remark that the purpose which God has in view, in the uniformity of his operations in nature, is not *necessarily* frustrated by an occasional deviation, provided that such deviation only take place with the view of meeting a special emergency: for, if the purpose be as supposed above, any deviation, *manifestly made with such a view*, would not tend to diminish our reliance on the ordinary uniformity of nature, and hence, would not diminish the excitement to exertion, which is the supposed object of that uniformity; the evident speciality

of the occasion would produce the conviction that the deviation was an extraordinary procedure, occasioned by extraordinary circumstances, and that therefore, unless there was a recurrence of similar circumstances, there would be no reason to expect a repetition of it. And let me add, that as the deviation does not necessarily take place at a time when man is using means to obtain some anticipated result, it does not necessarily disappoint any expectations God had led him to form as to the result of his exertions. Accordingly, we conclude that the supernatural does not necessarily frustrate the purpose of the natural, and does not necessarily disappoint expectations which God had excited. It is, therefore, not in necessary opposition to his consistency and truthfulness.

We have, indeed, been arguing, in reference to the unchangeableness and truth of God, simply from the notions which the phenomena of our own minds give us as to the meaning of these attributes; but let me remark, that this is the only source whence we can gain any ideas at all of the intellectual and moral attributes of God. I admit, as I have had occasion to observe in a preceding lecture, that it is an inadequate source; but it will be seen that this fact does not affect the validity of our reasoning, provided it is recollected, that, so far as the unchangeableness of God differs from our notion of it, it only differs as being a higher, a nobler, a more glorious unchangeableness, and hence that it cannot be characterized by anything which, because it forbids all possible variety of action, would be a bondage, not a liberty, a degradation, not a glory; and, in like manner, that so far as the truth of God differs from our notion of it, it only differs as being more excellent and more worthy of our admiration and praise, and hence that it cannot be

characterized by anything which would tie him down to fulfil the expectations of his creatures, when it would be no benefit, but an injury, to them so to do; for it would then, instead of being a perfection, be a mar and a hinderance to his infinite benevolence.

If, notwithstanding, any should still object to our argument on the ground adverted to, let them remember that it is simply a reply to the reasonings of those who maintain that the supernatural is morally impossible to God. These reasonings, however, are founded, as well as our reply to them, on notions of the Divine attributes derived from the phenomena of our own minds; accordingly, those who object to our reply on this ground, must, on the same ground, object to the reasonings against which our reply is directed; and if those reasonings are, on that ground, pronounced unsound, they need no reply. If we may not argue on the supposition that we can derive sufficiently true ideas of the unchangeableness and truth of God from the phenomena of the human mind, it will be impossible to prove that the supernatural is inconsistent with these Divine attributes; if on the other hand we may argue on that supposition, our argument is justifiable and valid.

May I not add, that as any argument respecting the unchangeableness of God must be founded on the supposition just adverted to, those who would reason on this subject should study the human mind, that they may gain as clear an idea as the nature of the case will allow, and especially may avoid the error of confounding variety with mutability.

The questions referring to the physical and to the moral possibility of a supernatural revelation having been solved, the next inquiry is, How far the possibility

of a supernatural revelation is restricted, either as to its subject-matter, or as to the mode in which it may be made? First: as to its subject-matter. Here there can be no question that it must be restricted to the subjects which are either naturally comprehensible to the human mind, or which, by an elevation of its powers, can be made comprehensible to it. For, if we have properly defined revelation as "such an uncovering of truth as brings it within reach of the mind," it must, since it cannot bring any truth which the mind is incapacitated to receive within its reach, be necessarily restricted to those truths which, when presented to the mind, it has either natural or supernatural power to grasp. It may, perhaps, be thought by some, that an unlimited power of grasping truth is possibly conferrible on man; but a moment's consideration will convince us that there must be a limit to the possible extent of any power possessed by a limited being, it being impossible for a finite being to have infinite power of any kind. If so, it must be impossible for finite man to grasp infinity. Accordingly, there must be truths which are, in their own nature, not only beyond the actual, but beyond the possible, comprehension of man. All such truths are plainly excluded from being the subjects of a possible revelation.

Is there any further restriction? Here the question arises, whether there are truths which, though they may be received from subjective experience, cannot be communicated to the mind from without? Is this the case with our ideas of relations, which Mr. Morell considers as derivable simply from the logical consciousness, or is it at least the case with all knowledge referrible to ideas unquestionably traceable to logical processes of

mind? Our ideas are divided by many philosophers into *material* and *form*, that being called their *material* which is immediately derived from any object of intuition, and that their *form* which respects the relations in which such *material* is viewed by the mind. The latter, I may add, is called form, because it is supposed to be derived not from the object, but from the subjective light in which the mind, by the constitution of its nature, is led to regard the object. Accordingly, it is held, in reply to the latter part of the question, that as the knowledge afforded by revelation must, from its nature, have an objective origin, no ideas referrible simply to forms of thought can possibly be its subject-matter.

Mr. Morell, in his "Philosophy of Religion," maintains that "intuition" has reference to objects considered as wholes, and independently of any relations which their parts may sustain to each other, or which they may, as wholes, sustain to other objects; and that the act of judgment, by which the parts of an object are compared with each other, or by which the relations between different objects are perceived, has reference simply to the subjective light in which the mind views the objects of its intuition. Accordingly, in reference to the former part of the question, he holds that judgment, in distinction from intuition, is a faculty belonging to the logical consciousness, a consciousness which is *entirely subjective and formal, and furnishes no new material of thought*; and that therefore revelation implies a kind of knowledge which lies beyond the reach of judgment, and indeed beyond the reach of the logical consciousness generally.

This at first sight is specious, but as an argument for

excluding relations as a possible subject-matter of revelation, it depends on two questions ; first, whether relations are merely a subjective light in which we view our intuitions, and are therefore *purely* forms of thought ; and, secondly, whether, supposing this to be the case, it would be impossible for the mind to receive ideas, corresponding in nature to its own forms of thought, from an objective source. Let us examine each of these questions separately.

First: Are relations merely a subjective light in which we view our intuitions, and therefore *purely* forms of thought ? For if not, it is very evident that the above argument for excluding relations as a possible subject-matter of revelation falls to the ground.

Now, if we will examine our exercises of judgment, we shall find that they are as truly *intuitional* as any exercises of what Mr. Morell calls "the perceptive consciousness." The exercises of the latter consciousness are called intuitional, for two reasons ; one, that they have reference to an objective reality ; the other, that the reference is immediate, not mediate. But both these reasons will, I think, be found to exist for denominating exercises of judgment "intuitional." For, first, exercises of judgment have reference to an objective reality. Let us, for example, suppose an exercise of judgment in reference to the comparative magnitude of two material objects. Magnitude is an essential attribute of everything material ; if, then, material objects have a real existence, magnitude, as an essential quality of all such objects, must also have a real existence. Let me, then, have a simultaneous perception of two material magnitudes ; it must be possible, since magnitudes may, from their nature, be either larger or

smaller, for one to be larger than the other: suppose, then, one to be larger than the other, and that, if I exercise judgment in reference to their comparative magnitude, it tells me that this is the case—that comparatively one is larger, the other smaller; here my judgment has evident reference to an objective reality. And not only so, but, secondly, its reference is immediate. My judgment is exercised on the objects themselves, and not necessarily on a subjective representation of them: moreover, it derives the idea immediately from the objects, and not by the intervention of any third idea; indeed, the only difference between an exercise of judgment and one of reasoning, is, that in the former the perception of a relation is immediate, and in the latter mediate. Judgment, then, is an intuitive faculty, and, accordingly, relations are not mere forms of thought, not a mere subjective light in which we view our intuitions, and hence may, possibly, be the subject-matter of a revelation.

But I ask, again, whether, supposing relations were a subjective light in which we view our intuitions, it would be impossible for the mind to receive, from without, any ideas corresponding in nature to these supposed forms of thought? That our idea of relations had a subjective origin, would not, of itself, prove that it was impossible for them to have an objective existence; an idea might be to us a form of thought, and yet there might be a corresponding reality objectively existing. But, if it is not impossible for relations to have an objective existence, even if our ideas of them are forms of thought, neither would it be impossible to receive the idea of them, from both these sources; if they are forms of thought, we may receive them from a subjective

source; if they objectively exist, we may receive them from an objective source. It cannot be said that it is impossible for me to receive the same idea from two sources, for this is contradicted by daily experience: it cannot be said, that, if my ideas of relations are forms of thought, it is impossible for me to receive any other ideas of relations than what my forms of thought supply; for relations, objectively existing, might give me ideas which mere forms of thought had failed to give, and there might be relations objectively existing for which I had no corresponding forms of thought: it cannot be said, that, if my ideas of relations are forms of thought, the only reason why they are so, is, that I have no other power for acquiring them, and, therefore, the perception of objective relations must be impossible, for, first, this would assume what we have already noticed as untenable,—that it is impossible for two sources to exist of the same idea; and, secondly, if I have any power at all of perceiving the objective, it must be possible for relations, provided they can objectively exist, to be presented to it. Relations, then, may be the subject-matter of a revelation, for they are intuitively perceived; and even if this were not the case, there is nothing, either in the nature of the mind or in the nature of relations, to render it impossible that they should be presented to the intuitional faculty.

But I further maintain, that knowledge referrible to ideas, traceable to what Mr. Morell calls the “logical consciousness,” and, therefore, incapable of being intuitively presented to the mind, may be the possible subject-matter of a revelation; thus, though I owe my ideas of genera and species to my logical consciousness, it is possible for me to receive from an objective source, and

therefore from a revelation, general ideas of orders of beings of whose nature, attributes, and existence I have never had any intuitive knowledge, nor, in reference to which, I have had any opportunity of going through the processes of abstraction and generalization ; for I may be told, on authority on which I can rely, that orders of beings, bearing to each other the relation of genus and species, exist, having characteristics differing from any beings with whom I have come into immediate contact, and possessed of attributes of which the only ideas which can be given me are analogical. If I am capable of receiving any idea of such orders of beings from testimony, it evidently may have an objective origin ; true, the objective would, in such a case, give me no new material of thought, but it would present to me new knowledge, which the material of thought already acquired would enable me to apprehend. We accordingly conclude that there is no restriction as to the possible subject-matter of a revelation but what arises from that limit to the power of grasping truth which must necessarily characterize every finite mind, and hence, that everything may be the subject-matter of a revelation but what the limited capacity of the mind renders it impossible it should, without a change of nature, be capable of comprehending.

Secondly. Is there any restriction as to the mode in which a revelation may be made? To solve this question, let us inquire what are the different modes by which the human mind ordinarily receives knowledge, and whether any of these modes is necessarily excluded in the case of a supernatural revelation. The ordinary modes by which the human mind receives knowledge are resolvable into two, *direct* and *indirect*.

Knowledge is directly received when the object is immediately cognized by the intuitive faculty; in other words, when there is a direct intuition of the world without, or of the world within—whether it be simply an intuition of objects, or comprehend, in addition, an intuition of relations. Knowledge is indirectly received when the object or relation is only mediately and not immediately cognized; and this may happen in two ways; one, if an object or relation which is not immediately cognized, is seen to be included or involved in something previously cognized; the other, if we have authority on which we can rely, that something which is not immediately cognized by us, nor even seen to be included or involved in anything which is cognized by us, has been cognized by another, either mediately or immediately. Are, then, all these modes of receiving knowledge possible, in the case of a supernatural revelation?

We need scarcely ask whether, supposing the supernatural to be possible at all, and this we have already demonstrated, the first-named mode of a revelation, viz., *by means of intuition*, is possible, because it is not, I believe, denied. Still, to complete our argument, we will make one or two remarks, showing why it is to be believed possible. There are two ways in which the mind may be conceived to be presented with a supernatural intuition; one in which, without any alteration in its power of intuition, an object, whose natural position or other circumstances place it beyond the reach of the mind's eye, is supernaturally altered in its position or other circumstances, so as to bring it within reach; the other in which, without any alteration in the object, the intuitional power is supernaturally elevated, and thus rendered capable of perceiving what otherwise

would be beyond its grasp. For example, if an angel were supernaturally to assume a visible form and to manifest himself to our organs of vision, the supernatural intuition would be of the former kind ; but if, without any change of form or place on the part of the angel, our organ of vision could be supernaturally empowered to perceive his presence, the supernatural intuition would be of the latter kind.

Now there can be no *à priori* reason for supposing that a supernatural intuition of either of these kinds is impossible : for there is nothing in the nature of the thing to render it impossible for Deity to present to the senses, by a supernatural alteration of the object or its circumstances, what otherwise would not be cognized by them ; or for Deity to elevate, supernaturally, the power of perception, and thus to render it capable of perceiving what naturally is beyond its reach. A supernatural intuition of one or both of these kinds appears to have been experienced by the apostle Paul when he was " caught up to the third heaven, and heard words which it is not lawful for man to utter." Either, objects of intuition, which otherwise would not have been present to his mind, were supernaturally presented to him ; or, his intuitional powers were supernaturally enlarged to perceive what, under ordinary circumstances, would have been beyond their reach.

Nor let it be supposed that supernatural intuitions are possible only in reference to objective phenomena ; there is equal reason for believing them possible when the phenomena to which they refer are subjective ; for surely there is no *à priori* reason for imagining it to be impossible to him who created the mind, so to elevate supernaturally one or more of its powers as to

produce supernatural subjective exercises; and we all know that such exercises could not be produced without the mind's conscious intuition of them. Thus, if the promise of Christ to the apostles was fulfilled,—that the Holy Spirit “would bring all things to their remembrance whatsoever he had said unto them,”—it would probably be by a supernatural strength imparted by the Spirit to their faculty of memory; but supposing this to be the case, the apostles must have been conscious of a strength of memory far beyond what was natural and ordinary; accordingly, as the phenomena of memory would, in the case supposed, be supernatural, their intuition of such phenomena might also be denominated “supernatural.”

A supernatural intuition of relations is not less possible. I have already shown that the objective is a possible origin of our knowledge of relations. If so, can any reason be assigned why it should be supposed impossible to God, either so to place supernaturally before our intuition related objects as to render the perception of relations, which otherwise must have been unperceived, possible, or so to elevate supernaturally our power of perceiving relations, as to enable us to perceive what could not be manifest to the ordinary intellect? Thus can there be any *à priori* reason for believing it impossible to God, either so to place the gospel in a supernatural way before the intellect of Paul, as to render some of its relations to the Mosaic law more manifest to him than they would otherwise have been; or to give Paul supernatural power to perceive relations which he would not otherwise have discovered? Such supernatural intuitions of the relations between the law and the gospel, given in either or both these ways,

would provide him with the knowledge requisite for the composition of the Epistle to the Hebrews. A supernatural revelation, then, by means of intuition, is possible; for whether intuition has reference to objective phenomena, to subjective phenomena, or to phenomenal relations, the object of intuition may be either supernaturally brought within reach of the natural intuitive power of the mind, or that power may be supernaturally strengthened so as to grasp what otherwise would have been beyond it.

But let us, next, put the question on which there will be, perhaps, more difference of opinion, viz., whether there may be a supernatural revelation of knowledge which is only mediately communicated. Mr. Morell maintains that there cannot; but his reasoning is founded on assumptions which we have already investigated, and have, I think, shown to be erroneous. One of these assumptions is his definition of the term "revelation." With his definition, for the reasons already stated, I do not agree; but even should we grant it etymologically, it would not affect the real question in dispute, but simply the proper interpretation of a word. The other assumption on which his reasoning rests is, that nothing except objects of immediate intuition can possibly be the subject-matter of a revelation; but if, as we have shown, something else may be the possible subject-matter of knowledge received from an objective source, we must have proof before we can believe that that which can be received from other objective sources cannot possibly be received from God. The reasoning founded on these assumptions cannot then be sound. Indeed I cannot conceive of any reason whatever for supposing that God cannot

supernaturally communicate knowledge in any mode in which it is possible for man to receive it. It must be remembered that we are not yet investigating the question, whether any such supernatural communication could be known to be from God, and therefore become authoritative: this is a point to be afterwards discussed; we have, as yet, only to do with the inquiry whether any supernatural communication of ideas is possible; and, surely, if the power of God is Almighty, his power to communicate cannot, *as to mode*, be confined to any other limit than the limit of the creature to receive: if not, it must be extended to every mode in which the creature is ordinarily able to receive communications. Accordingly, if man receives knowledge by means of his reasoning faculty, it must be possible to Him who made that faculty so to elevate it as to render it, by the supernatural strength imparted, the medium of receiving knowledge which ordinarily would be beyond its reach. In like manner, if man can receive ideas by means of verbal exposition from a fellow-man, he surely can receive ideas in some similar way from God; for if man can give intelligible verbal instruction, why should it be thought an impossibility, in the nature of the thing, for the Being who made man to give it?

We are now prepared for the third question, to which I promised to direct your attention, viz., What evidence will suffice to prove a supernatural communication to be from God, and to be therefore authoritative to us, and whether we have such evidence of the Divine origin of Christianity? This question, as you will perceive, consists of two parts; but I discuss them together, because I think I shall be able to make the argument clearer, by

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testing Christianity, as we proceed, by the conclusions to which we arrive, as to what evidence is required to prove the Divine origin of any communication which God may supernaturally make to us. In our reference to Christianity, we shall, however, *at present*, leave untouched the question of the direct inspiration and authority of the Scriptures. The Divine origin of *Christianity* is one thing, and the Divine authority of *Scripture* is another thing : the latter, however, is to some extent founded on the former, and hence we shall find that it can be more satisfactorily discussed after the former point is decided.

I have said that a supernatural revelation may be made either immediately by means of intuition, or mediately. If made immediately by means of intuition, we should have, independently of the question whether it came directly from God, the authority of our own intuitional faculty for the truth of the matter revealed to us. We have, it will be recollected, already investigated the question, how far the testimony of our intuition is worthy of credit, and if the conclusion at which we arrived is satisfactory, we should have the same evidence for the truth of the matter of an intuition, supernaturally communicated, as for that of any ordinary intuition. At the same time, except the supernatural intuition was analogous to some of our natural intuitions, such a communication must, from its nature, be confined to the party to whom it was directly made ; and, accordingly, if a supernatural revelation is, as some suppose, made merely by intuitions *of a nature peculiar to religious truth, and of a higher order than what men naturally experience*, the supernatural revelation could never be communicated to others, and must, therefore, be useless to all except the individuals who received it.

It has, indeed, been said that those, who have had their religious intuitional power supernaturally strengthened, may, by verbal or written exposition, awaken and elevate the power of religious intuition in others, and thus be, indirectly, the means of communicating the intuitions which they have supernaturally received. But let me ask, whether it is supposed that such awakening and elevating of the power of intuition in others would be effected by means of the supernatural intuitions which the agents had received, or independently of them : if it be said, By means of the supernatural intuitions which they had received, I ask, how this can be, seeing it is allowed that such intuitions cannot be communicated till the effect is produced? and if it be said, That the effect is produced independently of the supernatural intuitions referred to, it cannot be attributed to them; and, hence, as the power of intuition may, by such hypothesis, be awakened or elevated, *independently of the supposed supernatural element*, such element cannot be necessary, and if unnecessary, it cannot, I conceive, be proved to exist.

But, leaving the question of a supernatural revelation of transcendental truth, made immediately to the intuitional faculty, let us proceed to discuss a supernatural revelation of truths within the ordinary comprehension of the human intellect; and here we will confine our attention to the only species in which Divine authority can be supposed to be essential to warrant its reception: viz., that in which its credibility depends on the evidence of a Divine testimony. We ask, then, what evidence will suffice to prove such a communication to be from God, and to be therefore worthy of belief, testing Christianity by our conclusions as we

go along. There are, in such a case, two species of evidence conceivable; one, if we find something in the communication sufficiently characteristic of its author; the other, if its source be demonstrated by some sufficient external sign.

Let us separately investigate each of these species. The first is, if we find something in the communication sufficiently characteristic of its author. In order to this being valid evidence of the divinity of a supernatural revelation, three things must be proved—one, that the something referred to really characterizes the supposed revelation; another, that this something shown to characterize the revelation is so characteristic of Deity as to warrant the conclusion, that the revelation is at least possibly from him; and a third, that it is not merely characteristic, but *distinctively* characteristic of Deity; in other words, so characteristic of him as not to allow the supposition that the supposed revelation can possibly have any other origin. If all this is proved, there can, I think, be no question that a communication, which professes to be from God, is really from him.

Now the characteristic something, to which reference has just been made, may be supposed to be of different kinds; and, hence, the evidence demanding our present investigation may be subdivided. One of these kinds, and that to which I shall first direct your attention, is the adaptation of a professed revelation to meet some extraordinary want of human nature: I say a professed revelation, because if any communication was made to man, the utility of which depended on his knowledge of its origin, we should regard it as an *à priori* argument against its divinity, if it made no pretensions to

a Divine origin; we cannot conceive that God would speak to man that, which could not be of any value except it was known to come from him, without announcing himself as the speaker. But suppose a communication in which he did so announce himself, and that we find a want in human nature for which no provision is elsewhere made, that we find this want not originally and naturally essential to the constitution of our nature, but accidentally so, and therefore one for which, *à priori*, a natural provision may not be anticipated; that we nevertheless find the event to be of a kind for which, when it occurred, it would be like what we know of God, and consistent with all his dealings with man, that some provision should be made; that, as it is an extraordinary want, and one for which no natural provision is made, it is one for the supply of which it was to be expected that a provision, if made at all, would be made in an extraordinary, and therefore supernatural way; and if we further find that the provision required by the peculiar circumstances of the case is, as a matter of fact, made, and supernaturally made, provided the supposed communication be really from God; and that on the contrary, if it is not from God, it is unaccountable that it should be so well adapted to the circumstances of mankind,—we should then have the full evidence of the three particulars to which I have referred. For here is an extraordinary provision for an extraordinary want in human nature, and a provision which is sufficiently characteristic of Deity to warrant the inference that it is possibly from him, and which is also so distinctively characteristic as not to allow the supposition of another origin, there being by the hypothesis no other origin which would

account for its adaptation to the circumstances of mankind.

And now let us examine whether we have evidence of this kind in favour of the Divine origin of Christianity. Is there a want in human nature for which no natural provision is made? Is it a want accidental and not necessary to our nature, and for which, therefore, if a provision was made, we should not expect to find it in nature, but to be supernatural? Is it a want for which it is like God to provide? And is it a want for which a like provision can not be supposed to be made by any other being than God?

If we would answer these questions satisfactorily, we must resort to the help which psychology will give us, for without a psychological investigation of human nature we cannot scientifically decide what its wants are. But we cannot study human nature as it is, without discovering that it is imperfect, both intellectually and morally. If we study our intellectual nature we shall find it not only unable to grasp many important truths, but so liable to be misled and prejudiced as to render it oftentimes more accessible to error than to truth; and if we study our moral nature we shall find it deformed by various vicious tendencies. Accordingly, man, both intellectually and morally, appears disordered in his natural constitution; he is not only what, as a creature, he must be, finite; but he is not equal to what we could suppose him to be within those finite limits.

Accordingly, the questions arise, whether such a condition is necessary to man? if not necessary, whether it was probably his original condition? and whether, if his original condition may be reasonably supposed to

have been better than his present, it can be regained by any provision for the purpose found in nature? We ask then, first, whether the present intellectual and moral imperfection of man is necessary to human nature. The true import of this question is, it must be remembered, not whether man, *as man*, could possibly be absolutely perfect, but whether he has the perfection of which his nature in its present circumstances is susceptible. Now, if we examine the present constitution of our mind, we shall find nothing to necessitate the imperfection which is everywhere manifested: men are perhaps naturally exposed to various influences which render their reception of error or rejection of truth possible; such, for example, as authority, habit, worldly interest, indifference to truth, &c.; but if we investigate our mental constitution we shall not find it necessary that influences such as these should lead it astray; I do not say that our mind is not naturally susceptible to impression from them, but that its constitution does not necessitate such susceptibility to such a degree as to render them necessarily injurious. Nor is there anything in the constitution of our mind to necessitate vicious tendencies; none of its natural tendencies are in themselves vicious—they only become so when unduly indulged; but so far from an undue indulgence of any of them being necessary to the human mind, there is no natural tendency but what exists in one or other of our race without being unduly indulged; and let it be remembered that if there be any tendency the existence of which, in a vicious degree, is necessary to human nature, such tendency must *everywhere exist in that degree*.

Still, the question may be asked, whether the con-

stitution of the mind does not naturally fit it both for intellectual and moral progress; and, if so, whether,—granting that there are intellectual and moral imperfections in mankind which are not essential to man, *as man*,—they may not be ultimately conducive to the attainment of that higher perfection to which the principle of progress points, may not therefore be essential to the full development of that principle, and hence may not really be required by the constitution of the mind?

No doubt that the principle of progress implies imperfection. There are, however, two kinds of imperfection; one, *negative*; the other, *positive*. A positive imperfection is something positively evil, something having a positive tendency to lead us astray; but a negative imperfection is not itself positively evil—it supposes the existence of nothing but what, as far as it goes, is good and beneficial, though it has not arrived at full maturity. Thus, I have positive intellectual imperfection if there is anything in my mind *in antagonism to truth*, or which predisposes me to the reception of error; and I have positive moral imperfection if there is anything in me *in antagonism to virtue*, or which predisposes me to any form of vice. On the other hand, my intellectual imperfection is only negative if it simply consists in the limitation of my capacity for receiving and comprehending truth; and my moral imperfection is only negative, if it is nothing more than a deficiency of that strength of affection to virtue which beings of higher moral attainment may possess. Now, negative imperfection is inseparable from us as creatures; to be entirely free from negative imperfection we must be absolutely perfect, and this none is but God himself:

but this negative imperfection is all that is necessary to render us susceptible of intellectual and moral progress, and hence no imperfection beyond this can be necessary in order to some development of the principle of progress. The present imperfection of man, however, is not simply negative, there being tendencies in human nature positively obstructive to intellectual light and to moral purity, tendencies which are not, as negative imperfection is, inseparable from man as man.

If there are any who think that positive imperfection may possibly be necessary to the acquisition of future higher perfection, because it may be a means of educating the mind of man, and thus of fitting it eventually for nobler intellectual and moral attainments, let me ask them how a tendency to evil can possibly educate the mind in purity? If it be answered that the self-mortification required by such a tendency will produce this effect, let me ask again, whether a tendency to evil, whilst I admit that it gives opportunity for the exercise of self-mortification, is likely to excite to it? whether, on the contrary, if there is self-mortification, it is not, instead of being the effect of the tendency to evil, owing entirely to the coexistence of a counteracting tendency, —a tendency which has acquired power to overcome the tendency to evil? And as to the moral education supposed to be effected by self-mortification, I admit that, if there be evil tendencies in existence, it is not only the best, but perhaps the only way of eradicating them, and hence, that in all such cases it may indirectly strengthen virtuous principle by removing that which is positively injurious to it; but let me add, that, so far as the positive tendencies to good are concerned, not only would self-mortification be unnecessary, but it would

produce no influence for good on the moral character. In reference to the positive moral evil, it may be, and is, of the greatest service, but independently of that, it cannot produce any effect in strengthening good tendencies. Positive imperfection is, then, not only not necessitated by the constitution of human nature, but it is not necessitated in order to the full development of the principle of progress, and, therefore, to the full intellectual and moral maturity of man.

But if human nature is now characterized by positive imperfection, both intellectual and moral, and if this imperfection is neither necessitated by our nature, nor necessary to our future progress, we may ask whether the supposition is probable, that it *originally* characterized human nature. This question must be answered in the negative, if the argument of a preceding lecture be considered as having satisfactorily proved the natural and moral perfection of God; for a morally perfect Being would not create *positive* moral evil, nor would the benevolence essential to such a Being, permit him to attach to what he created any positive evil not necessitated by the constitution of its nature, and in no way adapted to benefit it. We conclude, then, that human nature is at the present time characterized by a positive imperfection, neither necessitated by its constitution, nor belonging to it at its first creation.

But if so, it must be an interesting and important inquiry, whether man can, by any means provided in nature, be delivered from this imperfection; in other words, whether he can, by any such means, be redeemed from his present intellectual darkness and moral degradation? Where are we to look for the means? Is a remedy to be found either in external nature, or in our

mental constitution? Men who have most thoroughly studied external nature, have not found it: men who have most patiently investigated the phenomena of mind, have not found it.

Some, indeed, have imagined that they have made the discovery, but we cannot examine the medicine they prescribe for the intellectual and moral elevation of man, without coming to the conclusion that the means are utterly inadequate to the result. And were it otherwise, the means which they have proposed are for the most part unadapted to the bulk of mankind; thus, when they affirm that the truths concerning God and virtue, which are taught in creation around us and in the constitution of our own minds, are, of themselves, sufficient to lead us back to the paths of moral purity, they forget that the truths of natural religion are so enveloped in the works of God, that it requires, in order to their discovery, a mind habituated to that degree of intellectual effort which is not the ordinary characteristic of the human mind; nay, that such is man, that even where there is the habit of intellectual effort, few, comparatively, care to employ it for such a purpose; and that, even in the cases where the value of moral elevation is professedly appreciated and the moral lessons of nature studied, the positive tendencies to error and to moral evil tend to pervert the intellect; and, whilst they obscure the light which nature would otherwise impart, they also lead the mind to mix up, with whatever light is received, much that mars its simplicity, beauty, and influence.

If further proof be needed that a supernatural revelation is necessary to meet the wants of human nature, I may appeal to the longing which is found in mankind for more light than what nature imparts. The conscious-

ness of every thinking mind will testify to a desire to know more of God and of our own destiny, than what natural religion has ever taught. This desire, so far from being satisfied by philosophical research, has been most deeply felt by those who have most diligently studied nature. Socrates, we are told, desired a divine teacher, from whom might be learnt what was the duty of man to God and to his fellow man; and the doubts expressed, both by himself and succeeding philosophers, on points of the deepest interest and importance to humanity, indicate what a longing has been felt by men of deep research for increased light in reference to such points. And, that such a longing is accordant with the general consciousness of mankind, is indicated by the existence of so many pretended revelations from heaven; if man had not felt the want of more light, there would have been no motive to forge a revelation, and no disposition to receive it when forged.

But, if the circumstances of mankind thus require a supernatural communication, may we not suppose it probable that he, who made man and who has so bountifully provided for all his other wants, would make some provision for this extraordinary want? and, if in human nature, as it now exists, there is a thirst for something which can only be supplied by the supernatural, may we not conclude that this thirst, of which the Author of our nature has rendered it susceptible, will be provided for by him? He has provided for the gratification of all our natural longings, and hence it is only in accordance with the analogy of his whole procedure if he makes provision for the gratification of this also. Accordingly, in the mere fact that there is an extraordinary want in our nature, for which, as an accident, no natural provi-

sion is made, and which, therefore, nothing but a supernatural revelation could supply, and that there is a longing and desire in our nature which nothing but a supernatural revelation could gratify, we find an *à priori* argument in favour of a supernatural revelation : and if Christianity be, professedly, a revelation from God, and be adapted to meet the wants, and to satisfy the desires, of our nature, there is, in this fact, an argument that it is what it professes to be—*Divine in its origin*.

Does, then, Christianity, or does it not, meet those wants of human nature to which I have referred? does it, or does it not, satisfy the longings, for more light, of which we have spoken? In order that Christianity may meet the peculiar wants of man, it must be adapted for his deliverance from those positive tendencies to error and to moral evil which now characterize his condition. Is this, then, or is it not, the case? There can be no doubt that Christianity proposes the deliverance of our race from their present state of intellectual and moral degradation; for it invites men with this object to return to God through a divinely-appointed Mediator. And is not, let me ask, its promise of pardon to those who comply, not merely an inducement to men to listen to the invitation, but a moral means adapted to deliver from that dread of God, which, to the guilty mind, must be an obstacle to the beneficial moral influence calculated to be produced by the contemplation of him as a loving Father? But this is not all: it presents to returning sinners the most powerful motives to holiness; it inculcates doctrines which undoubtedly have proved, in the experience of multitudes, sanctifying in their tendency; it requires faith in these doctrines, and thus their whole influence must be felt; and it promises

the Holy Ghost, in order that the doctrines may be applied by Divine power, and may, consequently, be made as effectual as possible, for cleansing the soul of man from the evil tendencies which produce blindness in the understanding and moral impurity in the heart and in the life. Thus, there seems a perfect adaptation to that want of human nature of which we have spoken. If it be objected that Christianity has not procured for its disciples a full deliverance from all the positive evils referred to, I reply that it professes to accomplish the end gradually, and hence that it cannot justly be charged upon it as a failure if the whole end is not at once attained ; that, further, it leads us to expect the full attainment of its object in another state of being, and hence that it cannot be said to have failed if the object is not fully attained in this life. But though it has not produced its full effect, it cannot be denied by any who have made themselves acquainted with the history of Christianity, that there are, and have been, numbers of instances in which it has, in this life, manifestly wrought a great moral and spiritual change—that it has, in such cases, to a most happy extent, accomplished the end proposed—and has thus given the earnest, that when the promised period shall arrive, it will be wholly successful. Christianity, therefore, is, we think, evidently adapted to meet those wants of human nature to which we have alluded.

And it is equally adapted to give the light for which humanity is longing. If man is longing for an infallible teacher, here we find a teacher of whom there are few who will not readily testify—"Never man spake like this man." If man is longing for more knowledge of God, here we find a revelation, which is far in

advance of the light of nature. If man is longing for more insight into a future state, here we find life and immortality brought to light. Besides, if it be a true revelation, it gives us not only confessedly the wisest and the best of teachers, but a teacher come from God, and whose words are the words of God : and it gives us not only more knowledge of God and futurity, but knowledge of *the greatest value*, both as to the character and ways of God, and as to the holiness and happiness awaiting the righteous beyond death and the grave.

But if Christianity be thus adapted to the circumstances and wants of mankind, and if it be calculated to gratify the longing of humanity for more light than what nature gives, it is exactly what the *à priori* argument, to which we have adverted as rendering a revelation probable, led us to expect. If that argument had led us to anticipate a different revelation in kind from this, or if this had not come up to its requirements, the very argument itself would have become a powerful objection to Christianity ; but as Christianity is just such a revelation as it showed to be necessary for us, the fact of its meeting such requirements—especially as it is the only professed revelation which does meet them, or at least, meets them so well,—is a strong probable argument in favour of the divinity of its origin ; and none, I think, will say that it is an unwarranted assumption that there is no professed religion which, at least to an equal extent, meets the wants of men ; for even if any imagine that Mohammedanism, or any of the various forms of Paganism, are partially adapted to the moral necessities of our race, they scarcely will assert that they are as well adapted to those necessities as Christianity is.

I have said that this is a strong argument in favour

of the Divine origin of Christianity ; for, if it be either the only system of religion adapted to meet the wants of humanity, or if it be better adapted than any other system, and yet be not divine in its origin, it must be possible for the adaptation alluded to to belong to something originating either in ignorant superstition, or in wilful falsehood. I ask then, first, whether such an adaptation could belong to anything which originated in ignorant superstition? Could anything, proceeding from such an origin, be supposed to be adapted to the circumstances, wants, and longings of human nature? The adaptation supposed manifests a wisdom utterly inconsistent with the supposition of ignorant superstition. Is it then possible that it should have originated in wilful falsehood? If it did, its authors must be morally bad, and hence, in adapting it to the circumstances of man, they could only have designed more effectually to accomplish some ulterior purpose which must have been morally bad. But what ulterior wicked purpose can we conceive of as the possible design of Christianity? If the originator be supposed to be a wicked superhuman being, the evil object in view could only be the injury of man, whereas Christianity, even if false, is not adapted to injure but to benefit man ; and if the originators were the men who first proclaimed it to the world, and they are supposed to have been wicked, their object must either have been to procure some good to themselves, or to do some evil to mankind. It could not have been the latter, for it is too wise an adaptation to the wants of mankind to be made beneficial by mistake. But if it was the former, it must have been devised for the sake of power, of fame, or of wealth. As it indicates, according to a former remark, too much wisdom to allow

of the supposition that it was instigated by the desire of accomplishing a purpose for which it was unadapted, we must suppose that if it was devised for the sake of power, fame, or wealth, it is adapted to the attainment of such end. Christianity, however, is not a scheme adapted to obtain wealth for its founders; so far from manifesting any disposition to obtain it, history proves that they were content with poverty, and did not use the means within their power to amass riches. Nor is Christianity a scheme adapted to procure for its founders power; if temporal power had been the object of Christ, he would have sought to establish a temporal, not a spiritual kingdom; and if it had been the object of those who first taught his resurrection from the dead, they would never have recorded the words, "One is your Master, even Christ, and all ye are brethren,"—words calculated to check any undue assumption of power on their part. Nor did the founders of Christianity seek for worldly fame; if they had, they would have devised a religion more adapted to the prevalent idea of a Messiah, and more likely to suit the prejudices of the Jewish people. In short, if Christianity was framed by wicked men to gain power, fame, or wealth, they must have had either tact to adapt it to their object or not: that they were not without the tact is evident, if it is their own invention, from its adaptation to the nature and circumstances of men, for we cannot attribute such an adaptation to mere chance; but if they had the tact, that they have not used it for the accomplishment of any one of the above-mentioned objects is equally evident.

If the originators of Christianity had no object—either to injure man or to benefit themselves—they could

have had no sufficient motive to induce them to invent a false religion. The only conceivable motive would be the mere love of falsehood and deceit. But if the love of falsehood and deceit was so strong as to induce a man to deceive, for the mere sake of deceiving, it would be next to impossible that there should be no manifestation of his disposition. So far, however, from there being any manifestation of the kind in Christianity nothing seems farther from the apparent character of its founders; all that appears in them is in accordance with truth, sincerity, and simplicity, and in direct opposition to anything like falsehood, deception, or double-dealing. So much for one subdivision of internal evidence to the Divine origin of Christianity. We have seen how closely allied psychology is to this evidence. To another branch of the internal evidence and also to the external I shall call your attention in my next lecture.

The religion of the Bible is intended for the human mind. If it be of God, it must be adapted to its circumstances and wants. To ascertain this let us investigate mind: the more we know of the present constitution of the soul, the deeper we have penetrated into its inner recesses, the more shall we perceive the nice adaptation of Christianity to its circumstances, the more shall we be led to admire the harmony which subsists between the religion of Christ and the nature of man, and the more fully shall we feel that such a harmony can only be accounted for on the supposition that Christ is really the Son of God and the Saviour of the world.

LECTURE VI.

EVIDENCE OF CHRISTIANITY.

[Three questions were proposed in the fifth lecture in reference to Christianity as a supernatural communication from God; the third question, which was partially discussed, was—What evidence will suffice to prove that a supernatural communication is from God, and therefore authoritative, and whether we have such evidence for the Divine origin of Christianity?]

Internal evidence is of two species; one of these, viz., that resulting from the adaptation of a professed revelation to meet an extraordinary want of human nature, was investigated in the last lecture. In the present lecture, a second species of internal evidence is discussed, viz., that arising from the consistency of the general character and influence of a professed revelation with what nature and reason had previously revealed to us respecting God. The nature and force of this argument having been first explained, the question is put—What is the character of Christianity? In order to decide its character, it is first asked what holiness is, and, in answering the question, the origin of our notion of right and wrong is investigated, and the true foundation of the distinction discussed. It is next shown that Christianity is holy in its nature, especially in reference to the doctrine of the Atonement. The influence of Christianity is in like manner investigated, and this closes the argument so far as internal evidence is concerned.

External evidence is next discussed. Here the question is asked whether any evidence can be necessary in addition to that already investigated, and, it having been shown that there are cases possible in which additional evidence is needed, the nature of external evidence is explained; after which it is proved that there are circumstances in which such evidence is recognizable and satisfactory, and that these circumstances exist in connexion with the introduction of Christianity.

Finally, the question is asked, Whether on the supposition that the supernatural has occurred under the circumstances named, testimony may be to us a sufficient evidence of the fact that these circumstances have happened.]

TOWARDS the close of my last lecture we commenced the discussion of the question—What evidence will suffice to prove that a supernatural communication is from God, and is therefore authoritative, and whether we have such evidence in favour of Christianity? I observed that there are two species of evidence conceivable,—one, if we find something in the communication characteristic of its author; the other, if an external sign accompanies it which is sufficient to demonstrate its source. We commenced the investigation of the first of these two species, viz., the evidence arising from something in the communication characteristic of its author. This is ordinarily denominated “Internal Evidence.” Internal evidence may, however, be of different kinds. One kind (and this we fully investigated in the last lecture) is the adaptation of a professed revelation to meet an extraordinary want in human nature. We showed that this evidence is sufficient to prove a professed revelation to be from God, and that we have this evidence for the Divine origin of Christianity.

There is, however, a second kind of internal evidence, and to this I now proceed to call your attention, viz., that which exists if a professed revelation is, in its general character and in the effects which it produces, manifestly consistent with what nature and reason had independently taught us of the character of God. If the principle of causality be true, and we think that we have proved it to be so, something may be learnt

respecting a cause from an investigation of its effect ; for it is very evident that that which proceeds from and is dependent upon something else, cannot be inconsistent with, and cannot transcend that from which it proceeds and on which it is dependent. Accordingly, it must be impossible for anything which is holy in its character and beneficial in its influence, to proceed from an unholy and malevolent cause. If, then, Christianity can be proved to be holy in its character and beneficial in its influence, its author cannot be unholy and malevolent, and, therefore, since it professes to be from God, it must be really from him ; for otherwise it would be the result either of wilful deception, or of mistake and fanaticism ; but it could not be the result of wilful deception, or its author would be deceptive, and therefore (contrary to the supposition) unholy and malevolent ; nor could it be the result of mistake and fanaticism, or (contrary to the supposition) it would not be beneficial in its influence.

The question, then, which we have now to put, is, What is the character and what is the influence of Christianity ? The character of a professed revelation depends on the character of the truths which it reveals, of the ends which it proposes, and of the means by which it seeks to attain these ends. Accordingly, Christianity must be regarded as holy in its character, if it reveals God as a Being of perfect holiness, and as experiencing complacency in the holiness of his creatures : if it teaches that there is an inseparable connexion between holiness and happiness, not only in this life, but in still greater perfection in the unseen world : if, further, its professed design be to restore man to perfect holiness : and if, with this view, it sub-

jects man to influences and requires of him efforts, which are both holy in their own nature, or, at least, are consistent with holiness, and which are calculated to produce holy results in his heart and life.

Now, that we may ascertain whether Christianity be thus holy in its character, it is very evident that we must first decide *what holiness is*, for, except this prior question be settled, not only will the discussions which may be satisfactory to one mind prove unsatisfactory to another, but they must, if founded on erroneous or obscure views of the nature and foundation of moral excellence, be themselves necessarily characterized by error or obscurity. But psychological investigation is requisite to decide this prior question; we must resort to psychology if we would ascertain the origin of our notions of right and wrong, and the true foundation of the distinction between them; and these being ascertained it will not be difficult to decide what holiness is.

We ask, then, first, What is the origin of our notions of right and wrong? It is maintained by some that we receive them from direct intuition. "The mass (says Mr. Morell) of thinking minds in all countries, the testimony of the common sense of mankind, and the evidence of all human languages (which are exhibitions of man's spontaneous thinking), all assign a separate sphere to moral truth, and appeal to a moral consciousness as the direct foundation of our thoughts and feelings on this subject."* This theory, let me remark, is not a matter of mere speculation; it leads to most important results: if it be correct, all our ideas of right and wrong must be *infallibly* correct; they are received from the immediate

* Morell's Phil. of Rel., pages 19, 20.

intuition of the objective reality, and, except such intuition deceive us, in which case it would cease to be intuition, the objective reality must correspond to the ideas we have derived from it. But if, on the other hand, our ideas of right and wrong are not received from intuition, but are ascribable to phenomenal experience, they were necessarily imperfect when first received, have only gradually acquired their present comparative completeness, and are susceptible of further advances. I have had occasion to show, in a preceding lecture, that we have no immediate intuition of God ; if the case had been different, and all men had had a direct intuition of Deity, the darkness and error in reference to God, which to so great an extent are found to prevail, would not have existed ; and, in like manner, if all had had an immediate intuition of right and wrong, there would never have been any difference of opinion as to right and wrong.

It may be admitted that some ideas of right and wrong universally exist ; but the arguments of Mr. Morell, as contained in the passage just quoted, will not, if investigated, afford any evidence at all for their intuitive origin. That all thinking minds do not ascribe these ideas to intuition, is evident from the controversies which have existed and still exist in reference to the true foundation of virtue ; that the testimony of the common consciousness of mankind can only be to the fact that men are endowed with the power of distinguishing between right and wrong, and not to the question, whether that power is intuitive or not, is very certain, if the majority would, as I think must be admitted, neither understand the term "intuitive" in such a connexion, nor the thing which the term is meant to express ; and that language,

so far as it affords any evidence at all of the origin of our ideas, is in favour of their empirical origin, is proved by the fact that we have no words but what *primarily* express ideas which are confessedly empirical. As to a separate sphere being generally assigned to moral truth, nothing is thence proved as to its intuitional origin, unless it be first shown that it is a sphere beyond the reach of the ordinary faculties.

Accordingly, the only plausible argument for the intuitional origin of our ideas of right and wrong is the supposition that they cannot be otherwise acquired: the grand question, then, is, whether they can possibly be acquired empirically. To investigate this, we will suppose a child to be without any idea of right and wrong, and ask whether experience can give him the idea independently of any direct intuition. Suppose that he is promised something, if he does so and so, which experience has taught him to desire; and, on the contrary, threatened, should he do so and so, to be visited with something which experience has taught him to dread,—this will lead him to associate in his mind one action with the promised good and the other action with the threatened evil; he will thus gain ideas of good as the result of the one, and of evil as the result of the other; and of the good being promised and the evil threatened for the express purpose of inducing him to do the one act and to avoid the other. Such ideas are those of reward and punishment. Now this association of certain actions with reward and of certain other actions with punishment, will lead him to esteem some actions as good, because they procure him good, and certain other actions as evil, because they are followed by evil. As his experience enlarges he finds certain actions to be, inde-

pendently of any promise or threatening, followed naturally by what experience has taught him is good, and certain other actions to be followed naturally by what experience has taught him is evil. Hence, he comes to regard actions as good or evil, not merely because followed by promised reward or threatened punishment, but on account of the effects which experience teaches him that they *naturally* produce. He does this from the principle of self love, which leads him to regard that as good which produces good to himself, and that as evil which produces evil to himself. Having arrived thus far, further experience extends his ideas ; he has a principle of benevolence as well as of self-love, and he soon finds that his actions have an effect for good or evil on others ; hence, he not only looks at the effects produced on himself, but also at those produced on others, and he thus learns to regard those actions as good which either benefit himself or others, and those as evil which do evil either to himself or others. He has now advanced far beyond his primary idea ; his primary idea of right was simply that of an action to the performance of which a reward was promised ; and of wrong, that with which the threatening of punishment was connected : but the idea he has now acquired of right is of an action which itself benefits the doer or benefits others, and the idea of wrong, that of an action which itself injures the doer or injures others.

Now these ideas being, as we have seen, attributable to the influence of the principles of self-love and benevolence, the question may be here asked, whether these are not intuitional principles—in other words, principles which themselves *immediately* grasp, appreciate, lay hold of, good and evil in actions. I

must notice this question before we proceed further. On this point, then, let me remark, there can be no doubt but that we must have an immediate intuition of the subjective feeling of pleasure when we experience it, and in like manner, of the subjective feeling of pain, just as we have an immediate intuition of any other subjective phenomena. But, our idea of pleasure thus received by the intuition of our subjective experience leads us to regard that as good which produces this experience ; and so also our idea of pain, received in the same way, leads us to regard that as evil which produces the experience of pain. Accordingly, the intuition of pleasurable or of painful feeling enables us to gain, by a logical process, an idea of good and evil. Thus far there is no meta-phenomenal intuition at all, nor does *Self-Love* give me even the phenomenal intuition ; all that it does is to lead me, after I have had a pleasurable experience and the intuition of the phenomenon, to desire its repetition, or at least, an experience that shall be like to it. Neither does *Benevolence* do anything more than lead me to desire for others what I have learnt to desire for myself. And if self-love and benevolence do not give me my first ideas of pleasure and pain, still less do they give me any *intuition* of certain actions as producing pleasure, either to myself or others, or of certain other actions as producing pain. It is experience alone that teaches me, at least in the first instance, that some actions are productive of pleasure, and others productive of pain, and it is after I have gained this experience, and not previously to it, that self-love and benevolence lead me to regard the actions as respectively good or evil.

These ideas of good and evil are, I admit, not only utilitarian, but, even as utilitarian, are of a low order,

seeing that they respect *simply* the immediate results of actions. As, however, experience advances, and we learn from it that the results of actions are not confined to their immediate effects, and that ultimate results may be far more important to ourselves and to others, our ideas make still further progress, and we look upon those actions as good which are *ultimately* productive of the greatest good, and upon those as evil which are *ultimately* productive of the greatest evil. We look however at actions, not simply as to their actual results, but also as to their final causes, and hence we call those morally good which are not only productive of the greatest good but were intended by the agent to produce good ; and having reached this point, we are possessed of an enlarged idea of right and wrong acquired empirically. True, it is, after all, only a utilitarian idea, but yet it is one which respects the *whole* utility of an action, remote as well as immediate, and the regard paid to that utility by the agent.

And what higher, what more worthy, what more noble idea of right and wrong can there be than this? If we examine any other, we shall find that either it is resolvable into this, or else is supposed incapable of any explanation. Some tell us that love to being as being is the essence of virtue ; but let me ask, whether it is not utility which renders such love virtuous? if productive of no happiness, either to the subject or to any other being, would there be any virtue in it? for, if not, it is evidently virtuous because productive of happiness. Again, some tell us that virtue consists in the harmony of our dispositions and conduct with our nature and with the relations which we sustain to other beings ; but if we ask,—why is this harmony morally good?—the only

reply which commends itself to our understanding is that it contributes to general utility; for, suppose that it did not, suppose that my acting in harmony with my nature and with the relations I sustain to other beings, would produce misery to myself and misery to them, the harmony could no longer be characterized as morally excellent: it is morally good only because in the highest and most general sense conducive to utility.*

We have seen how we have been led to regard utility as good:—we experienced a feeling of pleasure; we had an intuition, not of anything metaphenomenal, but simply of this phenomenal feeling; this intuition gave us the idea of pleasure, and hence led us to regard that as good which produced it; having next found by experience that there were actions which always produced this feeling, these actions we came to regard as good because they produced good. We next reasoned, analogically from ourselves to others, and considered that which was good to us as also good to them; we looked at the total as well as at the immediate results, and our principles of self-love and benevolence led us to regard the greatest amount of such good as the grand object of pursuit.

But the intuitionist will ask, whether I am bound to obey these principles of my nature—*self-love* and *benevolence*—and if I am, why? In reply, let me observe, that the moral obligation of man is of two kinds,—one, the natural obligation which arises simply from the excellence of virtue,—the other, the obligation resulting from the institution of the moral government of God. It is the first of these alone which lies at the *ultimate* foundation of virtue, and hence, if utility is the ultimate

* See Appendix.

foundation, it cannot imply anything more than the natural influence of these self-evident truths, that utility is good, and that it is good to seek good. But it is the second of the two kinds of moral obligation which is ordinarily referred to when the moral obligation of man is spoken of. This moral obligation is, however, founded on the prior obligation to which I have just alluded, first, because it is conducive to general utility, and, therefore, naturally good on the part of God to institute a moral government; and because if it be good that a government should be instituted, it must be good to uphold it by rendering to it the obedience it requires: secondly, because, independently of the good resulting from upholding the moral government of God, obedience is directly conducive to general utility, all the laws of God being framed for enforcing conduct producing general good: and, thirdly, because God, having power and having told us that he will exert it, to enforce obedience, we shall expose ourselves to the greatest calamities if we refuse or neglect to obey. I may add, that independently of all these considerations, it would be conducive to general utility for all intelligent creatures to love supremely a Being possessed of the natural and moral perfection which characterizes God; and if God is loved supremely, love will put us under obligation to obey him.

Some, indeed, argue that to make utility the foundation of virtue makes virtue virtuous, *not in its own nature, but only contingently on circumstances*, for say they, "If circumstances could be supposed in which an action acknowledged to be vicious would be productive of good, such action would, according to this theory, become virtuous." Let me reply, that an action is as virtuous in its own nature, if its virtue arises from its natural fit-

ness to produce good, as if it arose from any other characteristic; moreover, that the real utility of an action cannot be said to be contingent on circumstances, provided circumstances are, as we believe, only able to alter its immediate results. Let me take a particular case by way of example; suppose falsehood to be vicious, because, independently of all other evils, it destroys the confidence of mankind in each other, and thus tends to destroy the benefit and pleasure of social intercourse. Since this is an evil which results from the nature of falsehood, and is not contingent on particular circumstances, there could not possibly be any circumstances which would destroy its vicious character: if, however, it be thought that there could be circumstances in which it would be productive of good, let such circumstances be supposed; let there be supposed a party whom, by an untruth, we should be able to deliver from fear which would prove injurious to him, I admit that if, in such a case, we were to take a contracted view of utility, and to confine our attention to the immediate result, we should, if utility is the foundation of virtue, pronounce the falsehood a virtue: but the falsehood is, in its own nature, as calculated in the case supposed as in any other to destroy the confidence which men have in their fellow men; and hence, if we remember, first, that even so far as the untruth might be of temporary advantage to the party, such advantage would be in great measure lost if it were the practice, in all like cases, to resort to deception; secondly, that even in the case supposed there may be attendant disadvantages, such as the party being deprived of the opportunity of preparing himself for a coming evil; thirdly, that the destruction of confidence, which is the natural effect of falsehood, tends to cut

away the bands which render the union of mankind in social intercourse a benefit and a pleasure ; and, fourthly, that it does this beyond the influence of the particular case, because the occasional practice of falsehood weakens, by destroying the habit of truth, its power over the mind,—we shall feel that the total result on an enlarged view of utility, and independently of all contingencies, is in total opposition to the allowance of the falsehood. If this was not so,—if it could be conceived possible that a falsehood, not only in its immediate but in its most remote consequences, would be of greater utility than truth, I admit that, on the theory of utility, falsehood in such a case would become a virtue : but, because such a case is *in its own nature* impossible, it is, I believe, impossible for a falsehood, in any case, to be other than an evil. I have instanced a case of falsehood, but the same remarks will apply to every case of acknowledged moral evil in which a temporary good might be supposed to result.

Before I proceed, I will notice one or two objections to the theory I have advocated.

First. We are asked, whether man does not form moral judgments of actions irrespective of all regard to their consequences? Here, we will take, as before, the case of falsehood as a particular instance, and the question put to us will be, whether men do not judge falsehood to be morally evil, because, independently of all consideration of its results, they immediately perceive and feel it to be wrong? I reply that, after man has learnt to distinguish between right and wrong, and has been taught, either by his own experience or by lessons derived from his fellow-men, that such and such actions are right, and such and such other actions wrong, he may *at once*

perceive a particular action to be in opposition to the views he has already formed, and hence may, without any thought of consequences, regard it as wrong. Thus, if I have learnt from experience that falsehood is wrong, I associate moral evil therewith; hence, when a particular case of falsehood occurs, the idea of evil is immediately present to my mind, independently of the reasons which first produced the association; and thus, without any regard to consequences, I immediately perceive and feel it to be wrong. But it has not been proved, and I believe cannot be proved, that any one, previously to the opportunity for an empirical acquisition of the ideas of *Right* and *Wrong*, and previously to the reception of instruction on the subject from his fellow man, has had any experience of such *immediate* moral judgments as those referred to; and this seems itself probable evidence that they are not instinctive, not intuitive, but are founded on previous knowledge empirically acquired.

Secondly. It will, however, be further said by some that there are two different cognitions of right and wrong, an intuitive and a reflective,—and that, even if the theory of utility is correct, as to the reflective idea, there is *previously to that, and independently of it*, an intuitive perception. By the intuitive perception, in distinction from the reflective idea, is meant, that immediate appreciation of the thing which the parties alluded to believe to exist whenever their attention is directed to a virtuous or a vicious act; this appreciation, they maintain, enters into the essence of the moral emotion, which at such times is excited. But let me ask, in reply, first, whether what is called the logical and reflective idea is either independent of, or may even possibly be independent of, the supposed emotional appreciation of the

thing? There are, according to the admission of intuitionists themselves, facts, in connexion with the moral history of our race, sufficient to prove that moral emotions are not the only source of the logical and reflective idea: thus Mr. Morell, in an article inserted in the "Biblical Review," for April, 1850, supposes it possible for a man to be able "to define the idea of the good to a hair's-breadth, whilst his moral nature is either undeveloped or absolutely blunted." Admit a single instance of the kind, and we find a logical and reflective idea of "good" which is in advance of the moral nature. But this will be at once seen to be utterly impossible if the moral feeling is the only source of the reflective idea. Besides, I suppose it will be admitted that men, whose moral nature is undeveloped or absolutely blunted, are responsible beings. If, however, the emotion is the only source of the reflective idea they could not be responsible; for responsibility cannot be in advance of possible knowledge, which it would be if the moral nature was undeveloped or blunted, and there was no other source whence the knowledge of duty could be acquired.

If, however, on the supposition that there are two ideas of virtue, viz., the logical and the reflective, the former is possibly independent of and therefore prior to any moral emotion, let me ask, secondly, whether it does not follow that the whole moral emotion may possibly be owing to the *previous* acquisition of the logical and reflective idea. Suppose a man in whom the principle of self-love has gained an undue preponderance, that principle would, of itself, lead him to view, with peculiarly strong feelings of approbation, any action which his previous experience had taught him would contribute

to his own happiness ; and, with as strong feelings of indignation, any action which his experience had taught him would probably destroy his happiness. In such a case there is the full moral emotion, yet it is excited simply by the knowledge acquired by previous experience. We may suppose a similar case where the principle of benevolence is unusually powerful, and ask whether it would not, in like manner, lead the man to view with feelings of approbation, like those to which I have just referred, an action which experience taught him would contribute to the good of another or to the general good of mankind, and with feelings of disapprobation, like those already alluded to, an action which experience had taught him would do positive mischief to mankind. If so, we have again the moral feelings which are excited by virtue and vice, and yet owing their existence to previous logical and reflective knowledge. If then these are possible cases, the logical and reflective idea may not only exist independently of any previous moral emotion, but may possibly be the cause of moral emotions; and if it were, there would be no appreciation of right and wrong in the emotions, except what owed its existence entirely to the previous logical and reflective idea.

The principal reason which has led me to dwell at so much length on the origin and foundation of our ideas of right and wrong, is to show that we are not to suppose, as we must do if they had been derived from immediate intuition, that our first impressions of right and wrong are to be, in every case, the test by which we are to try the moral character of Christianity. If our ideas of morality had been intuitive, we must have taken them, whatever they were, precisely as we

found them ; they could never be proved to be erroneous. But if they are derived from experience, and we can ascertain their true foundation, they are susceptible of correction and improvement, and hence, before we make them a test of the morality of a professed revelation from God, we ought thoroughly to sift them, and especially ought we to do this before we allow them to lead us to the conclusion that any doctrine of Christianity is immoral in its character and tendency, and therefore cannot be divine.

I shall not occupy your time in showing, that Christianity *as an objective system of religion* is, in its general outlines, possessed of a moral character : this has so often been done, and is so patent to those who know anything of it, that it is unnecessary. I will, however, advert to one of its doctrines which has been objected to as immoral ; and I do so because the objection has not only led some to deny the moral character of Christianity, but has induced others to endeavour to explain away the doctrine with the view of freeing the Christian system from what they supposed to be injurious to its character—I mean *the doctrine of the atonement*. This doctrine is said to be opposed to our moral intuitions ; any punishment for sin, but what is corrective in its nature, is deemed, on the ground of a supposed immediate intuition, to be contrary to the moral perfection of God ; and so is any requirement of atonement in order to its forgiveness. If, however, it is lawful to investigate those views of morality which are supposed to owe their origin to immediate intuition, I think the conclusion, that the truths referred to, and any other truth involved in the doctrine of atonement, are inconsistent with the moral perfection of God, will

be found to be untenable. I do not deny that this doctrine may be so caricatured, as to make it appear contradictory to the justice and to the goodness of God ; but I think it may be shown that, *as taught by Christ and his apostles*, it is, so far from being contradictory to either of these attributes, the brightest manifestation of both. To understand the doctrine, we must keep in mind the great truth of natural as well as of revealed religion,—that God is the Moral Governor of Mankind. If this truth is inconsistent with his moral perfection ; or, if infinite benevolence requires him to regard individual at the expense of general good, I admit that the doctrine of the atonement is a flaw in the Christian system. But if God can be supposed, in perfect consistency with his own moral excellence, to have made men responsible beings, and if he can be supposed with the same consistency to regard the interests of the whole as of greater importance than the interests of the individual, the doctrine of the atonement can be proved to be in the highest degree honourable to his moral character.

Now, is it not the case, that those who object to the morality of the doctrine of the atonement, either deny the moral government of God, or put it out of view ? They pay no respect to the benefit which his intelligent creatures throughout the universe derive from it, and therefore no respect to the importance to intelligent creation at large of the preservation of its honour and authority. Under these circumstances, it is easy to represent the doctrine as both blasphemous to God and injurious in its moral influence on the creature. If, for example, sin be described as a mere private offence against God ; if God be represented as irritated

by the offence, and as requiring to be appeased by some propitiatory offering; and, further, as taking so much delight in suffering and blood that this and this only will be effectual in appeasing his wrath; if the Son of God be set forth as having more pity for man than the Eternal Father, and as paying the price requisite to appease him by enduring the most dreadful sufferings and shedding his own blood, — we shall have a representation of the doctrine of the kind to which I refer. But this is not the doctrine of Christianity. Christianity, if we are to receive our views of it from the teaching of Christ and his immediate disciples, represents sin, not as a private offence against God, but as a transgression of his law, and therefore an offence against his moral government. If so, and if the moral government of God be conducive to the interests of his creatures, it must be important to them that its influence be sustained; its influence, however, will necessarily be weakened if the moral motives which it presents to obedience be deprived of their weight; and of that weight they *must* be deprived if it be in any way rendered a matter of uncertainty whether the reward which God as moral governor has promised to obedience, or the punishment which he has threatened to disobedience, will follow. And it is evidently rendered a matter of uncertainty whether the reward and punishment will follow, if on the one hand, after he has said, "This do and live," he does not confer life when the thing is done; and equally, if on the other hand, after he has said, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them," he does not inflict the curse when the law is violated.

When all this is borne in mind, the requirement by

God of compensation when his law is violated, will not be looked upon as evidence of vindictiveness, but of a benevolent regard for the future moral welfare of his creatures, *if at least by compensation is merely meant something that will so far compensate the law for the non-infliction of a threatened punishment, as to uphold its future authority as entirely as if the punishment had been inflicted.* It must, in proportion to the importance of its future authority being upheld, be important to the creature that such compensation should be made, provided threatened punishment is not inflicted. The requirement, then, of compensation really enters into the essence of the love of which the apostle speaks, "Herein is love, not that we loved God but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins."

And let me add that God, according to the Christian doctrine of atonement, not only manifested his love to us by requiring the compensation to which I have referred, but by himself providing it; and though suffering and blood were involved, it was not because he took any delight in suffering and blood *in themselves*, but only as manifesting a perfect holiness which obeyed even to death, and as making, by means of suffering, that compensation to his law which enabled him, with a due regard to the future authority of his moral government, to exercise infinite mercy. It is not, then, taught by the doctrine of the atonement that God needed to be stirred up by his Son to exercise a mercy to which he was indisposed, much less to be bought over to exercise it. He himself was predisposed to its exercise, and, hence, of his own love provided the sacrifice whereby he could exercise it without inflicting a moral injury on the rest of his intelligent creatures. Christianity, I conceive, teaches no other

doctrine in reference to the atonement than this; and this cannot be fairly represented as implying that he is cruel, vindictive, and delighting in suffering and blood.

But even to this view of the doctrine it is objected, that if the innocent suffers in the stead of the guilty, it must be essentially unjust. Can it, however, be seriously maintained that it is essentially unjust for one being to make a voluntary sacrifice for the sake of others? If this be essentially unjust, some of the noblest acts of benevolence must be esteemed anti-virtuous, and it must be supposed that, instead of exciting admiration, they ought to be regarded with feelings of deep disapproval. If such actions are not anti-virtuous, injustice cannot be essentially involved in the suffering and death of Christ on the behalf of the guilty; they are not unjust if they were, as they are explicitly represented to have been, altogether voluntary on his part.

Still, as the doctrine is founded on the importance to the intelligent creation of God of sustaining those motives to obedience which arise from the promise of reward and the threatening of punishment, it is further objected to it, that its chief use seems to be to sustain the influence of these inferior motives to obedience instead of promoting the higher morality in which love is the grand actuating motive, and reward and punishment disregarded. It is, accordingly, maintained, that the doctrine represents God as preferring a lower to a higher morality, and, hence, that its moral influence must be injurious to man.

But let me ask, in reply, first, whether reward and punishment are not the chief incentives to morality which God employs *independently of a supernatural revelation*? Is not the pleasure which follows an action

known to be virtuous, itself a reward which God has annexed to it? and is not the remorse which follows an action when it is known to be vicious, itself a punishment which God has ordained as its consequence? It will, perhaps, be said that the man of high moral principle is not virtuous for the sake of the pleasure which follows, and that he does not refrain from vice for the sake of escaping remorse. Still, it will be admitted that he is virtuous because he has pleasure in virtue for its own sake, and that he is not vicious in consequence of his dislike to vice for its own sake. But, if so, he is virtuous for the sake of the pleasure he finds in virtue; and yet this pleasure he would not find if God had not made virtue pleasurable,—in other words, if he had not by so doing affixed a reward to virtue. In like manner, if he abstains from vice because he dislikes it for its own sake, he must abstain because he finds vice painful; but this would not have been the case had not God made vice painful, and so attached to it a penalty. The reward of virtue, then, we find after all to be the actuating principle of this man of high moral character, and the punishment of vice to restrain him from vice. Accordingly, if reward and punishment are made of important account as motives to obedience by the doctrine of atonement, the doctrine not only does not give a different representation of the mode of God's moral government to that given in nature, but it does not make them of more account than they are actually found to be in the experience of every virtuous man.

But are we not upholding here what may be called "a selfish morality," in opposition to a morality springing simply from love to God? Let us see. If I obey from love to God, I obey either because love leads me to

regard the commands of the Being I love as the wisest and the best directory of my conduct,—and then I act from a view to my own interest, and therefore on a principle precisely similar in nature to that which respects reward and punishment; or I obey because I wish either to benefit or to please the Being I love. I cannot, however, obey God with any view of benefiting him, for he cannot be benefited by any acts of his creatures; but if I obey to please him, I evidently regard pleasing him,—in other words, his favour, as a great good; if so, I look upon his favour as a reward attached to obedience, and therefore when I obey from the principle of love, it is really from a regard to reward and punishment. All then that the higher morality spoken of requires, is a just view of what is the greatest good and the greatest evil; for if I regard the favour of God as the highest good, and his displeasure as the greatest evil, I shall obey from a regard to reward and punishment, and yet obey from supreme love to God.

Is not the doctrine of the atonement, as taught by Christ and his apostles, intimately connected with this view of morality? So far from disconnecting love and obedience, it represents God to an offender in such a way as to stimulate to strong affection and gratitude, thus exciting to obedience on the principle of love. Moreover, whilst the punishment, the denouncement of which this doctrine upholds as a motive to obedience, is in its nature calculated to restrain those whose tendencies are vicious, both its nature and the nature of the reward the promise of which it also upholds, are calculated to have the most powerful influence after the principle, of love is kindled; for the reward is the light of the Divine countenance, and

the penalty is the displeasure of God and banishment from him.

But does not the doctrine of imputation, a doctrine intimately connected with that of the atonement, altogether destroy the effect of reward and punishment as motives, by bestowing the reward where the blessing is not earned, and delivering from punishment where it is merited? Here we have an objection, the very opposite of the former; *that* represented the doctrine as destroying the morality proceeding from love, and merely sustaining that springing from reward and punishment; but *this* represents it as destroying the latter morality and only upholding the former. The truth is, however, that the doctrine leads to morality on both principles; it is calculated to sustain the motives of reward and punishment in the case of sinless beings whose love is perfect, and who therefore will most perfectly feel the force of such a reward and punishment, as those, the certainty of which the doctrine upholds; and it is equally calculated to excite love in the case of sinful beings previously destitute of the principle, by showing a provision made for them, at a vast expense, of blessings wholly undeserved; thus inducing in them a desire to please God, not indeed with the view of purchasing his favour, but yet because the love stirred up within moves them to regard pleasing him as pleasurable, and grieving him as painful, to themselves. .

The doctrine of the atonement, then, is not morally dishonouring to God: it does not represent him as cruel, vindictive, and delighting in blood; it does not teach that he is unjust; it does not imply that he is more anxious to be feared than loved;—on the contrary, like every other part of Christianity, it teaches the

moral perfection of God, and is calculated to exert the best influences on men.

The preceding argument will be best understood and appreciated by the psychologist; the deeper insight we have into the structure of the mind, the better we shall understand the principles by which it is governed, and accordingly the more clearly we shall perceive the moral effect produced upon it by the hope of reward and the fear of punishment—the value therefore to intelligent creation at large, of the moral government of God, and consequently, if sinners are pardoned, the importance of that government being sustained by an atonement.

Similar remarks might be made in reference to other doctrines, which, like the doctrine of the atonement, have been objected to as offensive to our intuitional consciousness of right and wrong. This supposed intuitional consciousness, which, as we have shown, is in reality no intuition at all, but the product of a previous logical and reflective idea, is not infallible, and hence may often be corrected by the thoughtful exercise of the judging and reasoning powers. Accordingly, when examining into the internal evidence of a revelation professedly supernatural, we must judge of its moral character, not simply by first impressions, but by these impressions as afterwards either corroborated or corrected by an intelligent investigation into their accordance with truth. If we so judge of Christianity, I do not hesitate to affirm that we cannot fail of perceiving its moral excellency, and that we shall have no need to explain away any of its doctrines in order to justify its morality.

I remarked at the commencement of the present lecture that Christianity must be Divine in its origin

if it can be proved to be holy in its character and beneficial in its influence. I shall add nothing further as to the holiness of its character, but permit me to make one or two remarks on the influence which it produces. The general effect which it has produced on mankind is known to every student of history; and there are few who have come into contact with its disciples, who cannot personally testify to its power in renovating the character and reforming the conduct of their fellow men. The evidence, however, as to the superiority of its influence over the heart to any other means of moral improvement is, from its nature, best known to those who have themselves experienced it. The true christian knows experimentally what Christianity has done for him: it has given him happiness far superior to any he ever experienced before, even though he may have tasted all the pleasures which the world can bestow; it has, moreover, drawn his affections towards God and holiness; it has enlarged his benevolence, and destroyed the undue preponderance of self-love; it has thus made him a better man and fitted him to be of more service to society. I do not say that Christianity has done this *for all its professed disciples*; it is one thing to have the name of a christian, another to be a christian indeed; there are, accordingly, many who call themselves its disciples that are neither holier nor happier than they were before. But leaving out of the question those who have neither felt nor manifested its power, there are others who have experienced the full influence of which I have been speaking, and all such have within themselves an evidence of the divinity of its origin, which enables them to reason in some such way as this, 'Here is a revela-

tion which *professes* to be of God ; if it be not, it must be of deceit and wickedness. But can that which is deceitful and wicked exert an influence so excellent as that wrought upon me, and this without the intermixture of any evil? Could it have made me not only happier and holier than I was before, but happier and holier than I have found anything else able to make me? If not, the revelation which has done all this for me must be from God.' This evidence is felt by those who possess it to be perfectly satisfactory to their own minds, and others must acknowledge that, unless those who believe themselves to have it are deceived, it is evidence which ought to satisfy them.

At the same time, in order that this evidence may be philosophically investigated, we must resort to psychology. Psychology will enable us to investigate the peculiarities of the happiness which the christian testifies he owes to Christianity; and hence, to decide, irrespective of any mental tendency to regard a present happiness as superior to a past, whether the peculiarities of christian happiness render it, in its nature and tendency, superior to all other. Psychology, too, enables us to investigate the nature and foundation of true morality, and hence, to decide, irrespective of the influence of any feeling by which the judgment might be warped, whether the affections and dispositions which Christianity has imparted or strengthened be morally better in their character and tendency than those which exist independently of it. I do not mean that the mere psychologist, who knows nothing of the peculiar happiness of the christian or of the peculiar affections which exist in his breast, except from testimony, can be better qualified to judge of this evidence of Christianity than he who has ex-

perienced its effects on his own heart, or be even equally able to do so. All that I mean is, that psychology will enable those, who have experienced the effects of which I have been speaking, to form a more philosophically accurate judgment of the true value of the evidence, and thus to fortify themselves and others against the attacks of those who, from ignorance, represent it as founded on fanaticism or enthusiasm.

We have thus far dwelt on the internal evidence of the divinity of a supernatural revelation. When the Divine origin of such a revelation is *fully confirmed* by internal evidence, the question may arise, whether there is need of any other ? To this question, it may be replied, that however full internal evidence may be, there are several reasons why external evidence may be conceived as desirable in addition ; one is, that it calls attention to the revelation and to the existing internal evidence for its divinity. Suppose a new revelation to come from God without any supernatural sign to indicate its origin, it might receive no attention ; nor, when we consider the various impostures with which the world is inundated, could we attach blame to mankind for treating it with neglect. There needs something to give a *primâ facie* probability to a supernatural pretension, or men will not regard themselves as called upon to examine its claims : unless there be such *primâ facie* probability, they will naturally regard any supernatural pretensions as nothing but the offspring either of wilful deceit or of fanatical folly. Another reason why external evidence is desirable, is, that by the generality of men it is better understood and appreciated than internal evidence ; they might, perhaps, appreciate evidence arising either from effects visibly produced on the conduct of their neigh-

bours, or from effects experienced in their own hearts ; but such evidence could not be had till a revelation had been received independently of it ; and, supposing it to be had, it would not be regarded as so satisfactory as when confirmed by some external sign ; without such sign it might and probably would be imagined, that the effects were at least possibly attributable simply to the superior knowledge and wisdom of a fellow man. The degree of influence which an outward sign *ought* to have on the belief we shall just now investigate ; all that I wish at present to show is, that, let its legitimate influence be what it may, it cannot fail to produce an effect on many minds, and that it is, in its own nature, adapted to prepare them to receive such internal evidence as otherwise might be rejected as insufficient and unsatisfactory. Whether internal evidence would of itself be sufficient for a man of more philosophical power and of more experience in the investigation of truth, or not—it is insufficient for them ; whether the external evidence would, by the former, be regarded as adding to the stability of the foundation on which his faith rests, or not—it would by the latter ; and hence, would be an important addition to a revelation intended for the *whole* human family.

We have thus far simply supposed a supernatural revelation the internal evidence of which is, of itself, sufficient to establish its Divine origin ; let us now proceed to imagine a case where internal evidence does not go so far as this,—where it is simply consistent with the hypothesis of a Divine origin, but does not of itself establish it : could there be, we ask, any external evidence sufficient in such a case to decide the question ? Here it must first be asked whether a revelation, desti-

tute of sufficient internal evidence, is possible. If, indeed, by the destitution of sufficient internal evidence be meant, that the supposed revelation is characterized by something inconsistent with the character and perfection of God, we should at once reply, that such a revelation is impossible. Let it possess any amount whatever of external evidence, the probability of the external evidence deceiving us would be far stronger than that of such a revelation being from God. At the same time, before arriving at such a conclusion, we must be quite sure that real inconsistency with the character and perfection of God actually characterized the supposed revelation; if this were merely a matter of suspicion with us, or even if we merely thought it probable, the question would fairly arise, whether there was not a greater probability that we should be deceived on this point rather than by the external evidence. The case, however, with which we are now dealing, is not one in which any internal evidence exists contrary to the divinity of a supposed revelation, but merely where there is not sufficient internal evidence to prove it. Against the possibility of such a revelation it may, perhaps, be argued that God would not furnish a supernatural revelation without an adequate end, and that, with such an end, the revelation could not be destitute of internal evidence. To this I may reply, that such adequate end might be a remote result not to be effected in the present life, and so might not involve any such present effect as could of itself afford sufficient evidence of the Divine origin of its cause: we must have the knowledge and foresight of God before we could conclude that, because we did not perceive any adequate end, no such end would ultimately be accomplished, and,

therefore, before we could conclude that, because we could not find sufficient internal evidence to the Divine origin of a supposed revelation, it could not possibly be of God. Internal evidence may prove that a revelation is from him, and it may prove that a supposed revelation cannot be from him; but if the preceding reasoning be correct, there may possibly be a revelation which is without internal evidence sufficient to prove either the one or the other; if so, the absence of such evidence does not of itself decide the question.

If, however, such a revelation is possible, the next question is, whether external evidence can of itself be sufficient to justify us in receiving it. External evidence, in distinction from internal, is the evidence which is independent of, and exterior to, the character and influence of the revelation to which it testifies; it is some sign which bears testimony to the origin of a revelation it accompanies, by being itself a manifestation either of supernatural knowledge or supernatural power. I do not now enter into the question whether a supernatural interposition on the part of God is possible, because we have already had occasion to discuss it: my present inquiry is simply whether any sign of the kind supposed can be ascertained to be of God, and can warrant us in receiving a revelation which is attested by it.

I have in a former lecture remarked that we must distinguish between the evidence possible to a party to whom a revelation is immediately made, and the evidence possible to those who only receive it through him. Evidence may be afforded him which is, in its own nature, impossible to them; I refer to evidence possibly arising from the mode in which a communication is made, for if we are able, not only to make communica-

tions to each other, but to make ourselves known, in the very act of communicating, as the party from whom they are received—surely God, if he is pleased to make a supernatural communication to any individual, must be equally able in the act itself to make himself known as the communicator: true, to do this would be something supernatural, but the act of making the communication is supposed to be supernatural, and accordingly it may include in itself supernatural evidence of the source whence it came. The fact that we, who never have received a supernatural communication, cannot understand the nature of such evidence, is no proof of its impossibility, because, supposing it possible, it must be impossible for us to comprehend it, it being entirely out of the range of our own experience. Whilst, however, our inability to understand the nature of this evidence is no proof that it does not exist, or that it is insufficient for the party who receives it, it is a sufficient reason for our expecting other evidence. Let a man testify to us that he knows a communication he has received to be from God, though he cannot explain how he knows it; it would require confidence, not only in his integrity, but in his capacity to judge of the evidence, before we could believe on his bare word; if so, inasmuch as we could not understand a capacity to judge of evidence the nature of which was unintelligible to us, and therefore could not measure his capacity to judge of it, we could not receive a revelation without further evidence than that arising from his own testimony to his being the recipient of a communication from Deity.

Let us, then, turn to that external evidence of a revelation which is possible not only to the party himself

but also to others; in other words, to supernatural signs which, instead of being confined to subjective experience, are matter of objective observation. Here several questions present themselves to our attention; one, How we are to distinguish between the natural and the supernatural? another, Whether a supernatural sign may not possibly have some other than a Divine origin? and a third, In what way, and to what extent, such a sign, when it has manifestly a Divine origin, may evidence the origin of a professed revelation?

By the supernatural we mean that which is contrary to, or independent of, the established order of nature: thus, if it was the established order of nature for X always to follow Y and for X never to be produced but by means of Y, it would be contrary to that order if X did not follow Y, and it would be independent of that order if X was produced independently of Y. If this is what is meant by the supernatural, it may be asked, *whether it does not require a knowledge of the natural, beyond what man possesses, to be able to distinguish the supernatural from the natural?* No man knows *all* the laws of nature, and those which he does know, he may only know imperfectly; how then can he ascertain that any event whatever is either contrary to or independent of them? Suppose, for example, that any effect is not produced which his knowledge of the laws of nature had led him to expect, how can he know that the cause, instead of being a supernatural interposition, is not the counteracting operation of some law of nature of which he is ignorant? or, suppose that any effect is produced which seems independent of natural laws, how can he know that it is not attributable to some recondite law with which he is unacquainted?

In reply to these questions I must admit that, if we had no other means of distinguishing the supernatural from the natural than the peculiar nature of the occurrences which took place, it would be impossible for us to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion; but let me remark, that there may be connected circumstances which enable us to draw conclusions in reference to occurrences, which their nature, considered simply in themselves, would not warrant. To illustrate this, we will suppose some event or events to be *primâ facie* supernatural, that is, to be unaccountable to us according to any known natural laws, or even according to any natural law which we could analogically suppose as probably existent. Now, if such event be not supernatural, it must result from the operation of a recondite law. But we will suppose it to take place at the word of a man who knows nothing of any such recondite law except he has knowledge which no other man living possesses; and, to take place under circumstances when we have *à priori* reason to expect a supernatural sign, and under no other circumstances. We will, also, suppose it to take place under these circumstances, not once only but repeatedly, and to take place not simply at the word of one man, but at the word of a second, of a third, or of a still greater number, *and yet never without there being sufficient reason to expect the supernatural*. Would not, I ask, such attendant circumstances warrant us in believing the event or events which were *primâ facie* supernatural to be really so? If in such a case we suppose there to be only the natural, we are driven to one of two conclusions, — either that the event or events which were apparently supernatural had, *by mere accidental coincidence*, been produced at the particular time

when the word which seemed to have occasioned them was uttered, and therefore altogether independently and irrespectively of such word; or that the man or men, whose word appeared to us so powerful, had become in some way cognizant of laws of nature which, so far as all others were concerned, were recondite. The former supposition, if regarded as possible in the case of a solitary instance, is utterly inadmissible where there is a number of similar cases, especially, if the event or events have never been known to occur except under the supposed circumstances; it is infinite to one against such a repetition of accidental coincidences as must have occurred if the supposition were granted. Is then the second supposition admissible, or that the man or men, whose word appeared so powerful, had become cognizant of laws of nature which to all other men were recondite? Let us imagine that they have not been in circumstances which render the acquisition of any such peculiar knowledge probable, that they disclaim, implicitly at least, all such knowledge, that, so far as we can gather their motives from their conduct, they do not appear to have had any motive to deceive us on such a point, and that their general character and conduct show them to be men of honesty and integrity; surely the circumstances would forbid the supposition that they are making use of a knowledge of recondite laws of nature; we could not suppose it without rejecting all the teaching of psychology.

We will repeat the argument. We have supposed a number of events which are *primâ facie* supernatural, and which, if not supernatural, have been accomplished by means of a discovery, by the parties concerned, of some recondite law of nature. But there

are, we have seen, several reasons for believing that no such discovery has been made; first, it could only be supposed to be made as the result of a studious investigation of nature, whereas the parties are supposed to be unused to any such investigation and to have had no opportunity for it; secondly, if the discovery had been made, we could not believe, since they are supposed to be known as men of integrity and honesty, that they would even by implication have disclaimed it, much less that they would use it as a means of deception; and, thirdly, if the discovery had been made, and their integrity and honesty were not what they appeared to be, they must be supposed susceptible of the influence of wealth or fame; but if they had acted under such influence, they must, being by the hypothesis destitute of any higher counteracting motives, have either boasted of their superior knowledge of nature, or at least have made use of it for exalting and enriching themselves; in the case imagined however they do neither, for they are supposed to be without any apparent motive for deceiving us. When all this is taken into consideration, we cannot believe it to be possible that the effect should be owing to the discovery of a recondite law of nature, even if only one, but especially if a number of individuals have been concerned. If all this were considered insufficient evidence that the parties had not become cognizant of a recondite law, is it probable that it should have happened just at the time when a supernatural occurrence was *à priori* probable, and that the knowledge of the law should never have been manifested since? Assuredly not. We think, then, that there are circumstances in which the supernatural may be distinguished from the natural, at all

events with so high a degree of probability as to be deserving of full credence.

And are not these circumstances found in the miracles said to be wrought at the first introduction of Christianity? The miracles are too many in number to be attributed to accidental coincidence. They are wrought when, on the supposition that Christianity is of God, miracles might reasonably be expected, nor do similar events ever occur, except when miracles are similarly probable. They are, so far as *known* laws of nature are concerned, unquestionably supernatural. They are wrought by parties who represent them as the immediate operation of God, and therefore as not ascribable to any recondite law of nature which they have discovered. The parties by whom they are wrought are not natural philosophers, or otherwise in circumstances which would render it antecedently probable that recondite laws should have been discovered by them. Moreover, they do not use their powers so as to gain wealth, and they refuse to take the glory of their deeds to themselves. They are apparently plain honest men; no falsehood, no deceit of any kind, would accord with what is known of their character and history. Not only, then, are there circumstances in which the supernatural may be distinguished from the natural, but these circumstances all exist in connexion with the alleged miracles of Christianity.

Granting, however, that the supernatural is, under certain circumstances, distinguishable from the natural, we must next ask, *whether a supernatural sign may not possibly have some other than a Divine origin?* for, if it may, the question may fairly be put, whether that which can possibly proceed from some other source

can be considered as adequate evidence of Divine interposition?

We cannot deny that the existence of superhuman creatures is possible,—that if such creatures exist they must have superhuman power,—that, if their power is superhuman, it will not be bounded by the same laws of nature by which our power is bounded,—and, therefore, that they may perform works, which, according to the laws of human action, would be supernatural. How, then, are we to know, if something is done which would be supernatural to human power, that it is not done by superhuman creature agency, instead of being immediately attributable to Deity? To investigate this question, let me observe, that it is important, first, to ascertain whether the power, by which men and higher orders of creatures act, be their own independent power, or be merely a Divine power of which God permits them to make use. Here I must remind you, that the existence of God is, as we have shown in a preceding lecture, *absolutely necessary*, and is, therefore, necessary in all possible relations, and in reference to all possible circumstances in which his creatures can exist. If there be any one circumstance in relation to which his existence is not necessary, it is not *absolutely necessary*; but if his creatures could act without him, and this they could do if they had independent power of their own, there would be circumstances in their existence in respect to which his existence would not be necessary; accordingly, we conclude that the only power, by which creatures can act, is Divine power. But if so, the laws of nature by which they act are the different modes in which, according to the teaching of experience, they can make use of the power of God. And the uniformity in

the operation of these laws is simply ascribable to a Divine ordination whereby God makes his power available for their use ; for if the laws were variable in their operation, in other words, if that which was a law of nature to-day was not the law to-morrow, his creatures, except they had independent power, would be, for any practical purposes, wholly without power, and would lose all stimulus to exertion. But if the power by which creatures act be not their own but Divine power ; and if God has seen fit, in order to make his power available to them, to exert it according to fixed laws, there must be fixed laws for creatures possessed of superhuman power as well as fixed laws for men ; and hence, superhuman creatures cannot act any more than men, except in accordance with laws of action which God has constituted. Now, so far as superhuman creatures act in a different sphere from men, the actions of the two cannot interfere with each other ; and, accordingly, the laws by which the two act may, without impugning the Divine wisdom or even the Divine unchangeableness, be contradictory to each other ; for creatures of one order might be most wisely ruled by one set of laws, and creatures of a superior order by another set, some of which were directly contrary to the former. But not so, if superhuman creatures act in the same sphere as man, for then, if the laws of action were directly contrary, the actions of the two might so interfere as to make the laws of human action appear variable, and thus to destroy the benefit arising from the establishment of fixed laws. God would evidently contradict his own purposes if, after establishing certain laws, according to which his power should be exercised with the view of teaching us how to avail ourselves of that power to accomplish what ends we desired,

he should frequently act so as to nullify this teaching ; for example, if he determined so to work as to teach us that by A we might attain B and avoid C, and was yet often to work in such a way that, by A, we, instead of attaining B and avoiding C, found that we had attained C and avoided B. And if God would contradict his own purposes in such a case, provided we were the beings through whom he was acting, it would be equally the case if there was an unseen order of beings, acting in the same sphere as ourselves, through whom what we did could be turned, without our consciousness of their agency, to a different result from what we had been led by experience to expect. For this reason we regard it as impossible that God should ordinarily permit an unseen order of beings to work amongst us in opposition to any laws of nature which he has established for us ; and if not ordinarily, only extraordinarily when he has some special purpose to accomplish. And this conclusion is, I may add, established by the indisputable fact, that, if superhuman beings do work amongst men, there is no ordinary manifestation of their violating any known laws of nature. If, then, when supernatural signs occur in connexion with the introduction of what professes to be a supernatural revelation from God, these supernatural signs, if attributable to superhuman beings, can only be attributable to them on the supposition of *special permission* from God, it follows, that even if the signs are immediately attributable to such beings, the special permission, which their occurrence implies, is as strong a proof of Divine interposition as though they were immediately wrought by God himself without any such instrumentality.

This may be admitted, but still it may be asked whether such an interposition, when it occurs in support of a professed revelation, is necessarily a Divine testimony to its truth. It may be said that, as God permits wicked men to do evil, he might possibly give special permission to wicked superhuman beings to deceive men ; and hence, that supernatural signs may be conceived as possibly the result of such a permission. I allow that there are circumstances in which special permission to wicked superhuman beings to act in an extraordinary way, may be supposed possible. If God sees fit to permit men ordinarily to be tempted by the natural, there may be special occasions or special circumstances in which he may see fit to permit them to be tempted by the supernatural. As, however, he does not permit men ordinarily to be tempted to evil without their either knowing, or at least having the opportunity to know, that the thing to which they are tempted is evil ; nor without the affections, to which the temptations appeal, being under the circumstances an evil motive for action, so we may believe that he would not permit men to be tempted by the supernatural without giving them the means of ascertaining that the thing to which they were tempted was evil, and without restraining the appeal of the temptation to passions, which under the circumstances could not be indulged without conscious sin. This truth is further proved by a consideration of his wisdom and benevolence. He is a Being of infinite wisdom ; he would not then give special permission for the purpose supposed, or for any other purpose, without having some special object which such a permission was calculated to accomplish : he is a Being of infinite benevolence ; that special object would, therefore, be the good, not

the injury, of his creatures. But if so, and he permitted man to be subjected to a special temptation, we are quite sure that such special temptation could not be *necessarily* for his injury, nor be even possibly so except through his own fault; that, on the contrary, the permission would only be given, when if he acted virtuously under it, it would ultimately be advantageous to him. Consequently, we cannot believe that God would give special permission to wicked superhuman beings to produce supernatural effects for the purpose of attesting a false revelation, except there were sufficient means of ascertaining, independently of such effects, that it was false. It would be a reflection on his wisdom and his goodness to suppose it possible.

We conclude, then, that, if there be a revelation, professedly from God, which is attested by supernatural signs, such signs, if not directly from God, are attributable to his special permission, and that, if there was nothing in the nature of the supposed revelation which would make it palpable to every sincere inquirer that he was not its Author, he would never have permitted any such attestation, (except the revelation was really from him,) it being an attestation which, without any fault on the part of mankind, must lead them astray.

We can however conceive of a case stronger than this. Suppose a professed revelation whose claim to be of God, whilst it is not disproved by internal evidence, is in many of its parts corroborated by it; the internal evidence in favour of the parts would evidently afford a presumptive argument in favour of the whole. If, in such a case, supernatural signs are added in proof of its Divine origin, we could not but regard them as still more certainly a divine attestation to its divinity; for if, as we

have seen, it would be morally impossible for God to give a special permission for such signs in favour of any false revelation, when it could not by internal evidence be ascertained to be false, much less would it be possible for him to give a special permission for such signs in favour of a false revelation, when there was not only no evidence to prove it to be false, but when there was enough truth mixed up with it to afford some internal evidence in its favour.

And is not this the case with Christianity? Christianity is undoubtedly, as to many of its truths, proved to be Divine by internal evidence, and there is no evidence which, when fairly investigated, will prove that any of its truths are not Divine; accordingly, internal evidence affords, to say the least, a presumptive argument for the divinity of the whole. Under such circumstances, then, God could not, provided the preceding reasoning be correct, give special permission to any being, human or superhuman, to attest the divinity of the whole system by supernatural signs, if it were not from himself. To suppose that he would, would be to attribute falsehood and deception to Him who cannot lie, and would be in direct opposition to his infinite wisdom and benevolence.

I need scarcely point out the use of psychology in the preceding argument. We have argued on the supposition of what might be expected from man under certain specified circumstances; but such a supposition is based wholly on the knowledge we have of the constitution of the human mind: if it had been differently constituted; if its passions and affections had been different in their nature; if the considerations which now move it had no effect upon it; and considerations which now are regarded by it with indifference were the whole spring

of its conduct, the foundations of our reasoning would be subverted; our argument, being founded on the principles of human conduct, would be rendered worthless. If so, the argument must be more or less valid in proportion as our view of human nature is more or less correct. We have indeed argued analogically from man to God; we have supposed, from a consideration of what man would do, and what he would not do, under certain specified circumstances, what God would do and what he would not do under such circumstances; and hence have concluded that under certain circumstances he would not give a special permission to act supernaturally. I do not consider this argument less demonstrative, because the nature of God is, as I have shown in preceding lectures, far removed from our comprehension, for, the truth and benevolence of God being infinitely superior to the truth and benevolence of man, what is inconsistent with the latter will, *à fortiori*, be inconsistent with the former. Still it is evidently of importance to the validity of our reasoning that we should clearly understand our own mental structure, or we may draw inferences from it which more thorough investigation would show us to be unfounded.

We have, then, shown that there are circumstances in which we are able to distinguish the supernatural from the natural, and that there are circumstances in which the supernatural may be regarded as equivalent to a Divine testimony to the divinity of a professed revelation. But we must still further inquire, *In what way and to what extent a supernatural sign, when regarded as a Divine testimony, bears witness to the origin of a professed revelation?* The supernatural sign, of which we have been speaking, is external evidence; it is independ-

ent of the matter of the revelation ; it may be independent of the mode in which it is made. How then can it be so connected with the revelation as to testify to it ; and if thus connected with it, how far will its testimony go,—to the whole revelation, or merely to parts ?

The connection of supernatural signs with a revelation may be either avowed or implied. It is avowed, if the sign, previously to being given, is promised as a token of the Divine origin of a specified revelation ; or if it is given in answer to the prayer of a party, to whom a revelation is made, for some such token of its divinity : it is also avowed if the person, by whose instrumentality the supernatural sign is given, declares its purpose to be to substantiate a certain revelation. It is, on the other hand, merely implied, if the party, by whom a revelation is made, be at the same time endowed with a power of working miracles without there being any specific declaration of the reason why that power is conferred. In cases of the former kind there can be no controversy, either as to the connection of the sign with a specified revelation, or as to how much of the revelation the sign has reference to, the one being stated and the other defined by the authority with whom the sign originates. Thus, if Hezekiah was promised, as a proof of the Divine source of a message addressed to him, that the shadow should go ten degrees backward, he could not hesitate when he saw the sign to connect it with the message ; nor could he doubt what was the particular message with which he should connect it. The previous promise of the sign was either from God, or it was not ; if it was from God, it was as divine, and therefore as authoritative, as was the sign ; if it was not from God, there would be, if the sign was from

him, a previous promise of it independently of him, to suppose which would be to attribute to a creature such an insight into the supernatural purposes of the Creator as must, in its own nature, be utterly impossible. In like manner, Gideon, when he asked for a sign that God talked with him and would deliver Israel by his hand, could not doubt, when what he asked was given, to what it had reference, and to what its reference was confined: the correspondence of the sign with the request he had made must evidently be of God, if the sign was of God; if so, it must be supposed to determine, by its correspondence with the previous request, to what matter it referred.

But let us turn to cases in which the connection between a sign and a revelation is not definitely declared, but is simply inferrible from the fact that the person or persons, who profess to be the medium of a revelation, are endowed with the power of performing supernatural works. We ask, first, whether this is or is not a sufficient ground for the conclusion, that the power is bestowed for the purpose of attesting the revelation. We have seen that the bestowment of the power indicates a special interposition of God; such an interposition could not occur consistently with infinite wisdom without a purpose; if it has a purpose, it may be fairly presumed that, since the power is conferred on man and has reference to human affairs, the purpose must have reference to human affairs; as, then, we find a *prima facie* connection between the power and a professed revelation in the fact that the power is confided to the same party who affirms that he is the medium of the revelation, and as, on the supposition that the *prima facie* connection is the true one, the object has a re-

ference to human affairs, and therefore probably discoverable by man, it appears to be a natural conclusion, provided we can discover no other probable object for which the power can be supposed to have been given, that its purpose was to attest the revelation.

It has, indeed, been said that the power of working miracles may have been conferred simply for calling attention to the character and example of the party, and not for authenticating his teaching. But surely if God is supposed to bear testimony, by a miracle or a series of miracles, to the character of an individual, it must be regarded as a testimony to his honesty and truthfulness, and therefore as a testimony to the supernatural origin of all the teaching which he affirms he has received supernaturally. The supposition, therefore, that a miracle testifies to the character of a teacher, who represents himself as speaking from God, without authenticating his teaching, is absurd.

It must then, we conceive, be granted, if at least our preceding reasoning is conclusive, that if miracles are wrought by an individual who lays claim to be the medium of a revelation from God, a connexion must exist between the miracles as a supernatural sign, and the revelation as the thing to which they testify. We proceed then to inquire, *Whether in such a case the whole teaching of the party is to be regarded as included in the revelation so attested, or only a part of his teaching.* To solve this question, we must, first, ask whether the party himself bears any testimony on the matter, and if he does, whether he tells us either that all his words are to be regarded as the words of God, or merely that certain defined parts of them are to be so regarded; for if, whilst laying claim to be a Divine messenger, he

bears no testimony on this point, he must be considered as asserting that he is commissioned by God, without restricting the assertion to any particular parts of his teaching.

If on investigating this question we find that he himself testifies either that his whole teaching, or that certain specified parts are of God, there can be no doubt as to what is attested by his miracles. But if we find, on the other hand, that he is to be considered as simply asserting that he is commissioned by God without informing us what parts of his teaching are invested with Divine authority, we must ask, if we would ascertain the extent to which his miracles authenticate his teaching, whether either internal evidence or the circumstances of the case plainly divide it into two parts, and thus enable us to distinguish the Divine from the human. If it is thus plainly divided, we could only be warranted in regarding that part of his teaching as attested by his miracles to which the internal evidence or the circumstances of the case limit the possibility of the Divine. But if it is not plainly thus divided; in other words, if there be a case in which neither internal evidence nor the circumstances of the case indicate any such difference in his teaching, or if the only difference indicated is the impossibility of one part being human, but not the impossibility of the other part being Divine, we must, since we cannot limit a Divine revelation to what is manifestly impossible to be other than Divine, conclude that we have no warrant to limit the attestation of the miracles to a part of the teaching of the individual by whom they were wrought. If so, this is itself evidence that it was not intended by God to be so limited, and therefore that it must be applicable to his whole teaching.

Let us apply this reasoning to the miracles of Christ and his apostles. Christ testified that his miracles were a witness to the divinity of his mission. "The works (said he) that I do, bear witness of me that the Father hath sent me." But did these works bear witness to his whole teaching or only to a part? He has not himself defined any part of it as that to which their witness is to be considered as restricted; the circumstances of the case do not restrict it, nor is any of his teaching excluded from the possibility of being Divine by internal evidence. Hence we conclude that his miracles testify to the Divine origin of his whole teaching.

As to his Apostles, we will take Paul as a specimen, because we know more of him than of most of the others. His miracles were wrought, I admit, not so distinctively in confirmation of his own inspiration, as of the Divine mission of Christ, for they were wrought not as Christ's were, in his own name, but in the name of Christ. Still they were evidently intended to testify to the truth of his testimony concerning Christ, and to his authority as a messenger of Christ: accordingly, they attest the truth of his words, that the gospel, which he preached, he did not "receive of man, and was not taught but by the revelation of Jesus Christ." But whilst the miracles of Paul thus, like Christ's, bore witness that he spake what he had received from above, they do not, like Christ's, bear witness to the Divine origin of every word which he uttered. His own testimony with regard to what he was sent by God to proclaim, respects merely *the gospel which he preached*, — in other words, the facts and doctrines he taught in reference to Christ and his religion. This testimony, which his miracles authenticated, evidently confines his mission to his reli-

gious teaching: and so does the fact that his miracles were wrought in the name of Christ; for it confines their attestation to what he taught in his name, and, therefore, to what he taught respecting him and his religion. Hence, whilst the miracles of Christ prove *all* that he said to be of God,—the miracles of Paul merely prove that what he said relative to Christ and the gospel was of God; in other words, whilst the miracles of Christ evidence that the spirit of inspiration was not given “by measure” to him, the miracles of Paul merely prove that it was given by measure unto him. I may have to refer to this fact again when we come to speak of Holy Scripture. Here we have only to do with it so far as it refers to the evidence afforded by miracles to the Divine origin of Christianity. We have evidence that the Christianity taught by the apostle is a revelation from God, but not that anything else taught by him is therefore from God.

We have seen how psychology helps us to distinguish between the natural and the supernatural, and how it helps us to decide whether the supernatural is to be regarded as a testimony from God. If it does not afford us equal assistance in reference to the connection which a sign, ascertained to be supernatural and to be a testimony from God, has with a specified revelation, it is because here we do not stand in like need of its assistance. Granting that miracles have been wrought by Christ and his disciples, and that these miracles can be proved to be a Divine testimony to their message, it has not been disputed that the testimony has reference to the religion introduced by Christ and preached by his apostles; the only dispute has been on a matter to which our attention will hereafter be directed, whether

it has reference to anything more than this—in other words, whether it has reference to everything written or uttered by the apostles, both on the subject of Christianity, and on every other subject.

In the preceding argument we have proved that occurrences which are *primâ facie* supernatural, may be possibly a sufficient evidence of the Divine origin of a revelation: but, in order that this may be the case to any, except those by whom they were actually witnessed, it must be possible for testimony to be an adequate ground for believing in supernatural occurrences. I need not say that this has been disputed by a philosopher whose argument against it has been thought by many eminent advocates of Christianity worthy of investigation and reply, though I think that some of them have failed in properly handling it. The argument of Hume, the philosopher to whom I refer, is psychological, and it can only be psychologically answered. He maintains that the evidence of testimony is entirely founded on experience; more specifically, that the only reason why we believe the testimony of another is, that experience has taught us the general agreement of testimony with fact. Assuming this as a first principle, he investigates the different kinds of evidence founded on experience; these he represents as of two species,—that which is founded on uniform, and that which is founded on variable experience: the first he considers infallible, the second as fallible, and, therefore, susceptible of degrees. Suppose, then, a case in reference to which we have two different experiences leading us to opposite conclusions, he would argue, that, if one experience is equal to the other, we cannot receive the evidence of either, each being neutralized by the other; but that if one experi-

ence is stronger than the other, especially if one is uniform and the other variable, we must receive the evidence of the uniform and reject that of the variable experience. In applying this to the evidence of testimony for miracles, he maintains that a miracle is something in itself contrary to uniform experience, and, therefore, that even if faith in testimony was built on uniform experience, the testimony in favour of miracles would be neutralized by the uniform experience which was in opposition to them; but that it is more than neutralized if testimony is believed only on the ground of a variable experience: consequently, that miracles can never be proved by testimony.

In investigating this argument, let us, first, inquire, Whether the evidence of testimony is founded simply on experience? Here I do not ask whether our belief in testimony is, in the first instance, *traceable* to experience, but whether, be this the case or not, experience be the *only ground* on which testimony is afterwards worthy of belief. In the discussion of Hume's argument, too much attention, as it appears to me, has been given to the historical question, 'how man comes to believe in testimony?' The original source of his belief may be one thing, and the reason why testimony is really worthy of belief may be another and different thing; thus, if, as one philosopher tells us, we come to believe in testimony in consequence of the original constitution of our nature, this would not prove that testimony was worthy of belief, except it was also shown that the original constitution of our nature could not lead us astray; again, if, as another tells us, we come to believe in testimony as the result of experience, neither would this prove the truth of what we so believe, unless experience be shown to be

an infallible guide. Instead then of asking how man first comes to believe in testimony, and, for this purpose, of inquiring into facts so far removed from the region of possible observation as are those connected with the first experience of infant children, we will rather ask what are the reasons why man *ought* to believe in testimony. In reply to this query, let me remark that, if by experience, in reference to testimony, is simply meant our observation of the conformity of testimony to fact, we have other grounds than experience for believing it; whilst if by experience we may understand all the knowledge derivable from experience, and all the inferences which such knowledge fairly warrants, we shall find in experience a two-fold ground for believing testimony; and, moreover, shall find each to be a ground which will not, like the "experience" spoken of by Hume, equally apply to all kinds of testimony, but will point out what the particular kinds of testimony are which are worthy of our confidence, and to what extent they are so to be regarded.

To discover, however, this two-fold ground for believing testimony, we must resort to psychology. We have already shown that psychology teaches us that man acts under the influence of motive, and not by any self-determining power of the will. If so, one test by which we may decide whether testimony is credible depends on the knowledge which we have gained or are able to gain of the motives to which it is to be attributed. There is we know a motive by which men are ordinarily influenced in the use of language, and which, as being the only motive, must influence them where no counterbalancing motives exist, viz., the connexion which exists between language as a sign and that which it

represents as the thing signified. The two are connected by the mental principle of association; accordingly, whenever language is used, and no other motive operates, association leads to the use of language in accordance with the thing spoken of. Psychology thus leads us to believe that testimony will be true except there be some special motive for falsehood. Deeper investigation into mind will teach us what are the different classes of motives of which it is susceptible; and hence, when our investigation is complete, we can decide, in a specified case, provided the circumstances give us sufficient knowledge of what motives may possibly have influenced a party, whether it is possible for his testimony to be false, and if it be possible, how far it is probable. In this way psychology may teach us that a certain specified testimony, *A*, cannot be false; that another testimony, *B*, may possibly be false, but yet is probably true; and that a third testimony, *C*, is more probably false than true. The evidence of testimony then is not in all cases of the same value: there are cases in which it is of no value at all, and other cases in which we could not desire a stronger foundation for faith.

But there is another test by which we may try whether testimony is credible. We have shown, in a previous lecture, how psychology enables us to deduce the truth of the principle that every effect must have a cause. Accordingly, if several different parties agree in their testimony, it teaches us that there must be some cause for such agreement. There are, however, in any such case, only three possible causes,—the truth of the testimony, previous concert on the part of the witnesses, and accidental coincidence. Where there is agreement,

not simply in one point but in a number of different particulars, especially where there is such agreement not merely between two but between several witnesses, we cannot believe that it can be possibly attributable to accidental coincidence. In order to the possibility of such a coincidence, there must be no mental peculiarities in the parties, nor any peculiarities of external circumstances; whereas we cannot investigate mind without perceiving it to be not only susceptible of an infinite variety of peculiarities, nor observe mankind without ascertaining that, as far as our observation can go, there are no two human beings precisely alike, and no two human beings whose external circumstances are precisely alike. If, then, the agreement in the case supposed cannot be owing to accidental coincidence, it must, supposing that the circumstances of the witnesses prove that there cannot have been previous concert, be attributable simply to the agreement of each testimony with truth. Here is a second ground which we have, under certain circumstances, for believing testimony.

If there be thus different foundations for faith in testimony, and if these foundations be not applicable to every kind of testimony, Hume is totally wrong when he builds the credibility of testimony, *in all cases*, on precisely the same foundation. It may be very true that the testimony in favour of miracles would not be a sufficient reason for our faith in them, if we had no reason for believing the testimony excepting a variable experience; but the case is altered, if, instead of 'variable experience' being alike the ground of faith in this and all other testimony, faith in this testimony is built on two different grounds, both of them far more worthy of confidence than a 'variable experience.'

But it is said that the thing testified is, in the case before us, so improbable in its own nature, that no amount of evidence will justify faith. Miracles, the thing testified, are, we are told, contrary to the uniform experience of mankind, and, therefore, cannot be believed possible, for, let the evidence in their favour be what it may, the strongest evidence which can be adduced cannot, it is affirmed, be stronger than the uniform experience of mankind, and, therefore, cannot prove anything contrary to that experience. But, let me ask what is meant when it is asserted that miracles are contrary to the uniform experience of mankind. The utmost that can possibly be meant is, that the whole experience of mankind has been limited to the natural and never reached the supernatural. If this is what is meant, the miracles in question are, of course, left out of view, as still *sub judice*. Suppose, however, that independently of these supposed miracles and a few others, wrought professedly under extraordinary circumstances, the whole experience of mankind has been confined to the natural—it would not even then prove the supernatural impossible, except it could be shown that possibility is *necessarily* limited to human experience; nay, it would not even prove the supernatural *improbable* under circumstances different from those in which mankind have been placed. Let the ordinary circumstances of mankind be such as to make no demand for a supernatural occurrence, and let extraordinary circumstances arise which do make such a demand; the non-experience of the miraculous, under the former circumstances, affords no kind of proof, not even probable evidence, of the non-experience of the miraculous under the latter circumstances. All, therefore, that the experience of mankind

could be supposed to prove, in reference to the miraculous, is that, under such and such circumstances, the miraculous is improbable; hence it could not be said that the uniform experience of mankind, supposing it to be uniform, was against miracles, but merely that the uniform experience of mankind rendered miracles, *under circumstances like to their own*, improbable—the ground of such improbability being the unchangeableness of God, and the truth derived from it, viz., that his course of procedure at one time is an argument for expecting a like course of procedure at another time, under like circumstances. The improbability goes as far as this, but it neither goes, nor can go, a step further.

Seeing then that the circumstances under which miracles are alleged to have been wrought at the introduction of Christianity *differed from the ordinary circumstances of mankind*,—being circumstances which justified the expectation of the miraculous,—the ordinary experience of mankind is no argument at all against them. And we have previously seen that our belief of the testimony by which their occurrence is supported is not simply founded on our observation that testimony generally, though not always, agrees with fact, but is founded first on the psychological doctrine that man does not act without motive and has a natural motive for truth which will make him truthful when he has no motive to the contrary,—in connexion with the fact ascertainable from historical evidence that the witnesses of gospel miracles had and could have had no inducement to deceive: and is founded, secondly, on the agreement, not in one point only, but in a number of particulars, between the testimony of several witnesses,—an agreement which we have seen cannot be the

result of accidental coincidence, and one which may be shown to have taken place without previous concert, and therefore to be simply attributable to the truth of the thing testified.

I have thus discussed the various questions which have reference to the validity of the evidence for Christianity as a revelation from God. As, however, the truth of Christianity, and the inspiration and authority of the books which contain the record of its facts, doctrines, and precepts, are two different things, I shall in my next and last lecture, with the help of the conclusions to which we have already arrived, and with that of psychological science, discuss the question, Whether the books of the New Testament give us a fallible or an infallible representation of the Christian Religion, and, if infallible, whether it be without any admixture of what is merely human.

“ Truth divine for ever stands secure,
Its head is guarded as its base is sure ;
Fixed in the rolling flood of endless years
The pillar of the eternal plan appears ;
The raving storm and dashing wave defies,
Built by that Architect who built the skies.”

COWPER.

LECTURE VII.

INSPIRATION OF SCRIPTURE.

[In the fifth and sixth lectures controverted questions are discussed, (with what aid psychology affords,) in reference to Christianity as a system of religion supernaturally communicated to men from God. In this lecture such questions are discussed in relation to New Testament Scripture as an inspired record of the communication.

It having been proved in the preceding lectures that it is possible for a book to be written by Divine inspiration, the question is first investigated whether on the supposition that Christianity is of God, it is *probable* that a book would be written which should be so far inspired as to render the communication it contained uncorrupted and authoritative. After discussing this question, and finding that the conclusion depends on the position that Christianity reveals truths, the reception and value of which rest on the authority of God,—the doctrine of those is examined who either deny this position, or undermine it by the tenet that the revelation of such truths is a very secondary and unimportant object of Christianity.

The utility of psychological science to the preceding argument having been noticed, the second question investigated is, How far the *à priori* argument just concluded extends,—whether it requires the book, spoken of, to be *verbally* inspired; and whether it requires that nothing human shall be intermixed with the divine? This question being decided, the aid derived from psychology is, as before, acknowledged.

A third question is then briefly referred to, viz., on the supposition that Christianity is of God, and that the Divine communication which constitutes its basis is put on record by men inspired to the extent required by the preceding argument, what evidence would be necessary to prove that they had not exceeded their commission?

These three questions having been discussed, it is shown that the writers of the apostolic books were inspired, and that their inspiration extended as far as the preceding argument requires. The question of their verbal inspiration is noticed, and the division of inspiration into mechanical and dynamical criticised.

The conclusions with regard to the inspiration of the apostolic books of the New Testament, which the preceding reasoning warrants, having been stated, and a reference made to the non-apostolic books, the following objections to the theory of inspiration advocated in this lecture are answered,—that there are mistakes in the teaching of the apostles,—that the theory involves the Divine origin of a defective morality,—that an authoritative revelation of moral and spiritual truth is impossible,—that the theory exalts the letter above the spirit,—that it gives a low view of the spiritual and moral value of inspiration,—and that it does not account for the necessity of the influence of the Spirit in order to understand the word.]

IN the present lecture, we shall assume what is established by evidence the validity of which we have already investigated, viz., that Jesus Christ was a Divine messenger, and that the religion taught by him and his immediate disciples is of Divine origin. Accordingly, in commencing what is next to occupy our attention—an investigation into the inspiration and authority of the books written by the disciples of Christ,—we do not inquire whether they are the books of a true or of a false religion, but whether, on the assumption that they are the books of a true religion, they give us an inspired or an uninspired representation of it; and if inspired, whether with or without any admixture of what is merely human.

Here I shall not enter into any discussion of the question, whether we have sufficient historical evidence that the books which now compose the New Testament were written by the men whose names they bear, and have suffered no material alteration or corruption. This

question has been repeatedly and thoroughly investigated, and, so far as most of the books are concerned, is, as it seems to me, satisfactorily settled.* My present argument will, any way, assume that this is the case, and, hence, will only appeal to those who are prepared to grant that it is.

It will be remembered that we have already proved the *à priori* possibility of a communication being made by God through the medium of a book. We have therefore now no need to show, that it is possible for a book to have been written by Divine inspiration. But we may ask, and to this question we will first attend, whether *à priori* argument will not go further than this, —whether it may not be shown *à priori*, not merely that it is *possible*, but on the supposition that Christianity is of God, *probable*, that a book recording its fundamental facts and doctrines should be written by inspiration, and, I may add, by such an inspiration as will render it, in every important point of view, infallible and authoritative.

There can be no question but that, if Christianity is of God, it was intended, not simply for those who lived in Judea in the days of Christ and heard his words, but for mankind of all nations and of all ages. If, therefore, God saw sufficient reason to make such a revelation, such reason would suffice to lead him to provide the means essentially requisite to render it available to mankind at large. We cannot suppose it possible that God would interpose to make a supernatural communication needed by, and intended for

* A brief summary of this evidence may be found in "A Lecture on the Historic Evidence, &c., of the Books of the New Testament," by Dr. Tregelles. Published by Bagster and Son.

the world, and yet make it in such a way as necessarily to shut the world out of it. Now a supernatural communication may be of two kinds : it may relate to what is in its own nature true, to what therefore may be valuable, whether there be any external evidence of its truth or not ; or it may relate to what owes its truth to contingency, and therefore its whole value to the testimony of a Being whose knowledge reaches the contingency : and in the former case, that is, if it relate to what is *in its own nature* true, the truth may be either so far within the sphere of the human intellect as to be self-evident as soon as presented to it, or it may be so far beyond it as to require as much external evidence as if it had owed its truth entirely to a contingency external to itself. Now, suppose it to refer to a truth which only needs to be presented to man in order to his perceiving that it is, and must be, truth, it would be equally valuable whether known to be from God or not, for its value is wholly of itself, and is altogether independent of external evidence ; but if, on the other hand, it refer to a truth which is either not sufficiently self-evident to man to be immediately known to be truth, or which owes its truth to a contingency known only to God, the knowledge of its truth, and therefore its value to us, is entirely dependent on its being known to be divinely revealed.

Accordingly, it depends on the question whether the truths of Christianity are of the former or of the latter class, what kind of a provision is requisite in order to render a supernatural communication of them available to the human race. If they are all of the former class, it would not necessarily be essential to the value of the communication that it should be known to come from God, and hence a sufficient provision for their efficient

communication to man would be made if it was simply provided for their presentation to his mind. But if any of the truths of Christianity are of the latter class, it is evident that, inasmuch as the communication of them would be of no value except it was known to be from God, no provision for its dissemination could possibly be sufficient which would exclude the means of ascertaining whether the truths disseminated were of God or not.

Does, then, Christianity, or does it not, include truths of the latter class, truths which either are so far beyond us as to need superhuman evidence to satisfy us that they are truths, or which owe their truth and value solely to a contingency which cannot be known except by revelation to any creature? It cannot, I think, require any lengthened discussion to come to a satisfactory conclusion on this point. There can be no question but that Christianity reveals the truth, 'that Christ is a Divine Messenger:' but this is a proposition which owes its truth to a contingency dependent on the Divine will, and therefore only known to God; consequently, no presentation of the truth to our minds would be available to us, except it was accompanied with evidence to the divinity of its origin. Christianity also testifies to the way whereby we may obtain the forgiveness of sins, and deliverance from the wrath to which they have subjected us; but, since this is not a way by which these blessings are naturally attainable, the truth and value of the testimony altogether depend on its Divine origin being known. Christianity tells us, too, of a future resurrection from the dead, and of a better state of existence than the present as prepared for all who are pardoned and redeemed; but these are points in reference to which it depends for its truth

and value on the authority of God. Hence, no provision for the dissemination of the truths of Christianity could render them available to man, if it did not include, in addition to what might be possibly sufficient for the mere presentation of them to his mind, everything essentially necessary to their being known to be of God.

From these considerations we infer the *à priori* probability of an authoritative record of the Christian Revelation. For if Christianity is to be made known to men who have not received it directly from heaven, it must be communicated to them either by inspired men, or through the medium of uninspired men. If it be communicated through the medium of uninspired men, it would be impossible for the communication to be known to be of God, for whatever evidence there might be of the Divine origin of the original communication, there could be no evidence that the men through whom it had been handed down had not misunderstood it, or had not at least so mixed up the subjective with the objective, as to give a distorted representation of it. If Christianity had simply included truths which carried their own evidence with them, internal evidence might have enabled those to whom it was communicated to separate the true from the false; but if it includes, as we have shown it to do, truths the evidence and value of which depend entirely on the testimony of God, internal evidence would not suffice to render the communication credible and authoritative. Nay, even if a communication only included truths which carried their own evidence with them, internal evidence would scarcely be sufficient, if it was involved in so much obscurity and uncertainty as to leave the

mind unsatisfied or doubtful till it was confirmed by some adequate external authority; even then, if this had been the case with Christianity, even if it had revealed no truths but what by diligent examination might be discovered to be probable, the advantage would not be equally great if communicated in such a way as to make their whole value dependent on the perception of obscure internal evidence, as if they had been communicated in a way which sealed them with the authority of God. This might be said, even if the communication handed to us by uninspired men was given in all its fulness and integrity; for what is wanted, in the case supposed, is not merely the communication, but an authority which will render its truth unquestionable: the argument is however rendered stronger by the consideration that the natural probability is that uninspired men would not give us their own ideas of a Divine communication without giving a false colouring to some part or parts, if not to the whole communication. Accordingly we believe it to be *à priori* probable that God would provide for the communication of Christianity to mankind by inspired rather than by uninspired men; and let me remark that the same reasoning requires their inspiration to be of such a nature as to render their communication authoritative, the inspiration being, as we have seen, required, not simply that the truth may be correctly communicated, but to warrant our faith in it.

What, then, is the inspiration requisite for this purpose? It will be remembered that I have explained inspiration as including, not merely what is called the inspiration of elevation, or a supernatural elevation of the powers of the mind for perceiving objective truth;

but also a direct supernatural communication of truth to the mind. In the case before us, the inspiration must evidently be of the latter kind, because the former would not give the authority of God to the communication. Suppose the party through whom a Divine communication is made to us to have only the inspiration of elevation,—or that inspiration which merely elevates the natural powers, and gives them supernatural though not infallible strength,—it might enable him to discover truths which he could not otherwise have known, but it could not invest his discoveries with Divine authority.

If, however, it be thus *à priori* probable that God would provide for the communication of Christianity to mankind by men so inspired as to render their communication authoritative, we have evidently, *à priori*, reason to anticipate that he will either raise up a succession of men thus inspired to whom he will assign the work of making Christianity known to their fellow men, or that he will, at the first introduction of Christianity, commission men, not only by inspired oral teaching, to make it authoritatively known to the men of their own age, but by means of inspired records to do this to succeeding generations. If so, our argument has brought us to the conclusion, either that we must have men raised up for each succeeding age sufficiently inspired to give Divine authority to everything they teach respecting Christianity, or that we must have a book written by an inspiration of a kind that will suffice to render it authoritative. The question then arises, which course is, *à priori*, the most probable? Is it more likely that God would raise up a succession of supernaturally inspired men, or that a

book would be written by an inspiration of the kind referred to. In answering this question, it must be remembered that, whichever course is adopted, it is necessary, in order that the end may be answered, not only that the inspiration spoken of be granted, but that it should be accompanied with some sufficient sign to justify the belief of mankind that this was the case, seeing that nothing short of this could give to them sufficient evidence of Divine authority: accordingly, if a succession of supernaturally inspired men is raised up, there must be a succession of supernatural signs. If so, it can scarcely be a question whether, since in the one case supernatural signs will be required *simply* for evidencing the inspiration of the first teachers of Christianity, whilst in the other a *continued succession* of supernatural signs is required, it be *à priori* probable that God would choose the former course, or the latter,—for such a continued interference with the laws of nature, as would be implied in the latter, we cannot suppose would be adopted for a purpose that could be equally well accomplished without it. Hence we think that it is, *à priori*, to be expected that such a book as the New Testament would be written by such a Divine inspiration as would render it an authoritative exponent of Christianity.

The preceding argument evidently rests on the position that Christianity reveals truths to man the reception and value of which must depend on their Divine authority. We think that we have established this position. There are, however, parties who either openly deny it, or undermine it by maintaining that the revelation of these truths is a mere secondary object, and, therefore, that their reception is a matter of subordinate

importance. They hold that the grand object of Christianity is to awaken the religious life, and that it does this by simply awakening the *intuitional consciousness* to perceive truths which, without any supernatural revelation, are accessible to man as soon as such awakening takes place, and they hence believe that this object is accomplished, or may be accomplished, independently of the reception of any truths which derive their value from external authority.

Now, I do not deny that the grand end of Christianity is the communication to man of a new, spiritual, and heavenly life : its object is to make man "a new creature ;" to "raise him from a death in sin to a life of righteousness ;" so to elevate him, in a spiritual and moral point of view, as to fit him for far higher service and for far nobler enjoyments. Nor do I deny that when this object is effected his powers for apprehending truth will be enlarged and strengthened ; the prejudices which are owing to depravity, and which weakened his mental vision, will be removed, and the love of truth, so necessary to impart that interest to it which alone will sufficiently excite the attention and rouse the mental energies, will take hold of the mind. But, whilst I admit all this, I do not believe that the end is effected by awakening the intuitional consciousness, nor that it is accomplished independently of the reception of those truths whose Divine source external evidence must vouch for. I have already stated reasons why I disbelieve in the existence of the intuitional consciousness referred to ; if those reasons are satisfactory, we need say nothing further in opposition to the theory that Christianity accomplishes its end by awakening that consciousness. Even, however, if the theory were true, let me ask how Christianity

could awaken the intuitional consciousness, except by presenting facts and doctrines to the eye of the mind, which, however effective they might be if believed, must be utterly inoperative if unaccompanied with faith? If it be said that the facts and doctrines necessary to be believed are such as require no evidence of their supernatural origin, I answer that, so far from there being any proof that this is the case, we have the testimony of Christ and of his first disciples to the contrary, for they explicitly tell us that *belief in Christ* is essential to our receiving any benefit from Christianity; and I need not say that "to believe in Christ" involves the belief of a doctrine which has neither credibility nor value if there be no evidence of its Divine origin. Besides, if there are, as we have shown, other truths communicated by Christianity, which derive their evidence and value from the authority of God, these truths are either revealed for some important end or not; we cannot however believe that they are revealed without an adequate end, because such a belief would impugn the Divine wisdom; but if they are revealed for an adequate end, what end can we imagine but the accomplishment of the grand object which Christianity has in view? Whilst then we believe that it is the object of Christianity to communicate a new life, we believe that even if man had the intuitional consciousness spoken of, it could only awaken it by means of certain objective truths which, for this purpose, it could only reveal on evidence investing them with the authority of God. If it be said that the intuitional consciousness may be awakened independently of such truths by moving the affections, I ask whether the affections can be moved except through the understanding? and if not, whether

the truths which owe their credibility and value to Divine authority may not be the means of moving them? Even then, if the intuitional consciousness contended for had to be awakened, I know not how it is to be done, except by the instrumentality, direct or indirect, of the objective truths of which I have spoken. It could not however be by their direct instrumentality, because they are in their nature incapable of being presented *immediately* to the intuition, being only mediately communicable to the mind; and hence on the supposition that Christianity awakens the intuitional consciousness, there not only does not seem any possibility of its doing this but through the medium of truths depending for their credibility on evidence that their origin is Divine, but it is impossible for it to accomplish this end except by a mediate communication of them.

My argument in favour of such inspiration of the New Testament as will render it authoritative to man, has been simply *à priori*, and to such an argument psychology will be found to be of the greatest service. It is psychology which must decide the question whether we have any intuitional powers which refer to the metaphenomenal. Supposing that we have, it is psychology which must decide the question whether Christianity could awaken them in any other way than by the communication of truth to the understanding, for if not, and if it must therefore be supposed to accomplish this object by means of truths which can only be received on external authority, we cannot suppose such truths to be unimportant to us. If it should be supposed possible for Christianity to awaken our intuitional powers by merely moving our affections, psychology will still be necessary both to decide whether the moving of

the affections will awaken the intuitional consciousness, and if it will, whether it is possible to move the affections except through the understanding.

Nor is psychology less necessary, if we are, as we believe, destitute of the higher power of intuition : for it is necessary then to a scientific explanation of the moral and spiritual life which is the grand end of Christianity : it is necessary to show how this end may be produced by means of its facts and doctrines : it is necessary to indicate how far it is important to the production of the end that the facts and doctrines should be communicated to us in their integrity and free from all intermixture of error, and how far it is important for the same purpose that they should be authoritatively communicated—that is, communicated in such a way as to be evidenced to be from God.

This *à priori* argument in favour of what has been called a book-revelation, appears to me to be a very important one. We have not however done with it ; for the question now arises, how far this argument extends ? If it proves that a book-revelation may be expected, which shall be characterized by such external signs of the divinity of its origin as shall render it authoritative to man, we ask further whether this involves either that this book-revelation must be verbally inspired, and contain nothing but what has been received by inspiration ; or supposing it may contain something not so received, what is the extent to which it must exclude the human ? In discussing these points it must be borne in mind that we have here only to do with *à priori* argument. We do not look at the New Testament, and ask whether there is any evidence either of the presence or absence of verbal inspiration, or whe-

ther there is evidence or not of any intermixture of the human; but without looking at the New Testament at all, we inquire whether the *à priori* argument which has, as we have seen, led us to anticipate that such a book would be written by Divine inspiration, decides how it would probably be written in reference to the points referred to.

I have, in a former lecture,* had occasion to refer to the distinction which has been made by many psychologists between the matter and the form of thought. I have shown that, taking their own ground for the distinction, part of that which is called "form" ought to be included in the "matter," and that, independently of this, the distinction does not warrant the theory that the form of thought is necessarily excluded from the subject-matter of a Divine Revelation. I propose now to use the terms in a different application, not as *simply* referrible to thought, but as referring to thought in distinction from the verbal exposition of it.

As referred simply to thought, permit me to say that I, not only for the reasons already given, object to the *exclusive* application of the term "matter," to the ideas we derive from the objective by means of other intuitional powers than judgment, but also because the phraseology has a tendency to convey the notion that other ideas of objects are of greater value than those which have respect to their actual and possible relations to each other. Calling the former *material* and the latter *form*, it naturally leads to the supposition that the latter have no substance, no reality, and are therefore comparatively unimportant, whereas the truth is, that there is perhaps no objective existence which does not derive its chief im-

* Lecture Fifth.

portance and value as an object of knowledge from the relations in which its different parts stand to each other, or in which the whole stands to other objective existence. Bare material, if by material is to be understood the ideas we have of objects *considered simply as wholes and independently of the relations existing between their parts, or between them and other objects*, would be utterly worthless as objects of thought; they would, as to their value to the mind, be really mere form; whilst, on the other hand, the composition of the material, and the relations it sustained, would be, as objects of thought, of substantial worth.

Moreover, if the theory was granted that 'form' could not possibly be the subject-matter of a revelation, it would follow that, if 'form' is (as asserted) essential to every intuitional idea, there could not possibly be an uncorrupted revelation. If all our intuitional ideas are derived partly from the objective, and partly from the subjective, and if so far as they are derived from the objective they are material, whilst the part derived from the subjective is form,—how, I ask, are we to ascertain what is the part derived from the objective, and what is the part derived from the subjective? The terms *material* and *form*, as thus applied to thought, assume the existence of an analogy between thought and objects composed of a material substance put by nature or art into a certain form. In statuary, for example, as there must be the substance of which a statue is made and the putting of that substance into its proper form, the substance is evidently one thing, the form another; from the same substance as material the artist may make different forms,—the form of a man,—that of an inferior animal,—or any other form. Now, as he

cannot create the material, but can give what form he pleases to it, it has been supposed that it is so with thought, that there is material to be gained from without, just as the artist spoken of has to gain his material from without, but that the form is attainable from within, just as the framer of a statue gives whatever form his mind may suggest. But are not such material analogies in danger of leading us astray when applied to mental operations? There is, in any material figure, an essential difference between material and form, whether an artist has given form to the material or not; but in a thought the supposed difference between material and form is not necessarily in the thing itself, but may be merely in the origin of the thing,—that being called *material* which owes its origin simply to the objective, and that *form* which owes its origin to subjective processes; accordingly, the very same element in an idea may be possibly either material or form; the question does not depend, as in statuary, on the nature of the element, but on the source to which the mind is indebted for it. Thus, whilst there cannot possibly in the case of a material image, be any difficulty in deciding whether anything relating to it relates to its material or its form, how is this to be decided in the case of an intuitional idea? We receive every such idea, it is said, partly from the subjective, and partly from the objective; by the hypothesis, then, our intuition would not of itself enable us to distinguish between the two, because, if it did, we should have not only one intuitional idea derived from the union of the two sources, but another—a purely intuitional idea derived merely from the objective; and hence the doctrine would be overturned that *all* our

intuitional ideas are derived partly from the subjective, or that they all have form as well as matter. And if our intuition would not enable us to distinguish, what other power have we which would supply its deficiency? I receive an idea, X Y, by means of intuition; X, we will say, is from the external object, and Y is a form imparted by the mind to the view which it intuitionally takes of the object—a form, without which such view would be impossible to it; and it follows that I cannot possibly conceive of X except as X Y; it must, then, in the very nature of the thing, be impossible for me to distinguish between X and Y. Kant, indeed, has professed to solve the problem; he has told us that, as the form must be *necessary* to the idea, *that* in the idea which is *universal and necessary* is to be considered form, and the remainder matter: but, let me ask, if I find something necessary to *my idea* of objective existence, how am I to know that it is *simply* necessary to my idea of it; or, that the reason why it is necessary to my idea of it does not arise from its necessity to the objective existence of the material? If the latter, it must be an essential part of the material, and, accordingly, *that* in the idea which is necessary to it, would be derived from the same source from which the idea itself was derived.

Besides, even if we suppose the preceding reasoning to have no force, we shall come to the same conclusion if the foundation of the distinction between the matter and the form of thought is, that the one is derived *wholly* from the objective, and the other *wholly* from the subjective, for what element of thought is there which can be called either bare material or bare form? What is there which can be said to be pure material of

thought because it simply relates to that part of it which owes its existence to an objective presentation, when, by hypothesis, there is no objective presentation which could possibly give any element of thought whatever, without a colouring produced by the mind in grasping such presentation, and, therefore, any element of thought which is derived *wholly* from the objective? and, on the other hand, what can be said to be pure form of thought because it simply relates to that part of the thought which is known to owe its existence to a previous subjective process, when it cannot be denied that such subjective process implies previous intuitions, to which, in fact, it owes its existence, and when therefore there is no element of thought which can be pronounced as owing *wholly* to the subjective?

Leaving, however, this distinction between material and form as foreign to our present topic, there can be no doubt that a distinction exists between matter and form in reference to the verbal expression of thought: for if we express our thoughts by means of language, there must be both certain thoughts, and the arbitrary signs or symbols by which they are expressed, and here are plainly two things essentially distinct—one, the thought which is expressed, and the other, the language in which it is expressed. In such a case there can be no controversy that one is matter and the other mere form. If the first were supposed to exist without the second, it would comprehend the whole thing; the second would add nothing whatever to it. But if the second were to exist without the first, it would be utterly worthless, it would express nothing.

Now, if we take the substance of thought as 'matter,' and the verbal expression of it as 'form,' seeing that

the matter of thought is of different species, so will it also be with the form. We may, for example, think of things in themselves and independently of all their relations, and here the verbal expression will be simply proper names. Or we may think of them as individuals of a certain class, and here the verbal expression will be common names. We may immediately perceive certain relations existing between things, and here the verbal expression will be propositions. Or we may mediate, by the exercise of our reasoning faculties, perceive relations, and here the verbal expression will be arguments. Accordingly, under form we do not merely include the verbal signs by which things or their relations are denoted, but those outward forms of argumentation which, as a logical language, symbolize those processes of thought by which the mind draws conclusions. A process of thought by which the mind reasons, is one thing, and the outward form of argumentation by which the process is expressed, is another and a different thing; the former is the *substance*, the latter the *form*.

Taking, then, the terms '*material*' and '*form*' in these applications to verbal expressions of thought, let us inquire whether the *à priori* argument in favour of a book-revelation has simply reference to the thought, or whether it also refers to the language in which it is expressed? Here let me, first, remark in reference to the two things, *thought* and *language*, that the former is independent of the latter. That our thoughts are independent of any *particular* words in which they may be expressed, must be admitted by every one, for we all know that the same thought may be expressed in different words. But I believe thought to be independent, not simply of any *particular* words, but of *all* words, or

that we can think of things without the use of any sign or symbol at all by which they may be designated. If this be correct, and I think that experience confirms it, let it be remembered that the remark applies, not merely to single words and propositions, but to the verbal expressions of those processes of thought by which we mediate perceive relations between different things. Such processes of thought may exist without any form which symbolizes the process; much more may they exist independently of any one particular form.

But if the two things co-existing in a verbal expression or exposition of thought are thus distinct, and if, in every case, the thought may exist independently of the form, it must be possible for a revelation to be made by God to the mind independently of language; for we have already seen that there is no limit to the power of God to communicate, except the limit of power on the part of the mind to receive. So far, then, as the party himself to whom a revelation is immediately made is concerned, there is no need of language. If it be needed at all, it can only be either to enable him to make an *uncorrupted* communication of the revelation to others, or for giving *authority* to the communication. Is it, then, necessary for either of these purposes?

Is it necessary, we ask first, to enable him to make an uncorrupted communication of the revelation? Language, it must be allowed, is in its own nature imperfect, and hence it is *necessarily* an imperfect medium for the communication of thought. This arises from the imperfection of human nature: many of our ideas are imperfect, and these, of course, can only be imperfectly expressed; besides, language cannot, in consequence of the limit to our powers of communi-

cation, express all our intellectual ideas, except by analogies, which are in their own nature imperfect; consequently, it would be impossible for any language whatever to be a perfect medium of communication to man. When, then, we inquire whether a revelation must communicate language as well as thought, in order to enable a party to disseminate it uncorruptedly, we do not use the word '*uncorruptedly*' as meaning '*with absolute perfection*,' because this no language, not even one given by revelation, could do, except the constitution of man was altered; all, therefore, that we can possibly mean is, '*without any such imperfection as shall convey (where there is no wilful inattention or perversion) not merely a less full and less perfect but a different idea from that which came from God.*' If it do not convey the full idea, yet if it convey it with sufficient fulness to answer the end of the revelation, the idea cannot be said to be corrupted. Even if it do not convey the idea without the possibility of misapprehension and mistake, yet if it so convey it that any important misapprehension may by attention be avoided or corrected, the idea cannot be said to be corrupted.

Now, that man is able to communicate the thoughts he receives from God, provided they be communicable at all by language, both with sufficient fulness to make them *substantially* known to others, and with sufficient clearness to render other than *wilful* misapprehension avoidable, cannot be any more a matter of doubt than that he can so communicate *his own* thoughts. To deny that he could thus communicate his own thoughts, would be to deny him the power of language; but if God make a communication to his mind, and give him thoroughly to understand it, it becomes really his

own thought, and he can do with it just as he can do with any other thought. Accordingly, there is no *à priori* necessity for God to make a supernatural revelation to man by means of language, *in order to enable him to communicate it to others uncorruptedly*. If the supernatural revelation be of a nature incommunicable by language, it could not be so communicated by God; and if it be not, man, even though he received it independently of language, would be able to communicate it.

We proceed, then, to ask, secondly, whether there is any *à priori* necessity for God to make the revelation by means of language in order to give *authority* to the verbal communication of it by the prophet? We have seen that the *à priori* evidence in favour of a book-revelation requires, not only that it shall give the pure truth which God has revealed, but shall so give it that it shall be known to be God's truth, and, therefore, authoritative; the question consequently arises whether it is necessary for the accomplishment of this object that the words as well as the thoughts be supernaturally given to the writer? It may be said, in support of an affirmative reply, that if the language is not given, we could have no security, even though the party was able to communicate what he received without any false colouring, that he would do so. To this I reply, that the evidence by which God authenticated him as his messenger, whatever it was, must be understood as also authenticating his honesty in delivering the message; or even though he had the language given him, we should have no security that the words which he spoke were the same words which God had spoken to him: but if the evidence must be so understood we should have security that if he had the power to convey

a Divine message, without any colouring of his own, he would honestly use his power. Hence it appears to me that a written record could be known to contain the pure truth of God, (that is, as purely as the imperfect nature of language would allow,) and, therefore, could be justly esteemed authoritative, even if the language was that of the person whom God made the medium of his revelation. If so, there is no *à priori* argument in favour of a *verbal inspiration*, that is, of an inspiration which has reference to the form as well as to the matter of a Divine revelation. Accordingly, although we have reason, *à priori*, to expect that if Christianity be true, there would be a divinely inspired record of its revelations, we have no such reason to expect any superhuman characteristic in the language; no *à priori* reason, then, to anticipate that there would be any superiority of style to that ordinarily used by the writer, or even that the language would be more free from grammatical error than the education and circumstances of the writer had qualified him to make it; neither should we have any reason to expect superhuman characteristics in the form of the reasoning, —or that because arguments were supernaturally suggested, they would be expressed in a form more technically perfect than the writer would employ in stating any other arguments.

A priori evidence leads us, therefore, to anticipate not merely a divinely inspired record, but that the language may possibly be the man's own, seeing that if the substance is given the man is not only competent to frame a dress which will not materially alter or distort it, but may be known to have used his power honestly.

I must, however, add, to prevent any misunderstanding-

ing of the result of these investigations, that our *à priori* argument does not prove that the form *must be human*; it does not afford the shadow of an evidence that God could not make communications to man by means of language, if he pleased to do so; it does not then afford the shadow of an evidence that verbal inspiration is impossible. All that it shows us is, that so far as we can *à priori* judge of the need of a revelation, and of a book-revelation, verbal inspiration does not appear to be necessary.

But there still remains another question in reference to the extent of our *à priori* argument. Does it prove that if there be a book-revelation, there must be nothing whatever in the book but what forms a part of the revelation? Here I must remind you, as before, that we have at present nothing to do with *à posteriori* evidence. We do not here ask whether there is evidence, either external or internal, that the New Testament does or does not contain anything but what the writers received by direct inspiration; but we ask, *without looking at the New Testament at all*, whether the *à priori* evidence, which leads us to expect a book which will contain what is recognizably divine and therefore authoritative, requires that the book shall contain nothing else—nothing but what is divine.

Now, if its containing anything else would lead us to confound the human and the divine, if it would lead us, *without any fault on our part*, either to attribute that to man which was attributable to God, or to attribute that to God which was attributable to man, it would have the effect either of adding to, and therefore corrupting a revelation which God had sent us, or, by leaving us in uncertainty as to what he had actually sent, of prevent-

ing our recognizing its divinity and consequent authority. But *à priori* evidence leads us to believe that neither of these effects would be permitted *in connexion with a divinely attested record of a supernatural revelation*; the very same evidence which leads us to anticipate a record at all, forbids us to believe it possible that if a record is given, its utility would be thus, in part at least, if not wholly, destroyed. Is it not, however, possible for a book, which contains a revelation, so clearly to distinguish between the human and the divine, that neither of the effects of which I have spoken would be produced by the intermixture? Such a book would evidently not be affected by the preceding argument. Suppose, for example, that the evidence of the inspiration of an individual had indisputable reference, not to his being inspired on every subject within the range of his possible knowledge, but simply in reference to the facts, doctrines and precepts of Christianity; and suppose he were to give a lecture on astronomy and another on Christianity, there could be no question that the evidence of his inspiration would render one of these lectures authoritative, whilst it would not at all affect the other: nor would the fact of his speaking on a subject in reference to which he had no inspiration, as well as on one where he had inspiration, lead any astray who had paid attention to the evidence by which his inspiration was proved. They could have no difficulty in distinguishing the divine lecture from the human, because the evidence of his inspiration, seeing that it was restrictive, would distinguish it for them. In like manner, if such an individual wrote a letter to distant parties, in which he intermixed scientific and christian instruction; after giving the parties to whom he wrote evidence that he was inspired of God to

give the christian instruction, whilst he made no pretensions to be inspired in reference to science, the fact of his intermingling divine and human teaching in the same letter would not, if they paid any regard to his pretensions to inspiration, and to the evidence by which such pretensions were supported, endanger their confounding the human and the divine. The *à priori* evidence, therefore, which leads us to expect that if Christianity be of God there will be an authoritative record of the revelation, does not *necessarily* require that the record shall contain nothing human, except there be no evident criterion for distinguishing between the human and the divine.

I have already shown the use of psychology in enabling us to decide the *à priori* evidence that there would be a book-revelation in connexion with the introduction of Christianity, and is not psychology of equal service in deciding the extent of this *à priori* argument? We cannot without psychological research understand the question relative to the distinction between the material and the form of thought in the application of these terms simply to thought, and hence shall not *so clearly* understand their application to the expression of thought, nor so thoroughly perceive in this application the independence of the material on the form.

But taking for granted that we have satisfactorily shown that, if Christianity be of God, we have reason to expect an inspired and authoritative record of the revelation, and that we have also shown how far this *à priori* argument extends, we proceed to ask what evidence would be required to attest such a record. Would any other evidence be necessary than what is sufficient to prove that the writers were inspired men and to indicate the nature and extent of their inspiration?

Supposing that we had this evidence, we should unquestionably know not only that the writers had received a Divine revelation which they were commissioned to communicate to us, but also how far, when they either spoke or wrote, their words or writing had reference to the matter to which their inspiration related, and hence, how far their communication was authoritative. If we wanted more evidence than this, it could only be to satisfy us that, when speaking or writing on matters on which they had a revelation from God, they did not exceed their commission, and add their own inferences and conjectures to what God had revealed. This additional evidence we should have, I conceive, if, either as a part of the evidence already alluded to, or superadded to it, the parties were manifestly endowed with *continued* supernatural powers; for the continuance of such powers would be plainly an attestation of God, not only to their continued inspiration, but that they had not so abused their commission as to corrupt a revelation which God had given them.

All this evidence we have in favour of the inspiration of the greater part of the New Testament. The whole of the New Testament, with the exception of Mark, Luke, and the Acts of the Apostles, was written by the apostles; and that these apostles, on the supposition of the truth of Christianity, were inspired men, is proved by considerations which cannot fail to be satisfactory to the candid mind.

It is proved by the promise of Christ, for we cannot believe Christianity to be true without believing the apostles to be honest men, and, if their own testimony is credible, they had from their Master the special promise of the Holy Ghost "to take of the things of

Christ and to show them unto them," "to guide them into all truth, and to show them things to come."

Their inspiration is further proved by the miraculous powers with which they were invested: we have evidence not only that they possessed miraculous powers, but that these powers attested their inspiration; for if those who are endowed with such powers may be *à priori* expected to know for what purpose they are so endowed, we may believe the apostles when in their own case they declare that purpose, and especially if, 1st, the declaration is in accordance with what *à priori* reasoning had led us to anticipate, and if, 2nd, the declared purpose is the only one which would satisfactorily account for their possession of supernatural powers. If so, we have full evidence that in the extraordinary powers conferred upon them, God bare witness to their testimony "both with signs and wonders, with divers miracles, and with gifts of the Holy Ghost according to his own will."

Their inspiration is also proved by their assertion of their own inspiration, and that of each other, for, if miraculously endowed men are to be believed when they directly tell us why they were endowed with miraculous powers, their testimony must also be worthy of credit when they tell us of their own or of each other's inspiration, this being itself an *indirect* testimony to the object for which they had received supernatural gifts, and their indirect testimony on this point would be credible for the same reason as their more direct testimony. Hence, that Paul was an inspired man is proved by the claim which he made to inspiration when he tells us of the gospel he preached, that he "neither received it of man, nor was taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ": in like manner, when he asserts in reference to some of his

statements, that 'he received of the Lord what he delivered,'—and when, in other parts of his writings, he either affirms or implies the reception of a communication from heaven. It is equally proved by the testimony of Peter in the chapter where he places the writings of Paul in the same category with those Old Testament writings, of which he elsewhere had said, that "holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." And that all the apostles were thus inspired is proved from the explicit testimony of Paul in reference to the apostles generally and to the prophets, where he speaks of what "was revealed unto the holy apostles and prophets," and also where he represents the church as "built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner stone": and likewise by the testimony of Peter, in the passage where he enforces the commandments of the apostles as of co-ordinate authority with the words of the ancient prophets (2 Peter iii. 2).

And whilst we thus have evidence of the inspiration of the apostolic writers of the New Testament, we have also proof of the nature and extent of their inspiration. We have proof that it was not simply an inspiration of elevation, because, to take one example, no such inspiration could have revealed to Paul (what he explicitly tells us he received from the Lord) the detail of the first institution of the Lord's Supper: an inspiration which could reveal such a detail must have been something more than the miraculous strengthening of a natural power to grasp truth; it might exist if no natural power was strengthened at all, but it could not exist without that direct communication of truth, which no natural power, however strengthened, could have discovered:

nor was it possible that, in the case referred to, the truth should be communicated by some new presentation to the intuitional faculty, for though we could conceive of its communication by means of a vision of the actual circumstances, a vision would not be an objective presentation to the higher intuition (supposing such a power to exist), but be made either subjectively, or if objectively, only to the eye of sense.

There are other instances in which the communication must have been made without any objective presentation to the faculty of intuition. Amongst these I may mention the declaration of Paul to the Corinthians, that he "delivered unto them, first of all, that which he also received, that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures," for we must be quite sure, that as mere intuition could not, however elevated, discover a reason for a thing which did not necessarily arise from its own nature, no presentation of the fact of Christ's death to the intuitive faculty could possibly, of itself, enable the mind to perceive why he died. If it be said, in reply, that Paul might simply mean that he had received this from man, I reply that if so, the question would arise, *whence man had received it*, though that he did not receive it from man is evident from his own statement, that he did not receive the gospel he preached except by revelation of Jesus Christ. Should it be supposed that his intuitional faculty might possibly be so elevated as to perceive the meaning of those Old Testament Scriptures which predicted the death of Christ for our sins, and thus his inspiration be simply an inspiration of elevation,—I reply, that even if this was supposed possible, what the Old Testament Scriptures predicted must then have been received otherwise than

by intuition. There is, therefore, positive evidence that parts of the revelation recorded in Scripture were not made to the intuitive faculty, and, hence, that the inspiration of the sacred writers involved something more than a mere elevation of that faculty.

We have also evidence as to the *extent* as well as to the *nature* of apostolic inspiration. Inspiration may be supposed partial or complete. There are two senses in which it may be partial; one by being limited to particular objects of knowledge, the other by the knowledge communicated in reference to any object being only imperfect. In neither of these senses can man possibly have more than partial inspiration, for inspiration must necessarily be limited by man's capacity to receive knowledge, and it is impossible that creature capacity, seeing that it is, in its own nature, finite, should either extend to all possible objects of knowledge, or to all possible knowledge in reference to any one object. Accordingly, perfect inspiration has never been given in this world to any man, not even to the man Christ Jesus; * for though his inspiration, *as man*, was so far beyond the inspiration of all other men, that it is written of him, in distinction from every prophet besides, that "the Father gave not the Spirit by measure unto him," yet we have his own testimony that there were truths to which it did not extend; thus he says of the precise time appointed for his second coming, "Of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, *neither the Son*, but the Father."

* We here speak simply of the human nature of Christ. It was only as man that he was inspired. As God he needed no inspiration.

If *his* inspiration was limited, how much more the inspiration of those who could not claim to be the only begotten of the Father, and who were not endowed with the pre-eminence assigned to him !

That the inspiration of the apostles was limited to subjects connected with Christ and his gospel, I had occasion to show in a preceding lecture. Such limitation is evident from these facts,—first, that their commission simply extended to bearing witness to Christ and to preaching his gospel ; secondly, that all the miracles they wrought were wrought in his name, thus indicating that the first and chief object for which they were wrought was to bear testimony to him as the Christ ; and, thirdly, that whenever any claim is made by the apostles to inspiration, it is only to inspiration in reference to Christ and to his gospel. Paul received, he tells us, “ *the gospel* ” by the revelation of Jesus Christ, but he does not profess to have received anything else *by revelation*,—anything which was irrespective of the gospel.

Nor are we to suppose that the apostles had full inspiration even in regard to the gospel ; God communicated to them as much knowledge as he saw it good for mankind to receive through their instrumentality, but he did not communicate to them all that was to be known ; thus, Paul, speaking of himself and other inspired men, writes, “ We know in part, and we prophesy in part,” and in another place, “ Now we see through a glass, darkly.” Nay, what knowledge was communicated to them by revelation was not all communicated at once : their minds were gradually prepared to receive more light, and it was when they were so prepared that the additional light was given. There had been a progressive development of truth under the former economy ;

and, as inspiration was continued as long as the apostles lived, there seems to have been a progressive development of the truth till the last book of the inspired volume was completed.

This, if I may digress for a moment, may explain the reason why the discourses of Christ do not contain the full exposition of Christianity which we find in the epistles of his disciples: it can not arise from any possession by the apostles of more light than their Master; he had full light from the beginning; but in the days of his ministry, his followers were not prepared to receive the fuller light which was afterwards to be vouchsafed. Hence Christ told them that he had many things to say unto them, but that they were not yet able to bear them, and therefore that he should leave these things to be communicated to them by the Spirit of truth.

Whilst, however, the knowledge communicated to the New Testament writers by inspiration, even in reference to the gospel, was not complete—whilst one truth was revealed after another, which added to their light, and whilst much is probably still left to be revealed,—their knowledge, as soon as they received the Spirit by which they were inspired, was perfect as far as it went, that is, *was free from the intermixture of error*. They did not know all things, but what they did know they received from him who did know all things, and who communicated to them nothing but infallible truth. Their knowledge, therefore, on all points on which a revelation was made to them, was, as far as it was permitted to go, *true* knowledge. Though it might be partial and imperfect in point of fulness, it was com-

plete and perfect in point of truthfulness. I do not say that they would form no conjectures and draw no inferences in reference to points on which they had no revelation, and if they did, there can be no question but that such conjectures and inferences might be erroneous; all that I mean is, that there would be, in the knowledge *which they received from the Spirit*, nothing but pure truth. The Spirit was to lead and guide them into all truth—that is, I conceive, not *absolutely* into all truth, because that is impossible to man, but into all the truth which God saw it good to reveal to man—and into nothing but that truth.

If these views are correct, the question will arise, Whether the apostles, in teaching the gospel *either* orally or by their writings, would add any of their own conjectures or inferences to the truths which they received from above? We have, I reply, the following reasons for believing they would not:—First, we cannot suppose—seeing their doing so is shown, by the *à priori* argument already adverted to, to be partially, at least, destructive of the purpose of God in making them the medium of communication to men—that if they had done so, God would continue to bear witness to their ministry by miracles, without in some other way providing against the evil. Secondly, we have on record their own views with regard to such perversions of the gospel. Certain Judaizing teachers *added* their own notions to the gospel preached by the apostles, and accordingly taught that Gentiles must embrace Judaism, or they could not be saved by Christ; but Paul, in allusion to them, not only declared that the gospel which he preached was “*not after men*”—that is, as I conceive, ‘*not at all after*

men, had no such human additions by which the truth was perverted,'* but also that whoever preached a gospel other than he preached, that is, any gospel which had such additions of men, or was otherwise altered from what had been communicated from heaven, was accursed. These words found in the book of the Revelation moreover teach us what, according to apostolic testimony, is the mind and will of God in reference to anything added to, or subtracted from, a communication which he makes: "If any man shall add unto the words of the prophecy of this book, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book; and if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and from the things which are written in this book."

We have thus all the evidence in favour of the inspiration of the apostolic writings of the New Testament Scriptures which we previously showed to be requisite to render them authoritative. We proved that verbal inspiration was not essential, and, with a few exceptions, we have, I think, no evidence of verbal inspiration; on the contrary, internal evidence that the writers were, in many cases, not verbally inspired. I do not refer here to the peculiarities of style found in their writings, because on the theory of verbal inspiration such peculiarities might be accounted for by the supposition that the Holy Spirit adapted the language to the mental habits and peculiarities of the parties he inspired; but I may notice,—what appears to me unaccountable on the

* If it had been *at all* after men it would not have essentially differed from the gospel preached by Judaizing teachers.

theory of verbal inspiration,—the evident disregard on the part of the New Testament writers to the verbal accuracy of their quotations from the Old Testament; if the words had been inspired as well as the matter, the words would have essentially entered into what the Spirit had said, and hence a quotation could not be correct which disregarded the words; but if, on the other hand, it was the matter, and simply the matter, which was inspired, the correctness of the quotation would depend on the matter merely, and be irrespective of the words. Similar remarks might be made as to the indifference shown by the evangelists to verbal accuracy in the report they give us of the discourses of Christ, as witnessed by the verbal differences observable in their reports of the same discourse.

I cannot leave the topic of verbal inspiration without noticing the phraseology used to designate it by those who hold that inspiration consists in the elevation of the intuitional power. The theory of verbal inspiration they call "*Mechanical*," because it reduces, they say, the writers to mere tools or instruments; and they name their own theory "*Dynamical*," because it supposes inspiration to give to the mind extraordinary power and susceptibility.

But let me ask whether, when the term "*Mechanical*" is used, in distinction from "*Dynamical*," it is meant to denote that no communication was made to the understanding of the party, and that his mind was therefore necessarily unbenefited; for if so, the term "*Mechanical*" is not necessarily applicable to the theory of verbal inspiration. Verbal inspiration is possible, even if all inspiration is supposed impossible in which

no intelligible communication is made to the mind of the prophet, and therefore no communication but what would have some dynamical influence on his mind. Hence, verbal inspiration appears to me to be incorrectly regarded as *in its own nature* mechanical and non-dynamical. I admit that there may be cases in which verbal inspiration may convey a message which the prophet does not understand. It is said, indeed, that such verbal inspiration is no inspiration at all; but this is merely said on the authority of a definition, which, as we have shown, erroneously confines inspiration to the elevation of the intuitional faculty. That instances have actually occurred, is evident from the history of prophetic inspiration. Thus Daniel had a communication, of which he himself testifies, "I heard, but I understood not:" and the Old Testament prophets generally had communications, of the meaning of which they had but a very imperfect notion. "They searched," we are told, "what and what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow; but to them it was revealed that *not unto themselves*, but unto us (*who live in New Testament times*), they did minister the things which are now reported unto us by them that have preached the gospel unto us, with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven." In all cases such as these, it is evident that either verbal inspiration, or the symbolical language of vision, is essentially necessary. At the same time, there may be cases of verbal inspiration when the prophet does understand, and if so, the term "*mechanical*" is inappropriately applied to the theory which makes *all* inspiration verbal, provided at

least the term is meant to denote a species of inspiration which does not reach the intelligence of the party.

I have another objection. The advocates of what is called 'The Dynamical Theory' use phraseology which implies that the *Mechanical and Dynamical* include every theory of inspiration. If, however, the term "*Dynamical*" is confined, as the parties referred to confine it, to the inspiration which elevates the intuitional faculty, and the term "*Mechanical*" to verbal inspiration, every conceivable mode of inspiration is not included, for we have shown an inspiration to be possible which makes a communication to the intellect, independently both of intuition and of language, and such an inspiration would come under neither category. If, indeed, every supernatural communication made in any way except through the medium of intuition is called "*mechanical*," without it being intended to be implied that the prophet is necessarily an unintelligent instrument, we should, in such a case, whilst we might regard the word "*mechanical*" as ill-chosen, have no dispute, except about the name. But if by the term "*mechanical*," when applied to the inspiration of a prophet, is meant, that he is used as a mere machine, I deny that these are the only two modes of inspiration: the prophets are not treated as machines, but as intelligent beings, if they are commissioned to make known to others truths which have been first imparted to their own intelligence, although the communications may have been made to them in some other way than by a presentation to their intuitional faculty. Especially is it untrue that they are treated as mere machines if, the communication having been made to their intelligence, they are left to impart it to others in their own language.

We come, then, to the following conclusions with regard to the apostolic writings of the New Testament : —First, that they are written by inspired men, that is, men who have received supernatural communications from God in regard to Christ and Christianity. —Secondly, that the men by whom they were written have not corrupted the communications so received by any additions, inventions, or conjectures of their own. —Thirdly, that this does not imply that they have written nothing of their own, provided that it is extraneous to Christian teaching, therefore out of the limit of their claim to inspiration, and hence could not be mistaken for the teaching of God without wilful inattention ; nor does it imply that they have not clothed Divine revelations in their own language, and divinely-suggested arguments in their own forms of reasoning.

We must, however, add a few words in reference to the Gospels of Mark and Luke, and to the Acts of the Apostles. These, it is admitted, were not written, at least immediately, by apostles. Are they, then, to be rejected either as therefore undoubtedly written by uninspired men, or at least by men of whose inspiration we have insufficient proof? That Mark and Luke are not undoubtedly uninspired merely because they were non-apostolic men, appears from the unquestionable fact, that neither supernatural gifts nor supernatural revelations were, in the first age of the church, confined to the apostles. There was an order of men in apostolic days, distinct from apostles, who, like the Old Testament prophets, spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost ; and we have no evidence that Mark and Luke were not of this order. Some, indeed, have asserted that Luke disclaims inspiration, because, they say, he affirms, that

what he wrote was in accordance with what had been delivered by those who, "from the beginning, were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word." But let me remark, first, that the statement of Luke, if examined, will not be found to have a *necessary* reference to the source whence he received his information. It merely affirms the accordance of the various narratives, which exhibited the belief of Christians in regard to the life and ministry of Christ, with the testimony of apostolic eye-witnesses. Accordingly, the words of Luke may be thus paraphrased:—'Forasmuch as many have taken in hand to set forth in order a declaration of those things which are most surely believed amongst us, and have done so in exact accordance with apostolic teaching, and therefore not as indicating that apostolic teaching had only done this imperfectly, and that it could be better done than the apostles did it, but simply as putting into writing and form the very same things which they had set forth in their preaching,—even as they delivered them unto us, who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word, it seemed good to me also,' &c. If this be the meaning of the evangelist, there seem to be two reasons for the statement he makes, one, to point out why the narratives to which he refers should be regarded as credible, viz., that they accorded with apostolic teaching: another, to show that they were not intended to throw any reflection on that teaching, as though it were imperfect, and hence needed to be superseded by something better; if what they detailed accorded with what had been delivered by the apostles, it could not have been their object to attempt any improvement on apostolic teaching. Whether, however, my interpretation be admitted or not, Luke does not affirm

that the narratives spoken of were directly received from the apostles, though even if he had, it must be remembered that his own narrative is not included in the same category. I remark, secondly, that Luke represents the reason why he added himself to the number of those who had already written narratives of the kind referred to, to be, not that *he had received the information from eye-witnesses, but that he had "had perfect understanding of all things from the very first."* This perfect understanding might, for anything he says to the contrary, have been received by inspiration; and if the term *ανωθεν* may be translated, as some have rendered it, "*from above,*" he goes further, and explicitly declares inspiration to have been the source of his knowledge, though on this I lay no stress. But I further remark, thirdly, that even if Luke is to be understood as implying that his narrative was confirmed by apostolic testimony, it would not prove that he did not receive it by inspiration: for Paul, although he had supernatural evidence of the resurrection of Christ, and although he preached it as a fact divinely revealed to himself, was not, when he wrote, prevented from appealing to the testimony of eye-witnesses; thus, in proof of the resurrection of his Lord, he says, that "he was seen of Cephas, then of the twelve, and after that of above five hundred brethren at once; of whom the greater part remain unto the present time, but some are fallen asleep."

Not only, however, is there no proof that Mark and Luke were uninspired, there is probable evidence to the contrary; for, first, we learn that their narratives were received from the earliest date amongst the inspired books; but if so, as Mark and Luke were known in the

early church, and Christians were soon very jealous in reference to their sacred books, we cannot believe that the narratives written by these evangelists would have been so early, universally and unhesitatingly admitted, had there been no satisfactory evidence of their Divine authority. Secondly, if we compare the Gospels of Mark and Luke with that of Matthew, we find no internal characteristics which so distinguish between them as to warrant the conclusion that the former are inferior to the latter, or that Matthew partook of an inspiration of which Mark and Luke were destitute; this evidence, I may add, is the stronger, because of the marked differences in all other cases between apostolic and early uninspired Christian books. Still, thirdly, suppose this evidence be thought inadequate, it must be remembered that the writings of Mark and Luke are simply historical, and hence that, provided they are correct records, they derive authority, independently of their writers, from the parties whose acts and discourses are detailed; if so, as the chief end of the evidence of inspiration in such a case is to satisfy us of the historical accuracy of the record, we have, in reality, all the evidence necessary, if Mark and Luke did—what they not only had ample opportunity to do, but what tradition tells us they did (and provided they were uninspired, they undoubtedly must have done,)—derive their materials from the inspired testimony of the apostles. If, being uninspired, they had not done so, their narratives would not have had apostolic approval: and as they were published in apostolic days, they would not, if unsanctioned by the apostles, have been received in the church whilst the apostles lived: if, however, they had been rejected by the Christians of the first century, it

would not only have been difficult to have introduced them to the reception of the church afterwards, but it would have been utterly impossible to have done so without objections being raised, which would any way have prevented their universal reception.

Such, I conceive, is the nature, extent and evidence of the inspiration of the New Testament. As, however, the Divine authority of the sacred books is so very important a topic, and especially in the present day, allow me, before closing the present lecture, briefly to notice a few of the principal objections which have been urged against its plenary inspiration.

The first objection is founded on internal evidence. It is said that whilst, if the New Testament is plenary inspired, its writers could make no mistakes in their teaching, especially concerning Christ and his gospel; they not only have made mistakes in science, in minor facts, and in logical reasoning, but in important doctrines. Now, I do not admit that they have made any scientific mistakes, though if they had, the theory of inspiration which we have advocated would be untouched; we have not contended that they were inspired in reference to science. Neither do I admit that they have made mistakes as to minor and unimportant facts,—by which I mean facts which, whether true or false, make no alteration in the Christian instruction communicated,—though if they had, our theory of inspiration would remain untouched; we have not contended that they were inspired in reference to such details, but merely in reference to the great facts, doctrines, and duties of Christianity, *and only to details so far as they affect such doctrines, facts and duties.* Nor do I admit that they have made mistakes as to the form into which their rea-

soning is thrown, though if they had, it does not affect their inspiration, as we have explained and advocated it; we have allowed that, if arguments were divinely suggested, the writers might have been left to themselves in reference to the form in which such arguments should be exhibited. If, however, they have made any mistakes in reference to the great facts, doctrines, or duties of Christianity, our theory falls to the ground. Only one such mistake is alleged, excepting in reference to truths where mistake is only conjectured, not proved. This one has been so frequently noticed, that it is scarcely necessary to refer to it again. "Peter," we are told, "reasoned very perversely about the circumcision, and Paul at once vanquished him in argument and reproved him for his error." But is not the mistake here in the objector? We learn from Scripture, not that Peter *reasoned*, but that he *acted* perversely, not that Paul *vanquished him in argument*, but that he *reproved him for his misconduct*. That Peter was blameworthy, I do not deny; but I do deny most strenuously that a revelation from heaven which is sufficient to prevent error in doctrine, is therefore sufficient to prevent error in practice.

A second objection to the plenary inspiration of the New Testament is, that it involves a like inspiration of the Old Testament, and therefore involves the Divine origin of what is called its defective morality. I allow that whatever be the theory of inspiration adopted for the New Testament, it must equally apply to both Testaments. We have no proof that the inspiration of the apostles differed in kind from that of the Old Testament prophets, or that the New Testament is the product of one kind of inspiration, and the Old Testa-

ment the product of another kind. But I deny that the Old Testament does inculcate a defective morality ; it records indeed defects in the character and conduct of eminent saints, but the *record of defects is essentially different from the inculcation of them*. Instances, indeed, are alleged of acts said to be in their own nature immoral, which according to the Old Testament were enjoined by God ; for example, *the command to Abraham to put Isaac to death*. I deny, however, that this act *when enjoined by God* was evil ; man has no right over the life of a fellow man, but the Author of life has a natural right over it, and hence, without any moral evil can take it away when and how he pleases ; but if, without moral evil, God can when and how he pleases take away life, he can without moral evil take away the life of one by the instrumentality of another, and if so it ceases to be a moral evil to take it away if he commands it. When, then, God enjoined Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, it ceased to be morally evil in Abraham to put him to death. God did not command what was morally evil.

But it is said that a defective morality is breathed in those Psalms which imprecate curses on the enemies of the writer, a morality so defective as to destroy the possibility of a Divine origin ; but let me reply that, *on the supposition that the Psalms are inspired*, the enemies referred to are not the personal enemies of the writer, but the enemies of the reign and kingdom of Christ, whose downfall may, in accordance with the sublimest morality, be the object of supplication to God.

Parties sometimes speak of the morality suited to the Old Testament Dispensation as one essentially inferior to the morality of the Gospel. If it be meant that the morality actually attained under that dispensation was

inferior to what ought to be attained under a dispensation of greater privileges, I admit it; if it be meant that there was not the *full* moral light revealed then which is revealed in the Gospel, I admit it; but if it be meant that there was anything enjoined which was *essentially evil*, anything which was *essentially defective in its morality*, I affirm that nothing of the kind has ever been proved. The moral and spiritual light of the New Testament is greater than that of the Old; but the light of the Old was pure and perfect as far as it went; and this, let me add, is all that can be said of the fuller light of the New. The supposed defective morality of the Old Testament is, therefore, no valid objection to the theory of inspiration which I have advocated.

But it is objected to this theory, thirdly, "that an authoritative external revelation of *moral and spiritual truth* is essentially impossible to man." These are the words of Newman, and his argument is this—that before an external revelation could be authoritative we must have independent means of ascertaining that God knows the truth, and is disposed to tell it us; but we cannot ascertain this without previously knowing that he has virtues similar in kind to human virtues, and hence, as the authority of a book-revelation is dependent on this previous knowledge, it is impossible for such authority to alter the foundation on which that knowledge rests, and therefore for it to dictate any new laws of human virtue, or indeed in any way to change our *à priori* views of the Divine character. To this argument I reply, first, that even if it was sound, it would not prove that there could not be an authoritative external revelation of truths which would be the means of awakening our moral and spiritual sensibility more

perfectly than it could otherwise be awakened; and if there could, a book-revelation of such truths would be of the greatest value to man. But I maintain, secondly, that the argument is not sound. It does not prove that there can be no authoritative external revelation *at all* in reference to moral and spiritual truth; the utmost it proves is, that such a revelation could not *authoritatively* reveal any moral and religious truth *which is in opposition to the knowledge on which the evidence of its authority is founded*. Except, then, *that* knowledge comprehends all moral and spiritual truth, there may be truth authoritatively revealed which is not in opposition to, but only in extension of, previous knowledge.

Fourthly. It is objected to the theory of inspiration we have advocated, that it exalts the letter above the spirit. The outward revelation is by the objector called the letter of truth, whilst the inward experience is called the spirit. Now "the letter (we are told) can never serve as a standard for the spirit, because the two are incommensurable." (Morell.) But allow me to observe that the term "letter" cannot be appropriately applied to an objective revelation in contrast to a subjective experience. The terms "letter" and "spirit" are used in Scripture to distinguish between the shadow and the substance—the law being called "letter," because a shadow, a mere figure, form, emblem, of great truths—and the gospel "substance," because in it we find the reality of what was shadowed forth in the law. But objective revelation does not stand in a similar relation to subjective Christian experience; it is not a mere outward shadow of such experience, but is the source, instrumentally at least, whence the experience arises. It may, perhaps, be said, that if the Word describes Chris-

tian experience, it must shadow it forth. I allow that there are parts of the New Testament in which the writers detail their experience; but let me remark, first, that such parts form but a very small proportion of the whole, and secondly, that such parts, if a shadow, may yet be intended as a standard by which Christians may measure their own experience; any way the two are not incommensurable.

We may, indeed, speak of the letter of the Word, in distinction from the substance; but here we apply *both* terms to the objective revelation—the letter being the form of expression, and the spirit the thing expressed. We may also apply the terms *letter* and *spirit* to religion; *letter*, to the outward form of religion, and *spirit*, to the inward reality. But if we apply the terms *letter* and *spirit*, as is done in the objection, to an objective revelation and an inward experience, we apply the terms to two things which, for the most part, do not at all stand to each other in the relation of *form* and *reality*. If, indeed, any substitute a cold, lifeless belief in an external revelation for inward experimental religion, I would admit that their religion is a form, a letter, without substance, without spirit: but an external revelation, it must be remembered, is one thing, and a cold, heartless belief in it another. Hence, we are not to call the former a mere letter, because the latter may be justly so denominated. The two things, then—an objective revelation, and a subjective experience of religion—do not stand to each other in the relation of letter and spirit. There is the letter, and there is the spirit of the objective revelation, and there is also the letter and the spirit of subjective experience.

But do we not, it is asked, call the two what we may,

exalt, by our theory of inspiration, the objective revelation above the subjective experience? If it be meant that we make the former more important to us than the latter, I deny it. The two, if our theory is correct, are equally important. We must have the objective revelation, or we could not have the subjective experience; and if we have not the subjective experience, the objective revelation will have been (not in itself, not in its own nature, but yet in relation to us) utterly useless.

Fifthly. It is further objected to our theory of inspiration that it gives a low view of the spiritual and moral value of inspiration. If inspiration be the elevation of the moral and spiritual nature, we shall, it is said, have a high idea of the spiritual enlightenment of the apostles and other inspired men; but if it be simply a communication which may possibly be unconnected with any spiritual influence on the heart, we cannot think the same of its spiritual and moral value. This, however, is no valid objection. Scripture distinguishes between gifts and grace, and we ought to distinguish between them. A man may have, in the words of Paul, *the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge*, as well as have all the faith implied in the working of miracles so as to be able to remove mountains, and yet be without that love which is the essence of inward, spiritual religion. That inspiration does not, in its own nature, involve any influence on the spiritual and moral nature, is evident from the fact that bad men, *who have continued to be bad men*, have been inspired. I need only refer to the case of Balaam, who spake the words which God put into his mouth, but whose heart evidently remained "in the gall of bitterness, and the bond of iniquity." We believe the prophets and the apos-

ties to have been generally holy men, but they were holy not because they received the Spirit of inspiration, but because they received what was far more important, in a spiritual and moral point of view—"the spirit of grace, and the spirit of supplication." This spirit may be equally obtained by all Christians; they all may receive the richest influences from above for sanctifying their hearts, and drawing them nearer to their Lord: but the Spirit of inspiration is given only on extraordinary occasions, and given, not for the benefit of the individual, but for the benefit of the whole church.

There is still one other objection to the theory of inspiration we have advocated—it is said that it does not account for the necessity of the influences of the Spirit to understand the word. If inspiration consist in an elevation of the intuitional faculty, so as to enable it to perceive supersensual realities otherwise beyond its vision, there must, undoubtedly, be a like inspiration in the mind of another, before the revelation could possibly be communicated to him; but if inspiration consist in some communication to the mind which involves no new intuition, why, it is asked, can any spiritual influences be necessary in order to its being received? Let me observe, in reply, that spiritual influences are not necessary in order that the truths of revelation may be *theoretically* understood, or there would be no such thing possible as what has been called "a dry, barren orthodoxy." The reason why they are necessary is, that the heart may be made to sympathize with the truth when it is theoretically understood—that thus it may be received into the heart, and become the living, practical experience of the soul. No doubt that where it is thus received the inward experience will be a means of addi-

tional light to the understanding, and that, therefore, the word will be better understood than before; but this is an *indirect*, not the *direct*, effect of the Spirit's agency.

We do not contend for a dead orthodoxy, but we do contend for the reception, both into the intellect and into the heart, of that objective revelation which is the instrument of God for raising us up from spiritual death to a life of righteousness.

I have now done. I have endeavoured to show the connexion between Psychology on the one hand, and Religion, Natural Theology, and Revelation, on the other; and, with the help derived from Psychology, to discuss important and controverted questions in relation to the latter topics.

I have to thank those who have favoured me with their attendance for the kind attention with which I have been honoured. May we all receive the Spirit of God; may we know the truth, and experimentally find that the truth makes us free!

APPENDIX.

A.

PSYCHOLOGY.

THE principal controversies which have arisen amongst psychological philosophers refer either to the perception of external phenomena or to the cognizance of the metaphenomenal.*

In reference to the perception of external phenomena, several questions have been discussed. It has been disputed, first, whether what we call external phenomena have any other than a subjective existence. Those who think that they have not, are named 'Idealists.' Of this class was the late Bishop Berkeley. The qualities of matter had been divided into two classes, primary and secondary; the primary including those which, although supposed to be only mediately cognizable by the mind, were yet supposed to be cognizable *as they actually existed in the objective reality*; and the secondary, those occult qualities whose existence was only inferable from the effects supposed to be produced by them on the sentient mind. What the mind cognizes in reference to secondary qualities was thus admitted to have only a subjective existence, and *that* an existence to which the objective reality has no possible correspondence of nature. But if what we directly cognize in reference to secondary qualities has no corresponding objective reality, what we directly cognize in reference to primary qualities can, argues Berkeley, only have a

* By the metaphenomenal is meant that which underlies phenomena.

subjective existence, for primary qualities—extension, figure, motion—are, he says, inconceivable, abstracted from secondary qualities; and hence, where the secondary qualities are,—namely, in the mind,—there the primary qualities must be. Thus far the reasoning of Berkeley was regarded by many as unanswerable; still it was maintained that what we immediately cognize in reference to primary qualities might have an objective counterpart; but to this he answered, that, if primary qualities have an objective existence, our ideas of them must resemble the objective reality; and hence, that, since an idea cannot possibly resemble anything but an idea, it is impossible that there should be a counterpart to any of our ideas which has any other than an ideal existence.

Berkeley's whole reasoning evidently depends on several questions; one, whether what we cognize in respect to secondary qualities has only a subjective existence; a second, whether anything so cognized is essential to the idea of a primary quality; and a third, whether, if anything merely subjective be essential to the idea, and therefore to the perception of any primary quality, it would necessarily follow that the primary quality immediately perceived has a subjective existence. A fourth question might indeed be asked, viz., whether it is impossible for that which has a subjective existence to have an objective counterpart; but this I do not touch, because, whether answered affirmatively or negatively, it would, if it could be proved that the immediate object of perception is subjective, be very difficult, if not impossible, to show that the subjective object has, *as a matter of fact*, an objective counterpart. Independently, however, of this question, a due investigation of the three preceding ones will, I think, suffice to show the fallacy of Berkeley's idealism. I do not here examine the first, as I shall have occasion to give my views in reference to secondary qualities in an after part of this article. But suppose, for the sake of argument, we allow Berkeley an affirmative reply to it, would it apply to colour which is, I apprehend, the secondary quality he would regard essential to the idea of a primary one? Is, I ask, colour necessarily something subjective? Is it not rather, if at least primary qualities are objective, a certain relation which the

rays of light falling on them cause them to sustain to my organ of vision? If so, colour cannot be *assumed* as subjective in order to prove the subjectivity of primary qualities. Let us, however, even grant that colour has only a subjective existence, and might it not be simply a subjective condition of perception? If so, would the existence of a subjective condition of perception, or the existence of what is called a form of thought, of itself necessarily imply that there can be no objectively derived matter of thought? If not, Berkeley's reasoning is invalid. The invalidity of his reasoning was, however, not so evident as long as it was generally admitted that the perception of external objects was only mediate.

And this leads me to notice the second point of controversy, viz., whether our perception of external phenomena is mediate or immediate. Those who believe that it is mediate are called 'REPRESENTATIONISTS,' because they hold that the mind does not immediately grasp the external object, but simply a subjective representation of it. The only argument in favour of this doctrine is an assumption, for which there is not a shadow of proof, that it is impossible for the immaterial mind *immediately* to grasp a material body. Nor, if we admit the assumption, will the doctrine account for perception; for, let us suppose that the immediate object of perception is something representative, it must then be either a mode of mind or something distinct from mind. If the latter, it is either material or immaterial. Let it first be supposed to be material, and if it is impossible for the immaterial mind to grasp a material body, it would be equally impossible for it to grasp a material representative idea. Let it, then, secondly, be supposed to be immaterial, and I ask, by what power is the immaterial representative idea formed? If we suppose it formed by the objective reality, we not only give an active power to matter, but give it the power of creating something essentially differing in nature from itself; and if we suppose it formed by the mind, we give the mind the power (*presumed to be impossible to it*) of immediately grasping the material body, since otherwise it could not possibly make an idea representative of such body. We conclude, then, that the doctrine of a representative idea does not account for the existence of that idea if it is supposed to be dis-

inct from mind. Is it then possibly a mode of mind? If it be, I ask, by what power is this mode of mind produced? If it be said, by the power of the mind, I answer, that the mind cannot conform a mode of mind to some objective reality without grasping that reality, and this by the assumption is impossible. If it be said, by the power of the objective reality, I ask, how can a material substance have active power? and, besides, is there not as much difficulty in the supposition that matter can act on mind as in the supposition that mind can grasp matter? Accordingly, we think that the doctrine of representationism is not only incapable of proof, but that even if the assumption on which it is founded was granted, the existence of the representative idea would not be accounted for. Moreover, if the immediate object of consciousness is something subjective, what evidence could we have that this something actually represents an objective reality, and proves its existence? Except the mind is supposed to know this by a direct revelation from God, I cannot conceive how it could know it at all. Not only, however, have we no consciousness of any such revelation, our consciousness does not even tell us that the *immediate* object of perception is representative: so far as the testimony of consciousness goes, we have no cognizance at all of any other than the immediate object.

A third question, in reference to the perception of external phenomena, respects the distinction between sensation and perception.

Reid believed that our senses furnish us, in reference to both primary and secondary qualities, with sensations and perceptions. A sensation is, according to him, an affection produced by external phenomena in the mind, and hence can only have a subjective existence. But, together with every sensation, there is excited a conception or notion of an external object, which is the cause of it; this conception or notion is accompanied with an irresistible and immediate conviction of its existence, and it is called by Reid 'Perception.' The perception of primary qualities is, he says, direct, of secondary indirect.

Sir Wm. Hamilton's doctrine differs from Reid's. He believes that the sensual organism may be viewed in two aspects—one, as

animated and belonging to self—the other, as a material structure belonging to the body, and therefore objective to the mind. Accordingly, whenever the presence of an external object produces an affection of the sensual organism, the affection is twofold ;—for the organism *as animated* is affected, and it is at the same time affected *as a material structure*. Hence, as the attention of the mind may be directed to any affection of the sensual organism in both these aspects, a double experience may follow ; one of these is a feeling, viz., the experience of the affection of the organism as animated and subjective—and this Hamilton calls ‘sensation’ ; the other is an intuition of the affection of the organism as an objective material structure, and this he considers ‘perception’.

Intimately connected with the distinction between sensation and perception is the division of the qualities of bodies into primary and secondary, and hence I may here remark, that Sir Wm. Hamilton has made a threefold division. Primary qualities are, he says, those which occupy space, or are contained in space ; these are the objects of perception, being perceived by the mind in its sensual organism considered as a material structure. Secondary qualities are the affections produced in our sensual organism as animated and subjective. But there is, he says, a third class, which he calls secundo-primary ; it consists of those subjective affections which are themselves secondary qualities, but yet suppose the primary : they are all contained under the category of resistance, which, being opposed to displacement, supposes space and motion in space, and therefore supposes primary qualities ; but being as to its mode a subjective feeling, is itself secondary.

With regard to the metaphenomenal,—another important topic of controversy,—it has been disputed whether the knowledge of it is possible to man ; if possible, whether it be immediately acquired by direct intuition, be received by a revelation from God, or be mediately acquired by the exercise of the powers of the understanding on knowledge empirically attained.

Those who hold that the knowledge of the metaphenomenal is impossible to man, belong to what is called ‘the sceptical school of philosophy.’ They maintain that we neither have nor can have any knowledge of what underlies phenomena—that our

knowledge is by the constitution of our nature necessarily confined to the phenomenal. "To aspire to the knowledge of more than phenomena (writes a philosopher of this school), their resemblances and successions, is to aspire to transcend the limitations of human faculties. To know more we must be more."

Where, however, it is allowed that some knowledge of the metaphenomenal is attainable, it is disputed how it is acquired. Those who hold that we have a direct and immediate cognizance of the objective reality, are called intuitionists, because they believe in what is called a 'higher intuition,'—the intuition of the metaphenomenal.

Of those who believe that the knowledge is received by a Divine revelation, some suppose that God has, in the original constitution of our minds, implanted metaphenomenal ideas; and others that his presence is manifested in us in an impersonal power called 'Reason,' which, acting spontaneously, gives us the ideas in question. The former believe in what is called '*the doctrine of Innate Ideas*,' the latter in '*the doctrine of an Impersonal Reason*.'

Those who think that all our knowledge of the metaphenomenal is indirect and mediate, attribute it, first, to the knowledge we empirically gain of the phenomenal; and, secondly, to the exercise of our powers of understanding, or of what Mr. Morell calls 'the Logical Consciousness,' on our knowledge of phenomena.

Such are some of the principal controversies which have arisen amongst students of psychology. I will briefly state my own views. The human mind, I conceive, consists of powers and susceptibilities. Its powers may be divided into two classes, 'Intuitional' and 'Productive.' The intuitional powers may be subdivided into 'direct' and 'indirect.' A direct intuitional power immediately grasps the object of intuition; the mind is brought face to face with the object. I conceive, however, that nothing can be thus grasped by the human mind but phenomena objective or subjective; and, accordingly, that 'direct' intuition has reference simply to phenomena objective to the mind, and to phenomena within it. The phenomena objective to the mind are presented to the intuitional power by means of the senses. External objects bear certain relations to our sensual organs, and

hence, whenever they come within reach of our sensual organism, an effect is produced upon it, by means of which the relations between the objects and the organism are presented to the mind. The immediate object, however, of its perception is not, in reference at least to primary qualities of body, the effect produced on the organism, but that relation of the external object to the organism which, by the effect produced upon it, as, so to speak, by a window, is itself presented to the mind. The organism I regard as simply corporeal, and, therefore, as wholly objective; the effect, therefore, produced on the organism is simply corporeal. The organism is, however, naturally adapted to receive a certain effect, and hence there may be an effect in accordance with such adaptation, or one not in accordance with it. In the latter case, the effect may be calculated to disorder it. Now, as a connection exists between the mind and the bodily organism which we cannot explain, there is a sympathy between the mind and the organism, and, hence, if an effect is produced on the organism which it is naturally adapted to receive, the mind, sympathizing with the organism, has pleasure in the effect produced; but if, on the other hand, an effect is produced calculated to disorder the organ, the mind sympathizing with it experiences pain. I have said, that the immediate object of perception, so far as the primary qualities of body are concerned, is the relation borne by external objects to the organism, and not the effect produced on the organism. The effect, however, may, also, itself in some cases be an object of perception, and I conceive that it is so in reference to the secondary qualities of matter; thus, if I perceive sweetness, I perceive an effect produced by an external object on my organism, and to that perception, in conjunction with the mental feeling produced by the sympathy of the mind with its bodily organism, I give the name of sweetness.

It will be perceived that I do not fully agree with the 'presentationism' of Sir Wm. Hamilton. He makes *the effect* on the organism the *immediate* object of the intuition in the case of primary qualities; but let me remark, that if consciousness is rightly appealed to in support of presentationism, its whole testimony ought to be received, and that that carries us to a

presentationism of primary qualities beyond any mere effect on our organism. Thus, consciousness, if I look on a church, does not testify that I am simply looking on an effect existing in my organism, but on something external to my organism, though sustaining a certain relation to it.

I believe that we thus have a *direct* intuition of external phenomena; that we have, in like manner, a direct intuition of internal phenomena; and that we also, in the way explained in the lectures, (see page 201,) by the exercise of judgment, have a direct intuition of phenomenal relations. Those who read the preceding course of lectures will perceive that I entirely disbelieve in any direct intuition of the metaphenomenal. Whilst I believe that we have indirect knowledge of it, I have shown how that knowledge is empirically acquired.

So much for our powers of direct intuition, but we have also a power of indirect or mediate intuition. I have just said that judgment is the power by which we perceive relations *immediately*; but we perceive relations not only by judgment, but also by means of reasoning. The 'power of reasoning' is the faculty which enables us, by means of a third idea, to perceive relations which are not immediately objects of intuition. This power, therefore, I would call the faculty of indirect or *mediate intuition*.

We, however, have not only intuitional, but also productive powers. By productive powers, I mean the powers of producing subjective objects of intuition; thus, if I call to mind a beautiful prospect, I not only have an intuition of a subjective phenomenon, but am myself its producing cause. The powers by which we produce the subjective phenomena, of which we are intuitionally conscious, are generically two; first, the power of reproducing a former object of thought; and, secondly, the power of producing a new object of thought. The power of reproducing a former object of thought can only be exercised by means of some existing object of thought to which it bears some kind of relation, essential or accidental. The power of producing a new object of thought is of different kinds. Thus there is the power of producing abstract ideas; this arises from the faculty of judgment already alluded to, by which the relations existing between objects of

thought as wholes and their different parts are perceived, and also from the power we have of attending to any of these parts abstracted from their relations to other parts, and to the whole. We have, in like manner, the power of producing general ideas—a power which arises from the faculty of judgment, by which we perceive an agreement between two or more objects in one or more particulars, and from the power we have of attending to such points of agreement abstracted from all other characteristics of the objects. We have, moreover, the power of producing new wholes out of abstract ideas, a power which arises from the power already referred to of reproducing a number of abstract ideas from different objects, and from perceiving by the faculty of judgment the relations which they would sustain if put together.

If we be required to name these powers, I would, after the example of others, call the power of reproducing former objects of thought, '*the power of suggestion*,' or that '*of the association of ideas*;' and I would call the power of producing abstract ideas, '*the power of abstraction*;' the power of producing general ideas, '*the power of generalization*;' the power of producing new wholes, after Sir William Hamilton, '*the power of imagination*,' if the wholes be thought as material; and '*of conception*,' if they be thought as intellectual.

Such is a general view of the powers of the mind; the will controls the exercise of them, it being the power which the mind has over all its actions.

But the mind is endowed with susceptibility as well as with intellectual power. It is susceptible of pleasure and pain. It experiences pleasure or pain, as I have already said, in consequence of its sympathy with the material organism, in the adaptation to its constitution, or the contrary, of any effect produced upon it by an external object; it also experiences pleasure in the appropriate exercise of its different faculties, and, because this is pleasurable, it experiences pleasure in whatever gives opportunity for their appropriate exercise; and, therefore, in the acquisition of knowledge, and especially of ideas which stimulate to mental action. After experience has taught the mind what produces pleasure or pain, it learns to desire the one, and to dread the other; the as-

sociation of the one with pleasure leads the mind to regard it with complacency, and the association of the other with pain leads it to regard it with dislike. We might go on to show how all the desires and passions of the mind thus arise. But, as our object is simply to give a sufficient view of psychology to render the preceding lectures intelligible, we add nothing further.

B.

ETHICS.

Perhaps no science has exhibited greater diversity of opinion than Ethics. Different systems of Ethics have, indeed, arisen from a diversity of stand point whence the science has been regarded; but, independently of this, there is scarcely any doctrine, directly or indirectly connected with the theory of virtue, which has not been the occasion of controversy.

Some deny that there is any *essential* difference between virtue and vice. Of these, some hold that the difference has been constituted by Divine will, others by human legislation, and others that it has arisen from expediency. Those who, on the other hand, believe that the difference is essential, are disagreed as to its ultimate foundation, some maintaining that the essential difference is perceived by a moral intuition, which, being like other intuitions an elementary idea, is incapable of explanation; others, that it is founded on the natural and eternal fitness of things; others again that it is founded on the necessity of the Divine nature; and a fourth class, that it is founded on utility.

Some philosophers have disregarded the question, whether there is any essential difference between virtue and vice, and have simply inquired how our ideas of virtue and vice originate. Some of them think that they are to be attributed to instinct, others either to the principles of self-love, and benevolence, or ultimately to the single principle of self-love, and others to the sympathies of our nature. This inquiry is not, however, confined to this school of philosophers, some of those previously referred

to having also pursued it: of these some have come to the conclusion that we derive our moral notions from an intuitive faculty, and others that they are empirically acquired.

The rule of virtue is another topic of controversy. Some regard reason, others conscience, others utility, and others the will of God, as the rule.

In the midst of these conflicting opinions, whilst each should form an independent judgment, there should be proper respect for the judgment of others, and a conviction that fallibility characterises our own conclusions, as well as those from which we differ. It is with this feeling that I very briefly express my own views of ethical science. Having had occasion to refer to them in the lectures, I consider it only just to myself to give a more systematic summary of them than the course of discussion in the lectures permitted. As it is unnecessary to repeat what has been already said, I must request my readers to turn to page 230 before perusing the following lines.

The reasons, which lead me to believe that the distinction between 'right' and 'wrong' is prior to, and therefore independent of will, are, First, that it cannot be supposed to be dependent on any will without pre-assuming that it is right to submit to the decisions of that will; but such pre-assumption implies a rightness which is prior to and independent of its decisions, for if there is no such prior rightness no will could make it right to submit to its own decisions. Secondly, to suppose it dependent on will nullifies the holiness and the wisdom of God:—his holiness, because it could then mean nothing but conformity to his own will, and this without moral excellency being *possibly* a prior characteristic of that will:—and his wisdom, because if, prior to a decision of his will, there is no excellency in 'rightness,' or 'virtue,' it supposes him to constitute rightness or virtue from mere caprice.

If, however, the distinction between 'right' and 'wrong' is prior to and independent of will, it is the foundation of our moral obligation to obey God; and hence, as duty can never transcend possible knowledge, it must be ascertainable by man.

Wherein, then, we ask, does this original distinction, this ulti-

mate foundation, consist? I answer, IN UTILITY. By 'utility' I do not simply mean the advantage resulting to the agent, nor do I simply mean the advantage resulting *immediately* to others as well as himself; but I include a consideration of the whole effect of feelings and actions on the individual himself and on all other beings, both at the time and to all future ages. And, when I say that this utility is the foundation of virtue, I mean that it is both its final cause* and its actual result:—its final cause, because, if a party has no regard, mediate or immediate, to the ultimate foundation of virtue, there can be no virtue in the principle from which his action proceeds;—and its actual result, because if the good intention of a party does not succeed, it arises either from physical incapacity, or from negligence or some other moral defect; in the former case, the virtuous feeling is possibly existent, but the virtuous act is beyond the reach of the party; and, in the latter case, the virtuous feeling is insufficiently strong to produce the full effort requisite to success. According to this theory, it is evident there may be degrees of virtue. In its highest degree (a virtue possible only to God), there is physical power

* The question may be asked whether it would not follow from this doctrine that nothing can be virtuous, except what is done from an *immediate* regard to utility. I reply, by no means. Suppose the principle of utility teaches me that I ought to obey God, and that consequently I adopt the principle of obedience to God, the adoption of the principle is evidently virtuous, and hence renders every act done in obedience to God virtuous. But does not this make obedience to God a secondary instead of the primary principle of virtue? So, I reply, must every other theory except that which makes the will of God the *ultimate* foundation of virtue; and this, we have already shown, would nullify both the holiness and the wisdom of God. When, however, obedience to God is made a secondary principle, it is not meant that it is secondary in point of time, secondary in its claims to our regard, or that it is possible that it should ever be set aside by the primary principle. It is not secondary in point of time, for we come into existence as subjects of the moral government of God; it is not secondary in its claims to our regard, for the primary principle requires a primary regard to the will of our Maker. Nor can it ever be set aside by utility; the two principles, indeed, cannot possibly come into collision, because God is necessarily morally perfect, and therefore is, if utility is the foundation of virtue, necessarily guided by it. Obedience to God is thus, then, the primary immediate foundation of *all human* virtue: all obedience to him is essentially virtuous; all disobedience, direct or indirect, essentially criminal.

to accomplish the highest good, and there is the full disposition to exert that power.

My reasons for holding such a view of the foundation of virtue are these :—

1st. It is generally allowed by moralists, even by those who reject the theory of utility, that there is a universal coincidence between virtue and utility. But if virtue universally has a particular characteristic, it would seem a probable inference that that characteristic enters into the essence of the virtue.

2nd. Some virtues are undoubtedly founded on utility. Thus, temperance would not be a virtue, if, instead of being beneficial to our bodily constitution, it was injurious to it. All such virtues can only be virtuous *because they are useful*. Take away their utility and their virtue would be destroyed. But if so, one of these three consequences must follow,—either virtue is universally founded on utility, or it has no common foundation, or its foundation is something which equally underlies utility and non-utility. We cannot however conceive of anything as equally underlying utility and non-utility, or of anything which would equally produce both results. Has then virtue no common foundation? It must have, if there be an essential distinction between virtue and vice; for, if not, suppose virtue to have no common foundation, but to have two or more different foundations, and suppose, therefore, X and Y to have no common characteristic, and yet to be both virtuous, it follows that there can be nothing essential to virtue in X, otherwise Y, which is by hypothesis without it, could not be virtuous; in like manner, there can be nothing essential to virtue in Y, otherwise X, which is by hypothesis without it, would not be virtuous; consequently, there is nothing essential to virtue either in X or Y, and therefore no essential distinction between virtue and vice. We are then shut up to the conclusion that if utility is the ultimate foundation of any virtues, it is the ultimate foundation of all.

3rd. All the theories of virtue are resolvable into utility, except the one which maintains that the objective reality is immediately perceived by a power of moral intuition, and is, therefore, an elementary idea incapable of explanation. Thus, if virtue is said to be

founded on the fitness of things, why, I ask, is the fitness of things virtuous? is it not because it is beneficial? Let it be other than beneficial; and it will be acknowledged that, in many cases at least, it would cease to be virtuous. If virtue is said to consist in following nature, it can only be so either because following nature is necessarily virtuous to every being, whatever his nature is; or, because God has so constituted our nature as to make following it to be virtuous to us. According to the first alternative, following nature can only be supposed to be necessarily virtuous on the supposition that it is necessarily beneficial, for, if it could be imagined to be injurious to a being and to those with whom he is connected for him to follow nature, following it would not any longer be maintained to be virtuous. According to the second alternative, God has so constituted our nature as to adapt it either to that which he had previously willed to be virtuous, or to that which is in its own nature virtuous: the former is inadmissible, if there be an essential difference between virtue and vice; and the latter supposes that following nature will conform us to the virtue founded on the essential distinction; and, if so, as it is allowed that following nature will be beneficial to ourselves and others, we are brought to the conclusion that that which is beneficial to ourselves and others is essentially virtuous. One or two other theories are shown in the sixth lecture to be likewise resolvable into utility. Whence we conclude that either utility is the foundation of virtue, or that virtue is perceived by the higher intuition. Our argument in the lectures has, I think, proved that we have no power of higher intuition; consequently utility must be the foundation of virtue.

I must, however, notice a few of the principal objections to this theory. One is, that it destroys the essential distinction between virtue and vice; the force of this objection arises from the fact that actions allowed to be vicious are sometimes productive of beneficial results. This objection, even if powerful against any theory of utility which simply took into consideration the consequences of actions, has no force in opposition to a theory which represents the utility as their final cause as well as their ultimate result.

A second objection is, that it destroys moral obligation. By moral obligation I understand the force of motive. Now if the theory of utility is true, a virtuous being is a being led by the virtuousness of his nature to promote the good of others. Such a being must be influenced by the principle of benevolence, and if he is so influenced, utility will itself be to him a moral obligation. But this is not the only moral obligation under which man, according to our theory, is placed. I have shown (page 237) how he is also under obligation to God. So far then from destroying moral obligation, man is, by the theory, placed under a double moral obligation.

A third objection is, that the doctrine of utility confounds two distinct things, *the nature of virtue*, and *its tendency*. This might be a ground of objection to that form of the doctrine which decides the virtue of an action simply by the utility of its actual results without taking into consideration its final cause; but it cannot be objected to that form of the doctrine which regards its utility in both these points of view. It cannot be maintained that an action could be pronounced virtuous independently of any of its relations. An action in the abstract—an action abstracted from all its relations—could not possibly be either virtuous or vicious. But if the relations of an action constitute it virtuous, its relations to its final cause and to its ultimate results cannot *a priori* be decided as the relations in which its virtue cannot possibly consist. Any way the supposition that they are the relations in which its virtue consists will not any more than any other possible supposition confound the nature and tendency of virtue.

A fourth objection to the theory of utility is, that it does not account for our immediate appreciation of the right and wrong in our actions or in the actions of others—in other words, for our feeling at once and without reasoning at all on the matter, that such and such an action is praiseworthy, and such and such an action censurable. It is argued that if the theory of utility was true we should first calculate the consequences of an action, and, only as the result of such calculation, regard it as worthy of praise or censure. Those, however, who urge this objection,

reason as though it were proved that the immediate appreciation spoken of is independent of previous experience. I do not believe that if we knew nothing previously of right and wrong, and if the peculiar nature of the action did not indicate it to be either beneficial or injurious, any action would excite in us the immediate appreciation referred to. After, indeed, experience has taught us that a certain class of actions will be in their results useful or injurious, and are, therefore, so far at least as our knowledge of results goes, good or evil, we naturally associate goodness or evil with them, and, hence, when we see any action of that class, we are led by the mental law of association to think of it at once as good or evil, and thus seem immediately to appreciate its rightness or wrongness: but there is no such appreciation experienced, nor anything resembling it, in reference to actions which are out of the reach of our previous experience. But we are asked, whether we are not here denying that man has a conscience which commends him when he does well, and reproves him when he does wrong? Certainly not: the question is, what is conscience? Is it an original faculty of the mind which teaches him what is right and what is wrong, or is it an emotion of pleasure or of pain excited by a conviction to which the mind by its powers of understanding has *previously* arrived in reference to any of its actions? I have already stated why I do not believe it to be the former; and if it is the latter, its existence is not denied by anything I have said above.

I must add a few words respecting the rule of virtue. Whilst I maintain that utility is its ultimate foundation, I do not regard utility as its only or indeed its chief rule, for two reasons;—first, that man is incapable of judging of the *whole* consequences of actions, and hence, that, if he would do the greatest good, he must submit to be guided by a more competent judge than himself; secondly, that utility, as we have already seen, requires man to obey God, and this irrespective of any cognizance of the particular utility of the command to which he is to yield obedience. If, however, utility be the ultimate foundation, it is, I allow, utility which must primarily decide the question as to the virtuousness of following the guidance of any other rule, and

therefore as to the original virtuousness of obedience to God. In cases where the will of God is not expressed, utility must also be the rule wherever it gives an *undoubted* decision; and, I may add, even where its decision is less certain, provided there is no other legitimate rule.

Still, the will of God is *THE RULE* on every point on which his will is expressed. That will may be gathered in two ways. In the first place, from the constitution of our nature. If, indeed, we had been unfallen, we might have learnt it more fully than it is possible to do from a disordered nature; but yet we may to some extent ascertain it, because we can distinguish between tendencies which must have originally belonged to our nature, and that undue strength or weakness which may result from a moral disorder in our constitution. Hence, our natural tendencies may be regarded as, partially at least, a Divine guide: in order, however, that we may not follow them unduly, we must ask how far a consideration of their relative position in our mental constitution, our own past experience, the history of our fellow men, and especially Scripture, teach us to control them. But, secondly, and most certainly, may the will of God be ascertained from his revealed word. That "word is a lamp unto our feet, and a light unto our path." "Through it we get understanding," and thus learn to "hate every false way."

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